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A. STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Petitioner/defendant Charles W. Webb was jury tried in Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya. He was convicted of a 
first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302(1978). 
On July 15, 1988 Judge James S. Sawaya sentenced petitioner to five 
years to life, and a mandatory one year for use of a firearm and 
discretionary five years for use of a firearm, each to run 
consecutively to the sentence of fives years to life. 
Petitioner Charles W. Webb was jointly tried with co-
defendant, John E. Humphrey. Co-defendant John E. Humphrey was 
charged with count (1) aggravated robbery, and count (2) aggravated 
assault, the petitioner Charles W. Webb was jointly tried. When 
the petitioner was only charged with count (1) aggravated robbery. 
Mr Webb appealed his conviction to The Supreme Court of The 
State of Utah Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (i) (Supp.1988). On May 2, 1989 pursuant to 
the authority vested in The Supreme Court of Utah, this case 
No.880283 was poured over to the Court of Appeals, now case No. 
890256-CA, the May 2, 1989, order appears in A-l. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed his conviction in an opinion for publication March 
26, 1990, and the case remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to impose a maximum five year firearm enhancement 
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t B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Karekine Karmilian, testified at the preliminary examination 
November 24, 1987, that on October 21, 1987, a man came into his 
store carrying a bag. He was in the backroom work area. He saw 
the suspect reach into the bag and pull out a shotgun. The man 
then told the victim to come out of the room. Mr. Karmilian went 
to the safe and took out two full drawers and put them into the bag 
the suspect was carrying. During direct examination (Pt.4) 
Prosecutor: O.K. about what time of day was it that you 
got robbed. 
Around 3:30 afternoon. 
How many robbers were there? 
One person. 
Could you please describe what that robber 
looked like? 
About 54 to 50 years old was it and with the 
beard glasses, hat, jacket. 
Do you remember anything that he might have 
been carrying? 
The Witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The Witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The Witness: 
Prosecutor: 
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The Witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The Witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
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The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness; 
Shotgun. 
Could you describe the shotgun? 
Well it was short, about this, (PT.5) 
Your Honor the witpess is indicating 
approximately 18 inches in length. 
Yes. 
What color was it? 
Oh it was rusty when I saw th€J, my English is 
not perfect but I can make it to telling what. 
(PT.6) And what about the wooden part of the 
shotgun, did you see what color that was? 
I don't think so. 
(PT.9) Now I would like you to think about 
the person who had the shotgun in your jewelry 
store that day. 
Uh huh. 
Do you think you would be able to recognize 
im again ifr you saw him? 
Yes. 
Is that person anywhere in this courtroom? 
Yes. 
Would you please tell us where that person is? 
That gentleman over there with the tattoo on 
Prosecutor: 
It may so indicate. 
his hand. 
Your Honor may the record reflect that the 
witnesses is indicating Mr Humphrey. 
Judge: 
Steven Lee Church, testified at the preliminary examination 
November 24, 1987, during direct examination (PT.40) 
Prosecutor: And can you describe that shot gun? 
It was a automatic pump shot gun 12 gauge, 
silver barrel with a wood stock. 
(PT.41) Had the shot gun been altered in 
anyway? 
It appeared to be shortened sir. 
(PT.43) If you were to see the person with 
the shot gun again do you think you would be 
able to recognize him? 
Yes sir I would. 
Would you please indicate where that person 
is? 
The gentleman sitting next to the lady at the 
defence table, in the tee shirt. 
I see two different people sitting next to the 
lady at the counsel table and both of them are 
wearing tee shirts, on which side of her? 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
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Judge: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
Prosecutor: 
The witness: 
The witness: The gentlemen at the end, sir. 
Prosecutor: Your Honor may the record reflect the 
identification of the defendant, Humphrey. 
It may so indicate. 
Now you have indicated that this was a 12 
gauge shot gun, why are you so sure? 
I'm familiar with weapons, sir. 
Could you tell what color the stock of that 
weapon was? 
A Maddick brown, natural finished wood, dark. 
On cross examination of Steven Lee Church (PT.53) Lisa J Remal 
Attorney for co-defendant John E Humphrey. 
Lisa Remal: Did you see anybody as you came towards the 
store before this happened? 
No mamn. 
Did you run into anybody outside there? 
No mamn. 
A, the shotgun you have indicated that was a 
12 gauge gun, I assume you have your 
experience with guns from the military 
primarily? 
Yes mamn. 
And you have indicated the color was it the 
The witness: 
Lisa Remal: 
The witness: 
Lisa Remal: 
The witness: 
Lisa Remal: 
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barrel was silver but the stock of it was dark 
wood? 
The witness: Matt wood. Yes mamn Matt finish wood. 
Lisa Remal: What do you mean by matt finish? 
The witness: Non-glare, it was not high gloss. 
Lisa Remal: How long would you say the barrel itself was? 
The witness: It is difficult to estimate manm, I don't 
know. 
Lisa Remal: Any idea how long the whole gun was? 
The witness: No mamn. 
On November 3, 1987, Britt Martindale gave a statement to Sgt. 
Bill Abbott and Detective Harvey Jackson. On page 4, of that 
statement 
Q: Was this a double barrel or a single barrel? 
A: I don't remember. I just remember it was shotgun, 12 
gauge and it was sawed-off and it had black tape around 
the end, the handle part. 
Britt Martindale testified at the preliminary examination 
November 24, 1987, on page 63 direct examination Britt Martindale 
was ask. 
Q. What did the gun look like? 
A. A shotgun. 
Q. Do you know anything about shotguns? 
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A. A little, not much. 
Q. Can you tell us what kind of a shotgun it was? 
A. No, it was just ... 
Q. Can you tell us how clong it was? 
A. It was sawed off. 
Q. How do you know it was sawed off? 
A. Because they don't make shotguns that short that I've 
seen. 
Q. Can you remember did this shotgun have a wood part? 
A. It had a handle that was black taped. 
Page 64 
Q. Can you remember anything else about the shotgun? 
A. No. 
The petitioner's privately retained counsel Ray Stoddard filed 
to motions to suppress on January 22, 1988 one, property was seized 
pursuant to an alleged consent search of Ms. Gregersen.(R646) and 
on the shotgun being very prejudicial (R646) the shotgun seized 
fits a different description, because of the discrepancy of the 
description with the shotgun being introduced in the trial. This 
motion was never ruled on by the court, that the shotgun if 
introduced at the trial would be prejudicial. 
Judge Sawaya gave a protective order that any witness be it 
defense, or prosection concerning any alleged other bad acts by any 
3 
witness would not be admissible this denied the petitioner the 
right in a jury trial for the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court denied 
petitioner due process of law by refusing to allow him to present 
relevant, admissible evidence that another person committed the 
crime. A defendant in a criminal trial has the right, "to seek out 
the truth in the process of defending himself." Davis v. Alaska 
415 U.S. 308,320; 94 S.CT. 1105; 39 L.E.d.2d 347 (1974),, "Few 
rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present 
witnesses in his own defense." Chambers v. Mississippi. 410 U.S. 
284,302 93 S. CT 1038? 35 L.E.D. 2nd 297 (1973). On September 4th, 
1987, Sounds Easy Video was robbed at gun point. Helen Lamoreaux 
was the victim. On November 9, 1987, RO showed Helen Lamoreaux a 
photo lineup. Lamoreaux picked out a photograph of John E 
Humphrey, and stated that she was absolutely sure that Humphrey was 
the person who robbed her at gun point at her place of employment. 
A pp. 
The police report of Officer Tausinga appears in * B-l, the 
supplementary report of officer Ertel appears in appendix B-2 on 
November 11, 1987, Russell Martindale gave a recorded statement to 
Detective Harvey Jackson in that statement Russell Martindale was 
ask on page twenty one. 
Det. H. Jackson Q: So Russ if I understand you right 
your telling me that all the times that you went out on the 
9 
road, that you never did commit a crime? 
Russell Martindale A: No. 
Det. H. Jackson Q: Not a robbery? Not a burglary? 
Russell Martindale A: No. 
On page twenty-four of the statement of Russell Martindale November 
11, 1987. 
Det. H. Jackson Q: OK Russ let me just go over some of 
these cities that are on your phone bills OK. A Septembers 
17th, it looks like you called Britt From, Medford, Oregon. 
Ok, a did you do anything in Medford? 
Russell Martindale A: No sir. 
Page twenty eight of Russell Martindale'& statement November 11, 
1987. 
Det. H. Jackson Q: Russ did Renee ever go on the road with 
Chuck? 
Russell Martindale As Not that I know of. 
Det. H. Jackson Q: Ok Russ have you been honest with me, 
totally honest? 
Russell Martindale A: ABSOLUTELY. 
On November 12, 1987, Britt Martindale gave a taped statement 
to police at her home (see also Amy Blanchard affidavit in the 
appendix C to this petition). 
A phone call recorded on November 13, 1987, between Detective 
10 
Harvey Jackson and Russ Martindale. On page one of the 
recorded call. 
Det. H. Jackson Q: Ok so from what I understand in speaking 
with Britt and your dad, a we need to discuss what Twin Falls 
and Pittsburgh? 
Russ Martindale A: Yea 
Page two of the recorded phone call between Detective Harvey 
Jackson and Russ Martindale. 
Russ Martindale A: And A ....we came right back and we 
stopped in Salt Lake and picked up Renee. 
Det. H. Jackson Q: A huh. 
Russ Martindale A: Drove up to Renee's mom and dads. 
Russ Martindale A: Ok, so I went and got a car. 
Det. H. Jackson Q: Do you remember where you got that car 
from? 
Russ Martindale A: It was from a little car place in 
Burley. 
The nine page November 13, 1987, recorded phone call, between 
App, 
Detective Harvey Jackson and Russ Martindale appears in*D. attached 
to this petition. 
Russ Martindale told Detective Jackson now after Detective 
Jackson made a tape statement of of Britt Martindale at her home 
November 12, 1987, now in a recorded phone call of Russ Martindale 
11 
on November 13, 1987, Russ Martindale told Detective Jackson that 
he went to Twin Falls, Idaho and he was with Chuck, Renee, and the 
baby and Russ said that he stole a car in Burley Idaho and went to 
Twin Falls Jewelry Store and he grabbed a foox off the back counter 
and run out with it, got in the car he stole and drove to K-Mart 
got in the car with Chuck, Renee, and baby and came back to Utah. 
Russ Martindale also told Detective Jackson that he did a 
aggravated robbery in Pittsburgh Pennsylvania, that he went in 
the Ungers Jewelers and grabbed a box in the safe and ran out, 
went to a parking terrace and climb in the trunk of Chuck #s 
car. Russ Martindale was ask by Detective Jackson if Russ 
showed the clerk the gun, Russ told Detective* Jackson all he 
did was just patted his stomach. The police report from 
Pittsburgh states that a red bag was used in this robbery and 
that the gun was displayed and also a worker ran after the 
robber and again the gun was displayed again to the worker. 
Russ Martindale told Detective Jackson that Charles Webb only 
gave him $500.00 from this robbery to pay his rent for 
September. 
Russ Martindale now tells Detective Jackson that he did a 
burglary in Medford, Oregon after the robbery in Salt Lake 
City, October 21, 1987. But only after Detective Jackson 
talked with Russ Martindale #s wife at her home November 12, 
12 
1987. 
Russell Martindale was asked again by Detective Harvey Jackson 
on page seven of the November 13, 1987 recorded phone call 
statement. 
Det. H Jackson Q: Are we honest on everything now Russ? 
Russ Martindale A: Yea. 
Det. H.Jackson Q: We're positive huh? 
Russ Martindale A: Yea. 
On January 8f 1988, the court ordered a discovery, that order 
was (R.632). For the prosecution to provide anything that is in 
the law enforcement file. And for two of the prosecution witnesses 
(R634) No. 5 and 6, Britt and Russell Martindale's addresses and 
phone numbers. That defense counsel may be able to investigate and 
ask them questions. 
(1) Prosecution, did not provide defense counsel aa copy of 
the statement that Russell Martindale gave Detective Harvey 
Jackson on or before November the 3rd, 1987, that Detective 
Harvey Jackson used in the probable cause statement, that was 
used for the arrest of the petitioner. See the arrest warrant 
and probable cause statement in appendix E. 
(2) Prosecution, did not provide defense counsel a copy of 
the statement that Britt Martindale gave Detective Harvey 
Jackson when she personally contacted him on October 26, 1987. 
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See the affidavit for search warrant of Larry Johnson a 
detective with the City of Medford state of Oregon in appendix 
F, page 2. 
(3) Prosecution did not provide defense counsel a copy of the 
statement that bo&fe. Britt Martindale gave to law enforcement 
officers at her home at 438 East Wasatch Street on November 
12, 1987, See Amy Blanchard affidavit of October 31, 1988, in 
appendix C. 
(4) Prosecution did not provide defense counsel a copy of the 
recorded phone calls between the petitioner Charles Webb and 
Britt Martindale at her home at 438 East Wasatch after the 
petitioner Charles Webb was already in jail. See Amy 
Blanchard affidavit in appendix C. 
(5) Petitioner Charles Webb was denied due process by failure 
of the prosecution to reveal that Russell Martindale had made 
a standing offer of a plea bargain with the states of Oregon, 
and Idaho, for his testimony in the Utah robbery case, and in 
any hearing or trail regarding any offenses known by Russell 
Martindale to have been committed by John Humphrey, or 
petitioner Charles Webb. or KmseLF up*W Te^uesTcF /?*y OepuT* CoJtJfy A*f* 
(6) Petitioner Charles Webb was denied due process, and a 
fair trial, when the prosecution kept from the court, the 
order of the preliminary hearing Judge that order by the the 
14 
Honorable Judge Grant, was (P.tape 87-2413 side B) 
Judge Grant: Lets make it easy. I'll tell 
you and if you have any indication in this 
crime what so ever its a legal individual it 
would be in your best interest to invoke your 
5th amendment rights because you have not be 
charged in this crime and if you admit on this 
stand any implication of this crime what so 
ever, the court will have no other choice but 
to instruct the county attorney to follow 
action. You going to follow my advice? 
Russell Martindale: Yes sir. 
Judge Grant: I think that's the only fair 
do 
thing we can* with with this gentleman then at 
some future date, he becomes a witness, then 
we have to deal with that. Can't imagine any 
other attorney advising him any other way 
under those circumstances. And certainly I 
can't imagine him wanting to know anything 
other involvement with these two gentlemen. 
So I will take it upon myself to solve the 
problem I don't think there's any other way 
out. 
15 
In Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,95.S.CT 2550,45 L.E.D.2d 
593 (1975). The Supreme Court stated that a closing argument is a 
"basic element of the adversary fact finding process in a criminal 
trial". The Court held unconstitutional, as a violation of the 
sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel, a state statute 
that granted judges in non jury trials the discretion to deny 
closing argument. Id, AT 863-64. The court noted the affect of a 
closing argument, as follows: 
"{I}t is only after all the evidence is in 
that counsel for the parties are in a position 
to present their respective versions of the 
case as a whole. Only then can they argue the 
inferences to be drawn from all the testimony, 
and point out the weaknesses of their 
adversaries7 positions. And for the defense, 
closing argument is the last clear chance to 
persuade the trier of fact that there may be 
reasonable doubt of the defendant's 
quilt...Id., at 862. 
The trial judge has wide discretion to control the duration 
and scope of a closing argument by setting time limits, terminating 
redundant arguments, and preventing the argument from straying from 
its purpose. Id. See also United States v. Carter. 760 F.2d 1568, 
1581 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lamare, 711 F.2d 3 (1st 
Cir. 1983); United States v. Davila. 693 f. 2d 1006 (10th Cir. 
1982) 
The prosecution must present its closing argument first. 
After defense counsel present his closing argument, the prosecution 
may present a rebuttal argument. In a closing argument, both 
parties can argue the evidence and reasonable inferences from the 
evidence, but they cannot remark on matters outside the trial 
record. See United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 
1985); Whittinoton v. Estelle, 704 F.2d 1418,1423 (5th Cir). cert 
denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983); United States v. Ashfield. 735 F.2d 
101, 111 (3d Cir). Cert, denied, 105 S.CT. 189 (1984)(so called 
"rhetorical statement" are usually permissible during closing 
argument). Neither party may express personal opinions or state 
facts not in evidence. See United States v. Prantil, Supra; United 
U/Jt led £TflTe* V> Ri$it (so3 F.Zd t/94 CSTH C»r\ iQ*7q) 
States v. Netz, 758 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1985). Nor may the parties 
misstate the law. See United States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091, 1100 
(4th Cir 1984). 
Petitioner, Charles Webb was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel, when his court appointed attorney, would not push the 
motion to sever defendant Webb, from Humphrey, or would she push 
the motion to suppress the shotgun, petitioner, Charles Webb points 
to his court appointed attorney for failure to make any attempt to 
suppress the statements of Russell Martindale, and Britt Martindale 
under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 613 (b) or would his court 
appointed attorney file a Motion for pre-trial determination of the 
admissibility of co-defendants statements. Petitioner, believes 
that by the order of the lower court, the admissibility of all co-
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defendants statements that many, if not all, will be inadmissible 
and, therefore, pre-trial exclusion will avoid prejudicial evidence 
being put before the jury. 
Petitioner, Charles Webb was denied a fair teial by his court 
appointed attorney's unprofessional errors, in keeping from the 
court a true and accurate transcript of the preliminary hearing 
when Russell Martindale took the stand. Petitioner's court 
appointed attorney led the court to believe that all that was said 
when Russell Martindale took the stand was Russell Martindale 
taking the 5th Amendment, petitioner, court appointed attorney gave 
the court a one, page transcript and told the court that was all 
Apt 
that was said. The one page transcript appears in*G. 
Petitioner, Charles Webb was denied due process by the failure 
of his court appointed attorney to bring to the court's attention 
that the Honorable Judge Grant brought to the courts attention and 
to the attention of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, of the 
conflict. See (Tape # 87-2413) 
"The Honorable Judge Grant. It appears to me 
that with these two defendants you have a 
significant conflict, then to add in the fact 
that Miss Harold is representing Gregersen, 
that the Legal Defenders could even deal with 
it. 
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The petitioner Charles Webb ask this Honorable Court to order 
from the Lower Court the preliminary hearing tapes #87-2413 and 
#87-2414 in support of this petitioner. 
The evidence seized at the home of the petitioner was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
The trial court erred in denying the re-newed motion to 
suppress evidence. When Carolyn Renee Gregersen said she did not 
sign the permission to search agreement (R-40) the permission to 
search agreement appears in appendix H. To support that Carolyn 
Renee Gregersen did not sign the permission to search agreement, 
Carolyn Renee Gregersen brought in Linda J Knight, an experts 
witness who gave testimony May 20, 1988, at the proceedings before 
the Honorable Judge James S Sawaya (R29). 
Q (By Ms. Wells): Ms. Knight, as a result of the 
method which you utilized and the comparative study that 
you made of the known sample of Ms. Gregersen #s 
handwriting as compared to the questioned document, do 
you have an opinion as to whether or not they are of 
common authorship? 
Mr. Cope: Objection, irrelevant. 
The court: The question is whether the 
questioned signature is genuine. 
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Ms. Wells: I think she is ... 
Mr. Cope: We don't think this witness is 
qualified to render this opinion. We don't 
dispute she has an opinion. We don't thin& it 
is relevant. 
The Court: On the basis of her lack of 
expertise? 
Mr. Cope: That is correct. 
The Court: I will let her answer. 
Ms. Wells: What is your answer? 
Ms. Knight: My opinion is that Carolyn 
Gregersen did not sign the consent to search 
form. 
The February 16, 1988, opinion of Linda J. Knight Certified 
Graphoanalyst appears in*I. 
The Deputy County Attorney, James M Cope, offered no expert 
witness to rebuttal the testimony of the expert witness Linda J 
Knight's opinion. 
The court denied the motion on May 23, 1988 without citing any 
authority. 
The May 23, 1988 denial by the court appears in appendix J. 
The firearm enhancement pursuant to U.C.A. 76-3-203 (1) does 
not apply to the petitioner's conviction for aggravated robbery. 
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The sentence is so disproportionate to his crime that it violated 
his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED PETITIONER DDE 
PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A 
DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CHARGES WHEN THE 
TRIAL JUDGE EXCIUDED RELEVANT, ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE WHEN THE JUDGE GAVE A PROTECTIVE 
ORDER THAT ANY WITNESS BE IT DEFENSE OR 
PROSECUTION CONCERNING ANY ALLEGED OTHER 
BAD ACTS BY ANY WITNESS. 
In any criminal case the defendant has a due process right to 
introduce evidence that the actions the prosecution claims were 
committed by him were in fact committed by another person. 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. CT 1038; 35 
L.Ed/2d 297 (1973). Supra; Pettiiohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476 (1st 
Cir.1979); Hill v. Rose. 579 F.Supp. 1080 (M.O. Term. 1983); U.S. 
Const, Amend. XIV. 
U.S. Const Amend. VI the sixth amendment provides in part that 
M[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right...to be confronted with witnesses against him."Id. This 
right is extended to state prosecutions through the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 403 (1965). 
The Sixth amendment right to confront one's accusers is a 
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right which may be invoked only by the criminal defendant. See 
United States v. Raf f oul, 826 F.2d 218,222, (3rd Cir 1987)., 
Utah Code 77-35-4 Rule 4-(J) Prosecution of public offenses. 
(J) The names of witnesses on whose evidence 
an indictment or information was based shall 
be endorsed thereon before it is filed. 
Failure to endorse shall not affect the 
validity but endorsement shall be ordered by 
the court on application of the defendant. 
Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, 
except upon a showing of good cause, furnish 
the names of other witnesses he proposes to 
call whose names are not so# endorsed. 
Russell Martindale and Britt Martindale are the state's 
witnesses, on their evidence an indictment or information was based 
against petitioner, Charles Webb, for his arrest. (See the Arrest 
Warrant: and probable cause statement, in*E) 
The petitioner was prejudiced when the trail judge gave a 
protective order that any witness be it defense or prosecution 
concerning any alleged other bad acts by any witness would not be 
allowed. 
It is the exclusive function of the jury to weight the 
evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses; Booker, 
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709 P.2d at 345; State v Tolman. 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct. App.)/ 
Cert. Denied, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (1989). 
If, However, the defendant exercises the right to cross-
examination, he or she must be permitted to test both the 
credibility of the witness, Davis v Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 
(1974); Compare Clark v O'Learv, 852 F.2d 999, 1005-1008 (7th Cir. 
1988) (confrontation clause violated when defendant not permitted 
to question key witness regarding bias and prejudice against 
defendant resulting from witness' membership in rival street gang); 
and United States v Jones. 766 F.2d 412, 414-415 (9th Cir 1985) and 
the witness' knowledge of the facts bearing on the defendant's 
guilt or innocence. See United State v Pritchett. 699 F.2d 317, 
321 (6th Cir. 1983) (confrontation clause violated by limiting 
cross-examination about source of drugs when line of questioning 
likely to affect jury's acceptance of defendant's defense). This 
term, in Olden v Kentucky, 109 S.Ct. 480 (1988). The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed a defendant's right to inquire into any matter which may 
throw doubt on a witness' credibility, Id. at 484, in reversing the 
rape conviction of a defendant who was prevented from using cross-
examination to impeach the complaining witnesses' testimony 
concerning the witnesses' living arrangements. The Olden court 
found that the trial judge's restrictions were "a limitation beyond 
reason, Id. at 483• 
23 
In this case before the court the jury could not determine the 
credibility of the witness Russell Martindale, and Britt 
Martindale, when the evidence was kept from the jury by the 
protective order by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Petitioner, at trial could not bring out on cross-examination 
that witness, Russell Martindale told Detective Harvey Jackson in 
his November 11, 1987 statement (page 12); 
(Q) OK, now what happened when you got back to Salt 
Lake. 
(A) OK, uh, Humphrey and Chuck went and did what ever 
and he approached me with, uh,,, well, I'll, I'll 
let you go for a couple of hundred dollars that you 
owe me if you'll go get this car for me. 
Russell Martindale testified at trial (T.408); 
4A) Mr. Webb told me that he would pay mv rent on mv 
house if I did not thing for him, aind thar was to 
go down and test drive a car and tcLke ir back and 
then go back the next day and take if for another 
test drive, then give him the keys. 
The protective order by the Court stopped the petitioner from 
bringing out to the jury that Russell Martindale, on November 13, 
1987, gave Detective Harvey Jackson a statement on page 5, of that 
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statement Russell Martindale told Detective Harvey Jackson that he 
did a robbery at Ungers Jewelers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, (page 
6) of his November 13 statement. (See^D, page 5 and 6) 
(Q) Did you get any of that money Russ? 
(a) He gave me five hundred dollars to pay my rent for 
September. 
Britt Martindale gave a statement to Detective Harvey Jackson, 
November 3, 1987, and she was asked if she knew of any robberies 
that Mr. Webb has been involved in. (Page 15) 
(A) I know he was back east, but I don't know ... I 
know there was a robbery done back there, but I 
don't know where, or nothin. 
(Q) Do you know about what time. 
-(Page 16) 
(A) It was about two months ago. 
(Q) did he ever mention what they got in the robbery. 
(A) He said he got, I think he said he got about six 
thousand dollars worth. 
(Q) Of what. 
(A) A, I think he said diamonds. 
Britt Martindale gave a statement to Detective Harvey Jackson, 
November 3, 1987, page 13 of that statement; 
(Q) Did Russ receive anything from Chuck for getting 
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that car. Was he paid anything. 
(A) Shook head no. 
Russell Martindale, on November 11, 1987, on page 4f he was 
asked; 
(Q) OK, where did you go to, Russ? 
(A) He, he says I have this place up in North Dakota, 
OK. and I says, OK, and, he, he didn't tell me 
anything about till we got there, and uh, we go up 
there and... 
(Q) Which city were you in? 
(A) He had Humphrey with him. We went to North Dakota. 
Britt Martmdale, on November 12, 1987, gave a statement at 
her home to the police (T.256). After her statement, November 12, 
1987, Detective Harvey Jackson called Russ Martmdale, November 13, 
and Russ Martmdale gave Detective Harvey Jackson a statement over 
the Dhone, but only after his wife, Britt Martmdale gave a 
statement: to the police at her home on November 12, 1987. Now Russ 
Martindale tells Detective Jackson that the first time thar he left 
with Mr. Webb, was with Mr. Webb, Renee Gregersen and their son, 
and Humphrey was not with them, and we went to Twin Falls, Idaho, 
and did a theft at a jewelry store in Twin Falls. Russ Martindale 
also told Detective Jackson that he did a robbery at Ungers 
Jewelers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and he also told Detective 
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Jackson that he did a burglary in Medford, Oregon, 
It has long been settled in the law that the knowing use by 
the prosecution of false evidence material to the issues in a 
criminal trial constitutes a denial of due process and that a 
conviction obtained by the use of such evidence cannot be permitted 
to stand; Mooney v Holohan, 294 U.S. 103; 55 S.Ct. 340; 79 L.Ed. 
791 (1935); Napue v Illinois, 360 U.S. 264; 79 S.Ct. 1173; 3 
L.Ed.2d. 1217 (1959); Gialio v United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 
S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d. 104 (1972). The same result obtains when 
the state, although, not soliciting false evidence, silently but 
knowingly allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. Alcorta v 
Texas, 355 U.S. 28; 78 S.Ct. 103; 2 L.Ed.2d. 9 (1957); Napue v 
Illinois, Supra. That the falsity within the evidence may bear 
only upon the credibility of the witness, rather than upon the 
guilt of the accused, is not sufficient to render it immaterial. 
Bradv v Maryland. 373 U.S. 83; 83 S.Ct. 1194; 10 L.Ed.2d. 215 
(1963); Naoue v Illinois. Supra. These rules are well summarized 
in the case of Gialio v United States, Supra. Wherein the court 
stated: 
"As long ago as Mooney v Holohan, ... the court made 
clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by 
the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible 
with xrudimentary demands of justice1. This was 
reaffirmed in Pyle v Kansas, 317 U.S. 213; 63 S.Ct. 177; 
87 L.Ed. 214, — In Napue v Illinois— the court said 
"the same result obtains when the state, although not 
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected 
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when it appears"— Thereafter, Brady v Maryland, held 
that suppression of material evidence justifies a new 
trial * irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution'. When the xreliability of a given witness 
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence; non 
disclosure of evidence affecting credibility fa Lis within 
this general rule ... a new trial is required if *the 
false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood 
have affected the judgment of the jury." 
"The failure of the prosecution to disclose to the 
defense and to the trial jury the existence of plea 
bargaining negotiations with the witness, Russell 
Martindale deprived the petitioner of the Fifth Amendment 
due process of law." (Emphasis Added) 
The rules announced in Gialio v United States, Supra, and 
cases therein cited, are not limited in their application only to 
witnesses called by the prosecution. The prosecution may not sit 
silently by and be relieved of the duty of correcting a known 
falsehood simply because the witness testifying was not called by 
it to testify. This is particularly so where the state itself 
enabled the falsehood to arise by its own undisclosed plea 
bargaining activities. 
Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the witness, 
Russell Martindale, at the preliminary hearing before the Honorable 
Judge Grant, the court gave an order to the County Attorney (P. 
Tape 87-2413 side! B) 
Judge Grant, let's make it easy, I'll tell you and if you 
have any indication in this crime what so ever it's a 
legal individual, it would be in your best interest to 
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invoke your Fifth Amendment Rights because you have not 
been charged in this crime and if you admit on this stand 
any implication of the crime whatsoever, the court will 
have no other choice but to instruct the County Attorney 
to follow action. 
The trail court erred in not calling for a mis-trial when 
Russell Martindale's testimony he gave to the jury involved him in 
this robbery. More then just the theft of a motor vehicle, in 
closing argument the prosecution prejudiced the petitioner by not 
following action on the witness, Russell Martindale, the 
prosecution violated the lower court's order (P.Tape 87-2413), when 
the prosection put the witness, Russell Martindale as a co-
defendant in his closing argument. (T.615) 
When you have the eyewitnesses saying yes, that's who it 
was, when you have a third party saying these people 
participated in a robbery, That my husband helped to 
stage. 
(T.616) What difference does it make? Mr. Webb, Mr. 
Humphrey, Mr. Martindale. were all down there in Las 
Vegas getting rid of the stolen property. That's what 
they were doing. 
(T.616) He was angry and upset. He came back and found 
out that they used his kitchen table to divide up the 
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loot. He thought that the boss of the operation should 
have taken it to his house. 
(T.617) Namely, Martindale, didn't have contact or come 
back without them knowing about it because they are all 
in big trouble if he decides he wants to start talking 
about what he's been doing with them in Las Vegas and in 
Salt Lake City during the latter part of October, 1987. 
(T.621) Mr. Webb is with Mr. Humphrey in Salt Lake doing 
a robbery. Mr. Martindale is dividing up the loot at Mr. 
Martindale's house, going someplace to get rid of it so 
they can continue on with taking care of business. 
The trial court prejudiced the petitioner when the trial judge 
gave a protective order that any witness be it defence or 
prosection concerning any alleged other bad acts by any witness 
would not be allowed. This prejudice the petitioner in that he 
could not bring out to the jury the credibility of the witness, 
Britt Martindale, and Russell Martindale. At the preliminary 
hearing, Britt Martindale was asked: 
(Q) When was the first time you met Mr. Humphreys? 
(A) I don't remember the first time I met him. 
(Q) A, about how long before October 21st? 
(A> I'm not sure. 
(Q) A month. m 
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(A) I'm not sure. 
(Q) Five years? 
(A) No, it wouldn't be that long. 
(Q) Several months? 
(A) About a month maybe two. 
(Q) OK, and he has been staying at your home? 
(A) Yep. 
Russell Martindale on November 11, 1987, gave a statement to 
Detective Harvey Jackson, on page 12 of that statement, Russell 
Martindale was asked: 
(Q) Now where was Humphrey staying? 
(A) With Chuck. 
(Q) OK, was he ever staying with you and Britt? 
(A) No. 
The petitioner could not bring out to the jury that co-
defendant, John Humphrey, was staying with Britt Martindale, and on 
September 4, 1987, Sounds Easy Video was robbed. Lamoreaux picked 
out a photograph of John Humphrey and stated that she was 
absolutely sure that Humphrey was the person who robbed he at gun 
APP<*Nd.x 
point at her place of employment. (See^B.2) The petitioner could 
not bring out to the jury that John Humphrey did not have a car, 
and Humphrey was staying with Britt Martindale, and that Britt 
Martindale just may have been John Humphrey's get-away driver, at 
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the Sounds Easy Video robbery. 
Russell Martindale on November 11, 1987 gave a statement to 
Detective Jackson, and was asked by Detective Jackson: (Statement 
11-11-87 page 4) 
(Q) OK, where did you go to, Russ? 
(A) He, he says I have this place up in North Dakota. 
On November 12, 1987, Britt Martindale gave a statement at her 
home to police: (See Affidavit Amy Blanchard in^C) 
Now Detective Harvey Jackson calls Russell Martindale, and 
Russell Martindale now tells Detective Harvey Jackson that the 
first time that he went out on the road with the petitioner was to 
Twin Falls, Idaho not to North Dakota, as he told Detective Jackson 
in the first statement that he gave to Detective Harvey Jackson. 
Only after the police took a statement from Britt Martindale at her 
home, November 12, 1987, did Russell Martindale tell Detective 
Harvey Jackson that he went to Twin Falls, Idaho, and that he was 
with petitioner, Charles Webb and petitioner's girlfriend, Carolyn 
Renee Gregersen and his little son. Russell Martindale tells 
Detective Jackson, after his wife's statement to police on November 
12, 1987 that he did a theft at Twin Falls jewelry store and that 
he stole a car in Burley, Idaho for the theft in Twin Falls, Idaho. 
Russell Martindale also tells Detective Harvey Jackson that he did 
an aggravated robbery at Ungers Jewelers in Pittsburgh, 
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Pennsylvania, and that he got in the trunk of petitionees car, and 
he told Detective Jackson that petitioner only gave him five 
/tpP&jd** 
hundred dollars to pay his rent for September. (See*D, page 5 and 
6) Russell Martindale also did a burglary at John Nuich Jewelers 
in Medford, Oregon. (See^D, page 7 and 8) 
The protective order violated the petitioner's confrontation 
clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Russell Martindale and Britt Martindale are the petitioner's 
accusers, not a defense witness. (See arrest warrant and probable 
/IPPetidlx 
cause statement in^E) 
The protective order by the trial judge prejudiced the 
petitioner, when the jury could not determine the credibility of 
the witness, Russell Martindale and Britt Martindale, when the 
evidence was excluded from the jury. 
In closing argument (T.580) the prosecution told the court and 
j^ry: 
Who has a reason? Who has the best and biggest reason for 
fabricating in this case? Well, the defense said, in 
their opening statement, they were going to show that 
Britt Martindale had a good reason to do it. Evidence 
doesn't show any reason for her to do that. Her husband 
is in enough trouble. 
(T.580) The only people who have a motive to fabricate, 
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have a reason to fabricate, have time to fabricate, are 
these two gentlemen here, the gentleman in the red shirt 
and the gentleman in the white shirt. (Meaning the 
petitioner, Charles ^ Webb in the red shirt and co-
defendant, John Humphrey in the white shirt.) 
In this case, the witness, Russell Martindale, had made a plea 
bargain with the State of Oregon for probation for the burglary of 
John Nuich Jewelers located at, 231 East Main Street, Medford, 
Jackson County, Oregon, for his testimony in any trial regarding 
any offenses known by him to have been committed by petitioner, or 
co-defendant, John Humphrey. The witness, Russell Martindale, also 
made a plea bargain with the State of Idaho-, and the theft of Twin 
Falls jewelry store in Twin Falls,* Idaho for his testimony. for ifte IheFT of A (LAr /*/ SuHey, Xdflho 
Witness, Russell Martindale also made a plea bargain for the 
aggravated robbery at lingers Jewelers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
for his testimony. 
It was this witness and his wife, Britt Martindale who may 
have been impeached if it were made known to the jury that the 
States of Oregon, Idaho, and Pennsylvania had offered him a way to 
escape from a jury determination of guilt and punishment. As it 
was, the jury may^  in fact have given added weight to his testimony 
since he and the County Attorney, Deputy James M. Cope admitted his 
own involvement. If it had been made known to the jury that 
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Russell Martindale had nothing to lose by his testimony, and his 
wife, Britt Martindale had everything to gain, the jury might have 
afforded less weight to it than was the case. At any rate, the 
facts in this regard should not have been knowingly withheld from 
the jury by the prosecution. (See Rav v Rose, (1974, DC Tenn) 371 
F.Supp 277. 
2. PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS BY 
THE PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATION OF A 
DISCOVERY ORDER INVOLVING 
CONCEALMENT OF STATEMENTS OF THE 
MAIN PROSECUTION WITNESS. 
At the Preliminary Proceedings November 24, 1987, Russell 
Martindale was called by the defense as his accuser. 
(P.Tape 87-2413) 
Judge Grant, Mr Martindale before you 
commence, there's been some indication in this 
hearing that one of counsel for defense seems 
to feel vou were involved in the perpetration 
of this crime, and other crimes, so that you 
are fully advised do you understand that you 
have a right under the Constitution of the 
United States to remain silent in regards to 
any crimes that you may have committed. 
(P. Tape 87-2413) 
Judge Grant, I suppose the only thing that 
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bothers me as far as these defendant's are 
concerned their process is being delayed, 
anything that this witness bring in this 
hearing is going to turn into a question of 
fact. The question of probable cause may or 
may not be affected but if it turns into a 
question of fact it won't be affective. 
Counsel for defense, Jim Bradshaw, I don't 
think that's something we can deal with until 
we hear the testimony. 
Judge Grant, I'm certain as far as Mr Humphrey 
is concerned, this gentlemen has not been 
identified, because there was only one 
individual who went into the jewelry store and 
no matter what he says, as far as Mr 
Humphrey's concerned, now the conspiracy 
aspects for Mr Webb I can understand, but even 
at that rate he just may simply become a co-
conspirator and quash the fact. 
A defendant is entitled to the factual particulars to be 
presented to the jury, in all aspects of his case in aid of his 
defense. Article 1, Section 12, Utah Constitution (also relative 
to right to demand the nature and cause of the specific accusation 
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and all relevant material). 
In State v. Watts. 675 P. 2d 566 569 (Utah 1983) the court 
stated: "Circumstantial evidence alone may be competent to 
establish the guilt of the accused say long as it excludes every 
reasonable hypothesis, other than the defendant's guilt." 
The petitioner, was prejudice at trial when the prosecutor, 
violated the lower court order and did not follow action on the 
witness Russell Martindale (P.Tape 87-2413). The witness Russell 
Martindale would have become a co-conspirator by the lower court 
order when he, and the Deputy County Attorney admitted his 
involvement in this crime at trial. 
In Gialio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). The Supreme 
Court applied Brady to a situation in which the prosecution 
withheld the fact that it had promised a key witness he would not 
be prosecuted for his part in a crime if he testified against his 
companion. Id. AT 155. The Court found that because the 
creditability of the witness was at issue, it was a violation of 
due process not to inform the jury of the "deal". Id,; se Napue v. 
Illinois 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (due process required government 
to disclose both to defendant and to jury any promises of immunity 
or leniency offered to witness in exchange for testimony); 
Petitioner, was denied due process and equal protection of the 
laws by the prosecutor's violation of the lower court order, to 
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follow action of the witness Russell Martindale, if he admitted any 
implication of this crime what so ever. The Honorable Judge Grant 
also ordered the County Attorney if Russell Martindale at some 
future date, he becomes a witness, then we have to deal with that 
(P. Tape 87-2413) 
In closing argument the prosecutor told the jury ffl573) 
Yes, it is true the grant of immunity was 
procured by the county attorney. Mr. Yocom is 
the only person in the county who can give 
such a grant. Why? Because he was subpoenaed 
by the defense and there's no point in having 
him take the stand and claim his fifth 
amendment privileges. 
And kept from the jury the order of the lower Court Judge 
Grant, the petitioner, was prejudice by the prosecutor's violation 
of the lower court order, to follow action on the witness Russell 
Martindale, by the lower court order the witness Russell Martindale 
would have became a co-conspirator, and under Burton v. United 
States. 391 U.S. 123 (1968) the court in Burton held that the sixth 
amendments confrontation clause prohibits the introduction of a 
co=defendant's extrajudicial confession if it incriminates the 
defendant even when it is introduced only against the co-defendant. 
see: Bradv v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). in which the Supreme 
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Court held that the government's failure to disclose evidence^ 
favorable to a defendant who,specifically requested it violated the 
defendant's due process rights because the evidence was material to 
guilt or punishment. Id At 87. 
At pre-trial motion (R.14) attorney for defense Ms Wells ask 
the court; 
The second matter is that I understand that 
there was a statement which have not yet s€>en 
of a taped telephone conversation with the key 
witness Ms Martindale. 
(R.16) Mr Webb: I would like to say 
something, there is one statement that was 
taken at her house on 11-12-87. I would like 
a copy, sir. 
The petitioner, was prejudiced when the prosecutor would not 
disclose to tne defense attorney the taped telephone conservation 
between rhe petitioner, and the key witness Ms Martindale when rhe 
petitioner, Charles Webb was in jail on the robbery charge, that 
taped telephone conversation would show to the jury, that the 
petitioner ask her why he was in jail, and that she knew that the 
petitioner was not involved in this robbery, and the key witness Ms 
Martindale told the petitioner, that she knew he wasn't involved in 
this robbery. Or words to that effect. 
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The petitioner was denied due process and equal protection of 
the laws when the prosecutor would not disclose to the defense 
attorney the taped statement of the key witness Britt Martindale, 
APPe+lAi* 
that she gave police at her home November 12, 1987, seerfC. The 
affidavit of Amy Blanchard. Also see: the police handwritten 
interview with Britt Martindale at her home on November 12, 1987, 
Appendix 
intfK. 
The petitioner, was prejudiced when he could not bring out to 
the jury that the witness Britt Martindale on November 12,1987, 
told police at her home November 12,1987, that her husband Russell 
Martindale did a theft at Twin Falls Jewelers in Twin Falls, Idaho, 
the witness Britt Martindale also told police at her home November 
12, 1987, that her husband Russell Martindale did a robbery back 
east and her husband Russell Martindale hid in the trunk of 
petitioner, car. 
At the preliminary hearing November 19, 1987, just seven days 
after the witness Britt Martindale, gave a statement to police at 
her home November 12, 1987, the witness Britt Martindale, was 
called by the prosecutor to give testimony at the preliminary 
hearing, on cross-examination preliminary hearing page 79, and 80. 
Page 79, A: Chuck had said, Russ has caused 
him money and put his so called wife and kids 
out being out on the road with him. 
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Page 80. Q: Russ owed Chuck some money? 
A: He caused them to loose money. 
Q: Did he elaborate, did he say 
why? 
A: Because he didn't do this 
place, he didn't go burglarize 
that place. 
Q: So your husband, Russ, was 
supposed to do a burglary? 
A: And then some. 
Q; Excuse me? 
Ai And then some. 
Q: What do you mean and then 
some. 
A: He was just mad because he had 
been put out because Russ 
didn't do anything. 
In Bradv v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (19^3). The court found 
that the prosecutor's failure to disclose an accomplice's 
confession after the defendant had specifically requested any of 
his accomplice's statements, denied the defendant evidence material 
to the imposition of punishment and thus violated his fourteenth 
amendment right to due process. Id. 
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In this case before the court the prosecution sit silently by, 
while the key witness Britt Martindale gave perjured testimony to 
the court and kept from the petitioner, the statement that she gave 
to police at her home November 12,1987, this statement would have 
impeached the witness Britt Martindale. A prosecutor's failure to 
produce all evidence favorable to the accused constitutes a due 
process violation even if the prosecutor acted in good faith. See 
U.S. v. Miranne. 688 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir 1982). 
The petitioner, Charles Webb was denied due process and a fair 
trial when the prosecution kept from the petitioner, the statement 
that Russell Martindale gave Detective Harvey Jackson on or before 
November the 3rd, 1987, that Detective H Jackson used in the 
probable cause statement Brady, 373 U.S. AT 83,87 but see U.S. v. 
Miranne, 688 F2d 980, 988 (5th Cir 1982). (Brady warrants 
consideration of degree of governments negligence or bad faith 
when prosecution loses or destroys exculpatory material), cert, 
denied, 459 U.S. 1109 (1983). This statement would have impeached 
the key witness Britt Martindale, if it had been made known to the 
jury. The evidence in that statement was, material to the 
petitioner's guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). 
The petitioner, was denied due process and a fair trial when 
the prosecution did not provide the defense a copy of the statement 
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that Britt Martindale gave Detective Harvey Jackson when she 
personally contacted him on October 26, 1987. See: the affidavit 
for search warrant of Larry John a detective with the City of 
Medford, State of Oregon in F,*"page 2. 
The statement that Britt Martindale gave detective Harvey 
Jackson would have impeached the key witness Britt Martindale and 
her husband Russell Martindale at trial, page 2, of appendix F. 
Ms. Martindale informed detective Jackson that 
she had been told by her husband, Russell 
Martindale, that Russell Martindale was also 
involved. That Russell Martindale had advise 
Ms. Martindale that the subjects had made 
Russell Martindale steal a vehicle and that 
said vehicle was used by Humphrey's in the 
robbery of the Salt Lake jewelry store. 
Britt Martindale on November 3, 1987, gave a statement to 
Detective Harvey Jackson, on page 3. 
Q: So Chuck came up to Russ and said that he 
need Russ to get a car. Did he tell Russ 
what he was going to do with the car? 
A: I don't know, I wasn't there. 
At trial Britt Martindale gave testimony on cross-examination 
by Ms. Wells (T.252) 
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Q: You know now, don;t you Ms. Martindale, 
that you husband stole a car from car 
country? 
A: Yes. 
Q: All right, and you know that that car was 
stolen in order/*facilitate the Trolley 
Square robbery; is that right? 
A: No, I didn't know that. 
At trial Russell Martindale gave testimony on redirect 
examination. (T. 413) by Ms. Wells. 
Q: So you are saying, Mr. Martindale, today, 
that despite anything you may have said 
on the 11th it is true that when you 
stole the car you knew nothing that was 
going to happen at Trolley Square; right? 
ht That is correct. 
The statement that Britt Martindale gave detective Harvey 
Jackson when she personally contacted him on October 26, 1987, if 
it had been made know to the jury that Britt Martindale told 
detective Harvey Jackson that her husband Russell Martindale was 
also involved. 
The jury might have afforded less weight to the credibility of 
the witness Britt Martindale. The facts in that statement should 
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not have been knowingly withheld from the defense, and the jury by 
the prosecution, see Mooney v. Holohan. 294 U.S. 10 3, 108, 
(1935)(due process violated when prosecutor who learned at trial 
that witness had committed perjury did not disclose this evideijice 
to defence counsel)• 
At the preliminary examination November 24, 1987, Britt 
Martindale testified on cross examination (P.T> 76) 
Q: When did you fir contact the police? 
A: I didn't. 
Q: You never did? 
A: My father-in-law did. 
The Supreme Court fashioned a three tier standard under which 
the degree of materiality of the withheld evidence required to 
6er 
overturn a conviction un^Brady varies with the specificity of the 
defendant's disclosure request. Id. AT 104, 107. First, when a 
prosecutor knows or should know that the government's case contains 
perjured testimony, a court should reverse for nondisclosure if 
there is flAny reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could 
have affected the jury's judgment." Id. AT 103-04. Second, if the 
defendant makes a request for specific Brady material and 
government fails to disclose it, a court should reverse whenever 
there is reason to believe that the nondisclosure "might have 
affected the outcome of the trial" Id. AT 104. Third, when a 
45 
defendant has made only a general Brady request, or no Brady 
request at all, a court may reverse only if the undisclosed 
evidence would create "a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise 
exist." Id. AT 112. In United States v. Aours 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
the Agurs court thus recognized that evidence may be so clearly 
exculpatory that due process requires its disclosure even when the 
defense fails to make a Brady request Id. AT 110-11. 
The only evidence linking the petitioner to this robbery, are 
the statements of the key witness Britt Martindale and her husband 
Russell Martindale and for the prosecutor's failure to disclose 
evidence that is material to guilt or punishment. Violated due 
process because the credibility of the witness was at issue. 
Compare United States v. Burroughs, 830 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 
1987). 
3. PETITIONER WAS DENIED DDE PROCESS 
AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE 
PROSECUTION EXPRESSED PERSONAL 
OPINIONS AND STATED FACTS NOT IN 
EVIDENCE IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
The prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system is not to 
strive for a victory in an adversarial contest, but to seek 
justice. 
Justice Sutherland's advice in Beraer v. U.S. 295 U.S. 78 
(1935), although specifically directed to United States Attorneys, 
is instructive to all prosecutors: 
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The U.S. Attorney is the representative not of 
an ordinary party to controversy, but of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation 
to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution, is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done. As such he is ... the servant 
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not estiape or innocence suffer. 
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to 
refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just 
one. 
Id. AT 88. See also Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 
3.8 (1983)(special responsibilities of prosecutor in criminal 
case); Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103 
(1980)(duties of public prosecutor or other government lawyer); 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 
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(1980)(responsibility of public prosecutor to seek justice, not 
merely to convict). 
When a prosecutors conduct deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, due process is violated. See Beraer v. U.S. 295 U.S. 78, 
88,89(1935) (New trial required when prosecutor misstated facts, put 
words into witnesses' mouths, spoke as if he had person knowledge, 
assume prejudicial facts not in evidence, bullied witness, and 
conducted self in "thoroughly indecorous and improper manner"). 
In this case before the court the petitioner, was denied due 
process and a fair trial when the prosecution expressed personal 
opinions and stated facts not in evidence in his closing argument. 
Under Utah law, Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 602. Lack of personal 
knowledge. 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless 
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a 
finding that he has oersonaiknowledae of the 
matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge 
may, but need not, consist of the testimony of 
the witness himself. This rule is subject to 
the provisions of Rule 703, relating to 
opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
Britt Martindale, called as a witness, at the instance of the 
state, on cross-examination by Ms. Remal: (T.285) 
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Ms. Remal: Q: Now Mrs. Martindale, you 
indicated earlier this morning when you were 
testifying you hadn't heard any conversation 
about a robbery be in planned for the 21st or 
any other date at Trolley Square; is that 
correct? 
A: Not at Trolley Square. 
Q: You hadn't heard anything about this 
particular robbery? 
A: No. 
On cross-examination by Ms. Wells Britt Martindale was asked. 
(T.252) 
Q: That was the car that was stolen in order 
to facilitate this robbery correct? 
A: I don't know what the car looked like. I 
couldn't tell you. 
Britt Martindale had no personal knowledge by her own 
testimony of the robbery at King's Custom Jewelers at Trolley 
Square or by her own testimony did she know that a car was stolen 
in order to facilitate this robbery. 
In closing argument, the prosecution stated facts not in 
evidence (T.615) 
When you have the eyewitness saying yes, 
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that's who it was, when you have a third party 
saying these people participated in a robbery 
that my husband helped to stage. 
A prosecutor may not make material misstatements of fact and 
must confine his opening statement and closing argument to 
admissible evidence on the record and to permissible inferences 
from that evidence. See United States v. Peterson, 808 F. 2d 969#, 
977 (2d Cir. 1987)(prosecutor's closing statements characterizing 
witness' testimony as lies permissible when shown at trial that 
assertion tied to statements in record and plaijily directed to 
credibility of witness); 
There is no evidence in the record that the petitioner Charles 
Webb participated in this robbery at King's Custom Jewelers at 
Trolley Square. There is no evidence in the record that the car 
Russell Martindale was give immunity for was used in the robbery at 
ThaT . 
King's Custom Jewelers. The only statement Jsst involved the 
petitioner in this robbery, was the prosecutor in closing argument 
(T621) 
The only logical way that, your common sense 
will allow you to put evidence together shows 
clearly the guilt of both these men, the 
gunman and the wheelman. 
The prosecutor offered know evidence to the jury, but his own 
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testimony that the petitioner Charles Webb was the wheelman, the 
states own witness Britt Martindale gave a statement to detective 
Harvey Jackson see appendix F. page 2. 
Russell Martindale steal a vehicle and that, 
said vehicle was used by Humphrey' s in the 
robbery of the Salt Lake City jewelry store. 
On November 11, 1987, Russell Martindale gave a statement to 
Detective Harvey Jackson on page 15 of that statement, 
A: The store. And uh, Humphrey was hiding, 
told me he was hiding behind the door and when 
the security guard came in, he just stepped 
out behind him and tookhis handcuffs and put 
them on him. 
Q: OK. Did he tell you how he got away? 
A: He told me he uh, he then went through 
some construction and, and got in this car 
that I got him and went and parked it 
somewhere and climbed in the truck of the 
Cadillac. 
Q: He told you that he got in into the car 
that you had got from Car Country? 
A: Yeah. 
The petitioner Charles Webb was charged and convicted of 
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aggravated robbery Utah Code 76-6-302(1978). 
1. A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery he: 
A# Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon; or 
B« Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
2. Aggravated robbery is a felony of the 
first degree. 
3. For the purposes of this part an act shall be deemed 
to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of 
or in the immediate; flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery. 
The witness Britt Martindale stated she in no way participated 
in the criminal activity or its planning or did she hear anyone 
planning the robbery at Kings Custom Jewelers located at Trolley 
Square in Salt Lake City, Utah. Russell Martindale states that he 
did not know anything about this robbery at Trolley Square, in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
There is no evidence in the record that the petitioner Charles 
Webb participated in this robbery or its planning. There is no 
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evidence in the record that the petitioner participated during the 
commission of or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery. 
The elements do not meet the charge of aggravated robbery the 
petitioner was charged with. 
The Supreme Court held in In Re Winshio 397 U.S. 358 (1970) 
that the due process clause the Fourteenth amendment provides that 
no state shall "deprive any person on life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; see U.S. 
Const Amend. V. requires the government to prove every element of 
the crime with which a defendant is charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If the government fails to sustain its burden of proof on 
any element, the defendant must be acquitted. See Winship 397 U.S. 
AT 364; See U.S. v Perico. 832 F.2d 705,714 (2d Cir 1987). U.S. ex 
rel. Hickev v. Jeffes 571 F 2d 762,764, (3rd Cir 1978) U.S. v. 
Mclntre. 836 F.2d 467,471-472(10th Cir 1987). The defendant must 
also be acquitted when the court fails to instruct the jury on any 
element that the prosecution is required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See U.S. v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1323, 1325 
(5th Cir. 1983). U.S. v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315,319,324 (6th Cir 
1988). U.S. v. Washington, 819 F.2d 221,226,(9th Cir. 1987). See 
Speiser v. Randall. 357 U>S> 513, 523, (1958)(State or federal 
government's definition of offense unconstitutional under due 
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process clause if"it offends some principle of justice so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental") 
Material misstatement of fact also constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct. See Q>S. v. Santana-Camacho, 833 F.2d 371 (1st Cir. 
1987)(prosecutor's incorrect statement that evidence demonstrates 
defendant illegally entered country constituted plain error and 
mandated reversal when prosecutor was Assistant United States 
Attorney; illegal immigration information is official information 
he presumed to know). 
In this case before the court, the petitioner was prejudice by 
the prosecution at trial when the prosecution gave the witness 
Russell Martindale the anonymous letter, so that he could use it in 
his testimony. The anonymous letter appears in appendix L. On 
November 11, 1987, the witness Russell Martindale gave Detective H 
Jackson a statement of page 12 of that statement. 
A: Urn, the first, the only thing he said to 
me was I, I'm gonna let you off for some of 
the money you owe me if you go get this car 
for me, ok. So I says ok, uh, I guess I'll do 
it. And he says ok, I got this car lot in 
West Valley. 
Q: Uh hum. 
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A: Ariel all you have to do is walk up there 
and ask the man to test drive it. So thctt's 
what I did. I test drove the car and, and he 
said, now if you get the car, meet me over 
here at McDonalds and give me the keys and 
ride the bus home and that's what I did. 
Now after the prosecutor gave the witness Russell Martindale 
a copy of the anonymous letter, Russell Martindale gave testimony 
at trial (T. 408) 
Mr Webb told me tha: he would pay my rent on 
my house if I did one thing for hiir;, and that 
was to go and test drive a car and take it 
back then go back the next day arid take it for 
another test drive, then give him the keys. 
See U.S. v Valentine. 820 F. 2d 565, 570 (2d Cir 1987) U.S. v. 
Kaufman, 803 F.2d 289,291-292(7th Cir. 1986). U.S. v. Foster, 874 
F.2d 491, 494-95 (8th Cir 1988). Brown v. Wainwriqfat, 785 F.2d 
1457, 1464-66 (11th Cir. 1986)(habeas relief granted when witness' 
false testimony material to outcome and government knew testimony 
false. 
The petitioner, was prejudice by the prosecution in closing 
argument when the prosecution stated facts not in evidence, the 
prosecution denied the petitioner, due process and a fair trial 
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when the prosecution in closing argument used the witness Russell 
Martindale as a co-defendant, and by doing so violated the lower 
court order to follow action on the witness Russell Martindale if 
he had any implication of this crime what so ever. (P.tape 87-2413 
side B) The statement the prosecution gave in closing argument is 
included in appendix M. 
In closing argument (T.616) The prosecution stated facts not 
in evidence. 
What difference does it make? Mr Webb, Mr Humphrey, Mr 
Martindale, were all down there in Las Vegas getting rid 
of the stolen property. That's what they were doing. 
There is no evidence in the record that the petitioner Charles 
Webb, or Mr Humphrey sold anything in Las Vegas that came from this 
robbery. The only evidence to the jury was the prosecution 
personal opinion. See United States v. Prantil supra; United 
States v. Risi 603 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Netz, 758 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1985). 
At the preliminary examination December 10, 1987, Case Number 
CR87-1572 Re: State of Utah v. Carolyn R. Greqerson, witness Britt 
Martindale gave testimony. 
Q: You had not reported to the welfare before 
that he was not living there? 
A: He was there for two day's and I had 
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talked to my worker. 
Q: So he was there for two days before this 
took place* 
A: Yeah. 
Q: And he had been gone for a period before 
that? 
A: Yeah. 
In closing argument the prosecution knew that Russell 
Martindale was not with his wife Britt Martindale from the 13th to 
the 21st of October 1987. The statement the prosecution gave the 
jury (T.571) 
The State suggests that the circumstances and 
the testimony of Mr Martindale and Mrs 
Martindale show there are no phone calls 
between the 13th of October and 26th or 27th 
of October, because he was in town. He was in 
town conducting some business with Mr 
Martindale and with Mr Humphrey. That 
business involved a jewelry store. 
The statement in closing argument prejudice the petitioner, it 
is the government duty not to present or use false testimony. See 
Brown v. Wainsriaht, 785 F.2d 1457, 1464 (11th Cir 1986) A 
prosecutor may not express any personal opinions about the 
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defendant's guilt or credibility or about matters requiring expert 
knowledge. The prosecutor knowingly misrepresented the witness 
-Britt Martindale's testimony; she gave at the preliminary 
examination December 10, 1987. In this case the only evidence of 
the petitioner's guilt, are the testimony of the witness Britt 
Martindale, and for the prosecutor knowingly misrepresented the 
testimony of that witness when this case rested on the credibility 
of the witness Britt Martindale •« 
4. PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED THE 
PETITIONER BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that ineffective 
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment requires 
A, 
"Showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsels guaranteed the defendant by the 
sixth amendment. 
"[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of 
reasonably effective assistance Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984). 
In this case the petitioner, was denied a fair trial by his 
court appointed attorney, when she would not push the motion to 
sever the petitioner Charles Webb's trial from the co-defendants 
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Humphrey, that the petitioner's privately retained attorney filed. 
If a court finds compelling prejudice even though the initial 
joinder of defendant was proper, it must order severance. United 
States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438,449 n.12 (1986): Kotteakos v. Unites 
States,328 U.S.750,765 (1946). Such prejudice may result from: (1) 
defendants' antagonistic or mutually exclusive defenses. Prejudice 
can result when conflicting and antagonistic defenses create an 
undue inference of guilt. See United States v. Buliubasicf 808 
F.2d 1260, 1263-64(7th Cir.)(Severance necessary when co-
defendant's defense portraying defendant as violent thug so 
inconsistent as to give rise to "unjustifiable inference" of guilt) 
cert denied. 108 S. CT. 67 (1987). But of United States v. 
O'Connell, 841 F 2d. 1408, 1432 (8th Cirl)(mere assertion that 
defenses may be inconsistent insufficient to require severance 
based on mutually exclusive or antagonistic defenses) cert, denied, 
108 S. CT 2857 (1988). Joinder must not require the jury to choose 
between competing defenses so that believing one defendant 
necessarily convicts the other defendant. See Person v. Miller. 
854 F. 2d 656, 666 (4th Cir 1988). (2) A co-defendant who has 
exculpatory testimony to offer at a separate trial but is unwilling 
to testify in a joint trial due to the potential for self-
incrimination, or (3) A violation of the rule in Burton v. United 
States. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The court in Burton held that the 
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sixth amendments7 confrontation clause prohibits the introduction 
of a co-defendants extrajudicial confession if it incriminates the 
defendant even when it is introduced only against the co-defendant. 
Id. AT 137. 
A denial of severance will only be reversed by the Supreme 
Court if it is affirmatively shown that a defendant's right to a 
fair trial has been impaired. State v. Velarde. No. 19682 (Utah 
Sup. Ct. filed December 4, 1986). 
-In this case the petitioner was denied a fair trial by his 
court appointed attorney from the legal defenders jointly 
representing co-defendants. Independent counsel would have 
actively sought a severance from Humphrey and would have distanced 
Webb from Humphrey in all aspects-as opposed;to joint motions and 
joint voir dire. 
Neither the store owner nor the security guard identified the 
petitioner as the armed robber (T. 85, 187-188). None of the 
petitioner's fingerprints were found in the alleged get-away 
vehicle found near trolley square (T. 368-69, 379), A vehicle which 
Russell Martindale stole (T. 262, 344, 394). The only evidence 
against the petitioner consisted of the testimony of Britt 
Martindale and the gun, ring and watch seized from the petitioner 
apartment some two weeks after the robbery. Without Britt 
Martindale's testimony, there was no evidence to support a robbery 
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conviction against the petitioner, at best, it could be argued that 
he had possession of stolen property. State v. Kalisz. 735 P. 2d 60 
(Utah 1987). 
What the evidence did establish is that co-defendant Humphrey 
robbed the jewelry store (T. 85, 187-188). Further, the evidence 
established that the person who stole the get-away vehicle was 
Russell Martindale (T. 262#, 344, 394), that Humphrey was living at 
the Martindale's at the time of the'robbery (T. 277, 343). That 
immediately after the robbery, Humphrey shaved off his beard at the 
Martindale's home (T. 2$8). And that same night left for Las 
Vegas, Nevada with Russell Martindale (T.241). Subsequently, 
Humphrey returned to stay at the Martindale's (T. 293-294, 434)• 
The petitioner was denied a fair trial when he was tired with 
the co-defendant Humphrey, the petitioner, could not bring out to 
the jury that John Humphrey on September 4, 1987, robbed Sounds 
Easy Video. See appendix B2",f and that Britt Martindale just may 
have been John Humphrey's get-away driver, at the Sounds Easy Video 
Robbery, John Humphrey was staying with the Martindale's from 
September to October 21, 1987, the petitioner's court appointed 
attorney
 tfrom the Legal Defender Association would not cross-
examination the co-defendant John Humphrey in the defense, for the 
petitioner, due to a conflict of interest with the co-defendant's 
attorney from the same legal defender association. The 
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petitioner's court appointed attorney would not bring out to the 
jury that Russell Martindale did a robbery at Ungers Jewelers in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, see the affidavit of Rhonda Blanchard in 
appendix N. The petitioner was prejudice, and denied a fair trial 
when he was tired with the co-defendant Humphrey when the 
prosecutor in closing argument (T.618) 
-Russ Martindale is the great leader of the 
pack. You saw him on the witness stand. Doe 
that man look like he is capable of pulling 
off an armed robbery without the help of 
anybody else? By himself? Were these 
gentlemen assisting him? UH-UH. 
The petitioner's court appointed attorney would not bring out 
to the jury that the key witness Britt Martindale on November 3, 
1987, gave a statement to Detective Harvey Jackson in that 
statement she told Detective Jackson that it was the petitioner, 
Charles Webb that did a robbery back easr. Knowing it was her 
husband Russ Martindale that did the robbery. The witness Britt 
Martindale would say anything to keep her husband out of jail. See 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17(1974). Compare Clark v. 
0/Learv. 852 F.2d 999,1005-08 (7th Cir. 1988) and U.S. v. 
Pritchett, 699 F.2d 317, 321 (6th Cir 1983) 
The petitioner's court appointed attorney would not bring out 
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to the jury that Russ Martindale was a armed robber, and it was 
Russ Martindale that did the robbery back east, by himself without 
the petitioner assisting him, if it were made known to the jury 
that the wife of Russ Martindale would say anything to protect her 
husband the jury might have afforded less weight to the credibility 
of the witness, rather than upon the guilt of the accused. And for 
the petitioner's court appointed attorney not to push the motion to 
server, denied the petitioner, a fair trial, and due process 
guaranteed the petitioner, by the United States, and Utah 
Constitution. 
Petitioner, Charles Webb was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel, when his court appointed attorney would not push the 
motion to suppress the shotgun that the petitioner's privately 
retained attorney filed. The shotgun introduced at trial was not 
the shotgun used in the robbery/ and was prejudicial evidence being 
put before the jury. 
Strickland also held that, in order for a defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to require reversal, the 
defendant must also show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. AT 687. To show such prejudice, 
"The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the 
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proceeding would have been different.ff Id, AT 
694. 
Here, that is the case. At the preliminary examination, the 
security guard Steven Church gave testimony (P.T. 40) 
"It was a automatic pump shotgun, 12 gauge 
silver barrel with a wood stock". 
(P.T. 43)" Now you have indicated that, that 
this was a 12 gauge shotgun why are you so 
sure? 
(A) I'm familiar with weapons sir. 
(Q) Could you tell what color the stock of 
that weapon was? 
(A) A maddick, brown, natural finished wood 
dark. 
(P.T.44) Did you notice any additions or 
subtractions to the weapon, other then what 
you have already testified to? 
(A) No Sir. 
On cross examination (P.T. 53) do the security guard Steve 
Church. 
(Q) A. The shotgun you have indicated that 
was a 12 gauge gun, I assume you have 
your experience with guns from the 
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military primarily. 
(A) Yes mamn. 
(Q) And you have indicated the color was it 
the barrel was silver but the stock of it 
was dark wood. 
(A) Matt wood, yes mamn, matt finish wood. 
The shotgun introduced in evidence by the state was 
prejudicial, and the petitioner's court appointed attorney should 
have pushed the motion to suppress the shotgun that the 
petitioner's privately retained attorney filed. The shotgun 
introduced at trial as a 12 gauge shotgun with a blue barrel, and 
a pistol grip with black tape around the i pistol grip. At the 
preliminary examination (P.T.51) on cross examination of the 
security guard Steven Church. 
(0 It didn't frighten you to have a shotgun 
pointing at your abdomen? 
(A. I've had it before. 
(Q) How many times? 
(A) To many to count, I'm a retired military 
man, two tours in Viet Nam so I have 
dealt with firearms before. 
The security guard Steven Church would be an expert witness on 
firearms, he is a retired military man with two tours in Viet Nam, 
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and his testimony, that the shotgun used in this robbery was a 
automatic pump shotgun 12 gauge silver barrel with a wood stock a 
maddick, brown, natural finished wood dark. 
It was prejudicial for the petitioner's court appointed 
attorney not to push the motion to suppress the shotgun that the 
petitioner's privately retained attorney filed. 
The petitioner's court appointed attorney deficient 
performance prejudiced the petitioner's defense. The petitioner 
could not bring out to the jury that the shotgun introduced in 
evidence was not even similar to the shotgun used in this robbery. 
If the jury would have known that Russell Martindale on November 
11, 1987, gave a statement to Detective Harvey Jackson, and on page 
14, of that statement was asked. 
(A) And did you see the shotgun? 
(A) Yea, I did when he took it out. 
(Q) Took it out of what? 
(A) Out of the house. 
(Q) Where was it? 
(A) Uh, he stuck it in the bag, in the bag. 
At trial, Russell Martindale gave testimony (T.395) 
(A) She just said she wanted the gun of the 
house, the** Mr Webb tooK it out of the 
house. 
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At the preliminary examination Britt Martindale gave . 
testimony. (P.T. 86) 
(Q) Who took the shotgun? 
(A) Both, well I handed it to them. I took 
it out the door. 
(Q) And handed it to. 
(A) Chuck. 
(Q) He was going to leave without it? 
(A) No. 
(Q) Was he leaving when you walked out the 
door to hand it to him? 
(A) No. 
(0) He was coming? 
(A) He just got there. 
At trial Britt Martindale gave testimony (T. 241) 
(A) They came and got my husband and I handed 
the shotgun to Chuck and they left for 
vegas. 
In closing argument (T.619) the prosecutor told the jury. 
"The rusty color that Mr. Karmilian talked 
about was the color of the stock. It wasn't 
the color of the barrel. And no amount of 
twisting or working with his transcript or his 
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preliminary hearing testimony is going to 
change that. 
The prosecution stated facts not in evidence and, misstated Mr 
Karmilian's testimony he gave at the preliminary examination, to 
lead the jury to believe that this was the shotgun used in this 
robbery. The testimony Mr Karmilian gave about the shotgun appears 
in appendix 0, 1 of 3 pages. 
Mr. Karmilian never did say that the rusty part, was the stock 
of the shotgun, but he did give testimony that the rusty part was 
the barrel. 
The petitioner's court appointed attorney prejudiced the 
petitioner's defense, when she would not push the motion to 
suppress the shotgun. Strickland, 4&& U.S. AT 687. To show such 
prejudice the petitioner, could not bring out to the jury that the 
shotgun Britt Martindale testified as being the shotgun she seen at 
her home the day of the robbery, could not have been but was the 
shotgun that she seen at the petitioner's home many times before, 
the petitioner could not bring out to the jury that the key witness 
Britt Martindale would say anything to keep her husband's plea 
bargaining with the state of Oregon, Idaho, and Pennsylvania. 
If the jury would haven known that this was not the shotgun 
used in this robbery, the jury may have given less weight to the 
credibility of the key witness Britt Martindale, and more weight to 
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the credibility of tin apartment manager April Dean, who testified 
that she did not see the petitioner, Charles Webb or his car at the 
apartments in zhe month of October but did see %&& him, and his car 
ttt£ first part of November (T. 417-18). 
The petitioner was denied a fair trail, and due process by his 
court appointed attorney when she would not file a motion for pre-
trial determination of the admissibility of co-defendants 
statements. At the preliminary hearing the Honorable Judge Grant 
on the courts own motion, told the prosecution, and the attorneys 
from the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, that if Russell 
Martindale, at some future date, he becomes a witness, then we have 
to deal with that. The prosecution, and the attorneys from the 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association knew that Russell Martindale 
was going to be a witness for the State. See: The response to 
request for discovery in appendix P. At a hearing the petitioner, 
could have pre-trial determination of the admissibility of all co-
defendant's statements because he believes that many, if not all 
would be inadmissible and, therefore, pre-trial exclusion would 
avoid prejudicial evidence being put before the jury. At such a 
pre-trial hearing the petitioner could have brought out that the 
statement Britt Martindale gave Detective Harvey Jackson that her 
husband left with the petitioner, and co-defendant Humphrey in 
petitioner car, at 11:30 p.m. the night of the robbery, could not 
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have happen. Russell Martindale on October 21, 1987 pawned items 
of jewelry in Las Vegas Nevada, and if he left Salt Lake City Utah 
at 11:30 p.m. on the night of the robbery, he could not have sold 
anything on the 21st of October, but if he left Utah right after 
the robbery as the anonymous letter said, page 4, and as co-
defendant John Humphrey gave testimony to at trial (T.439) 
(A) Yes. We left about 5:00, I think it was. 
It could have been brought out in the hearing that the only 
way Russell Martindale could have pawned items of jewelry in Las 
Vegas, Nevada on the 21st, of October, was to have left Salt Lake 
City, Utah, at or about 5:00 p.m. on the night of the robbery. 
At such a pre-trial hearing petitioner, could have brought out 
that Russell Martindale on November 13, 1987, gave a phone call 
recorded statement to Detective Harvey Jackson, and told Detective 
Harvey Jackson that he did a robbery at Ungers jewelers in 
Pittsburgh PA, and that he used a red bag, and he ran and climbed 
in the rrunk of petitioner, car and petitioner, only gave him 500 
hundred dollars to pay his rent, at such a pre-trial hearing, 
petitioner, could have brought out that this was what Russell 
Martindale's wife Britt Martindale told Detective Harvey Jackson 
happened in the Utah robbery. This evidence would bear only upon 
the credibility of the witness, rather then upon the guilt of the 
petitioner. 
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At such a pre-trial hearing petitioner could have brought out 
that on November 11, 1987, Russell Martindale gave a statement to 
Detective H Jackson on page 6 Russell Martindale told Detective 
Harvey Jackson. 
I don't have dime one in my pocket and how, 
how would I get home, you know. 
At the hearing petitioner, could have brought out that the 
wife of Russell Martindale sent him money when he was out of town. 
See: Comcheck Public Money Transfer, in appendix Q. 
At such a pre-trial hearing the witness Russell Martindale 
would have been charged with aggravated robbery by the order of the 
preliminary hearing Judge Grant, (P. Tape 87-2413 side B) 
And if you admit on this stand any impliccttion 
of this crime what so ever the court will have 
no other choice but to instruct the county 
attorney to follow action. 
Under Burton v. United States, the witness Russell 
Marrindale#s•out of court confession would have becm inadmissible, 
and, therefore, pre-trial exclusion would have avoided prejudicial 
evidence being put before the jury. 
(P.Tape 87-2413 Judge Grant talking about Russell Martindale's 
testimony. 
Now the conspiracy aspects for Mr. Webb I can 
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understand, but even at that rate he just may 
simply become a co-conspirator and quash the 
fact. 
The petitioner's court appointed attorney prejudiced the 
petitioner's defense. Strickland. 466 U.S. AT 687 in keeping from 
the court a true and accurate transcript of the preliminary hearing 
when Russell Martindale took the stand. And led the court to 
believe that all that was said was Russell Martindale taking the 
5th Amendment. See appendix G. 
"The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different" Id. AT 
694. 
Here, that is the case, at a pre-trial hearing a true and 
accurate transcript of the preliminary hearing would have been 
brought out, Russell Martindale would have been charged, with 
aggravated robbery by the order of the lower court, the fact would 
have been quash against the petitioner, when Russell Martindale 
became a co-defendant. The petitioner, would not have been tried 
with co-defendant Humphrey. The only evidence against petitioner 
was after the fact. 
An accessory after the fact could not be indicted jointly with 
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the principal defendant, nor tried with himf but if tried at all, 
he had to be tried separately. People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 
P. 737 (1891). 
The aggravated robbery charge then would have been dismissed 
against petitioner a much different result then what actually 
occurred. 
The petitioner, Charles Webb was denied his right to the 
effect assistance of counsel, because his appointed counsel, The 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, improperly represented both 
petitioner, and he co-defendant Humphrey, at their joint trial. 
This conflict of interest warrants a reversal of the petitioner's 
conviction. 
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, The United States 
Supreme Court reversed the convictions when it concluded that the 
trial court had improperly required a public defender to jointly 
represent three defendants despite timely objections that such 
represenration created a conflict of interest. Where the potential 
of a conflict had been raised at trial, the court held that 
prejudice would be presumed. 435 U.S. AT 490. 
Once notified, the court must take adequate steps to remedy 
the problem so that the defendant is not deprived of effective 
assistance of counsel. People v. Jones. 121 111. 2d 21, 111 111. 
Dec. 164, 520 N.E. 2d 325, 329 (1988). Citing, Holloway, 435 U.S. 
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475. 
-Here, petitioner's, motion for severance, and co-defendant 
Humphrey's motions for conflict of interest and trial separation 
were sufficient to alert the trial court to the potential for 
conflict. But under Cuyler v. Sullivan 446 U.S. 335 (1980) The 
Supreme Court explained that a trial court has a limited duty to 
avoid potential conflicts of interest, ID. AT 346. That duty 
requires a court to initiate an inquiry into a potential conflict 
if it knows or reasonably should know that a potential conflict 
exists. Id AT 347 (divergence or compatibility of co-defendant's 
interests are factors used to determine whether court had notice of 
potential conflict); see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 
(1978)(when court knows of conflict, it should appoint separate 
counsel or ascertain whether risk is too remote to warrant separate 
counsel); 
In the case at bar, under Cuyler v. Sullivan, the trial court 
knew that a potential conflict exists. And was put on notice of 
the potential conflict at the preliminary hearing by the Honorable 
Judge Grant, see (P.Tape # 87-2413) 
"The Honorable Judge Grant, it appears to me 
that with these two defendants you have a 
significant conflict, then to add in the fact, 
that Miss Harold is representing Gregersen, 
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that the legal defenders could even deal with 
it." 
When a trial court has notice of a potential conflict and 
fails to iisquire, the reviewing court presumes prejudice to the 
defendant. Compare Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475. 484 
(1978)(violation of right to assistance of counsel when trial judge 
failed to investigate claim of possible conflict of interest on 
part of defendant's attorney) and U.S. v. Sutton. 794 F.2d 1415, 
1419 (9th Cir. 1986)(dictum)(violation of right to assistance of 
counsel when defendant raised timely objection to joint 
representation based on risk of conflict of interest, and trial 
court failed to either appoint separate defense couns€»l or take 
adequate steps to ascertain whether risk too remote to warrant 
individual representation). 
In the case at bar, the petitioner, ask his court appointed 
attorney for a true and accurate transcript of the preliminary 
hearing tape when Russell Martindale took rhe stand. To bring to 
the court of the conflict, petitioner's court appointed attorney 
gave the court a one page transcript and told the court that was 
all that was said. See appendix G. Co-defendant, John Humphrey in 
a pro se motion brought to the courts attention that the* tapes was 
different then the preliminary transcript (R.ll). 
Co-defendant John E Humphrey in a prose motion put the trial 
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court on notice of the potential conflict. (R.12) 
"Mr Humphrey: I might as well submit this 
motion for conflict of interest. 
The court: I will deny them all, whatever 
they are." 
In the case at bar, the trial court was put on notice and was 
timely notified of a potential conflict. See Hollowav v. Arkansas, 
435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978)(Failure of trial judge to investigate 
claim of possible conflict is violation of right to assistance of 
counsel). 
Petitioner, Charles Webb, respectfully requests that this 
court reverse the conviction and grant petitioner, a new and 
separate trial with new counsel, free of any conflict. 
5. THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AT THE HOME OF 
THE PETITIONER WAS IN VIOLATION OF 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE DNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
A person may waive fourth amendment protection by consenting 
to a warrantless search by law enforcement officers. Whether a 
defendant has voluntarily consented to a search is a question of 
fact which will be upheld on appeal unless the lower court's 
finding is clearly erroneous. 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that consent was in fact freely and voluntarily 
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given. United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 754 (5th Cir. 
1988) . United States v. Massell, 823 F.2d 1503, 1507(llth Cir. 
1987)(burden on prosecution to prove consent was voluntary). 
On Januarys 22, 1988, a motion was before the court to 
suppress, Detective Ray Dalling was called as a witness, for the 
state and testified as Follows: (665). 
(By Mr Cope) 
(Q) you were going to tell us how the police got into 
the residence. 
(A) We knocked on the door, it was opened by 
Ms. Gregersen's son, the young...not the 
infant but the teenage boy. 
(Q) And what did you say when the door was 
open? 
(A) We identified ourselves as police 
officers and moved the young boy out of 
the way up against the wall. 
J.C. Chester, Ms Gregersen's teenage boy called as a witness 
for the defendants and testified as follows: (R687). 
(0) What happened, do you recall what 
happened? Do you recall the police coming 
to the door? 
(A) My mom went to the door and she unlocked 
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the door. When she was about to turn the 
knob, they pushed the door in and knocked 
her down, and then I heard a lot of noise 
and then the bedroom door opened, and 
then all I seen... then there was this cop 
holding the gun in my face. 
Carolyn Renee Gregerson, called as a witness, and testified as 
follows for the defendants. (R 696) 
(A) The police knocked on the door and I 
opened the 4<>ox> I unlocked J.t and just 
as I was going to open it, it was pushed. 
The door was pushed in at me and I was 
knocked on the floor. 
(Q) Now, do you remember talking to the 
officers about (R.697) consenting to a 
search? 
(A) No, I do not. 
(Q) Do you remember signing a document? 
(A) No, I do not. 
(Q) Do you remember reading a document? 
(A) No, I do not. 
(Q) Then you were taken to the jail? 
(A) Yes. 
78 
On January 22, 1988, The Honorable James S Sawaya denied the 
motion to suppress. That denial by the court appears in appendix 
R. The Honorable James S. Sawaya did not believe Carolyn Renee 
Gregersen when she %pld the court that she did not sign the 
permission to search agreement, but did believe Detective Harvey 
Jackson when he gave testimony (R653). 
Detective Dalling went over the right for him 
to search and Renee signed it and I witnessed 
it along with detective Dalling. 
The Honorable James S Sawaya also believed the testimony of 
detective Ray Dalling over the testimony of Carolyn Renee 
Gregersen, when detective Ray Dalling gave testimony (R.670). 
A: No, on the contrary, I had explained to 
her that she did not at anytime have to 
give us permission to search. Also 
explained to her that anytime she wished 
to, she could drop her consent to the 
search and the search would be stopped. 
Renee Gregersen did not sign the permission to search form see 
the affidavit of Renee Gregersen in appendix S. Carolyn Renee 
Gregersen knew she did not sign the questioned search document. To 
show the court that she did not sign the permission to search 
agreement Carolyn Renee Gregersen brought in Linda J Knight an 
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experts witness who gave testimony May 20, 1988, at the renewed 
motion to suppress, that her opinion is (R.29) that Carolyn Renee 
Gregersen did not sign the consent to search form. 
Rule 12 (G)(4)(77-35-12, enacted by L. 1980, Ch 14,§1; L. 
1982,Ch 10,§3.) 
If the defendant or applicant establishes that 
the search or seizure was unlawful and 
substantial by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the peace officer or governmental 
agency must then, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, prove the good faith actions of the 
peace office. 
In the case at bar, the only evidence the prosecuting attorney 
offered to the court that the signature on the permission to search 
agreement was genuine, was his own statement to the court. (R.44) 
But we don't think that has anything to say to 
this court because people have testified in 
this court about how the signatures were 
obtained. 
The question before the court was not how the signatures was 
obtained, but was the signature genuine. 
Detective Harvey Jackson, report on November 4, 1987, was that 
Carolyn Gregersen gave verbal consent for R/O to search the 
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premises, and property was seized and placed in evidence. The 
November 4, 1987 report of Detective Harvey Jackson appears in 
appendix T., 
On January 22, ^ 988, a motion was before the court to suppress 
detective Harvey Jackson, called as a witness, at the instance of 
the state, and testified as follows: (R.653) 
It was a consent to search form. I filled out 
the initial part of the information, 
referenced Renee#s name in the address. 
Detective Dalling went over the right for him 
to search and Renee signed it and I witnessed 
it along with detective Dalling. 
The testimony detective Harvey Jackson gave January 22, 1988, IAM5 
inconsistent to his statement in his police report of November 4, 
1987. This would draw in the credibility of the witness and the 
good faith of the peace officer. 
The prosecution did not prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that Carolyn Renee Gregersen signed the permission to search form. 
The prosecution brought in no expert witness to give testimony 
that the signature on the permission to search form was Carolyn 
Renee Gregersen's. 
The petitioner establishes that the search was unlawful by a 
preponderance of the evidence when Linda J Knight an experts 
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witness a Certified Graphoanalyst gave testimony that her opinion 
is (R.29). 
My opinion is that Carolyn Gregersen did not 
sign the consent to search form. 
The court denied the renewed motion to suppress on May 23, 
1988, without citing any authority, the court failed to meet the 
procedural requirements of Utah Code Ann.§(77-35-12) Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Rule 12 (G)(1) for the court to deny the renewed 
motion to suppress was so erroneous, the preponderance of the 
evidence proved that the search was unlawful and a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
This case should be reversed, and grant the petitioner, a new 
trial, free from any violations of the United States Constitution. 
6. THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THE PETITIONERS CONVICTION 
FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
The state has the authority to define the elements that 
constitute criminal conduct and may design statutes that facilitate 
proof of every element, see: McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 
79, 85 (1986)("In determining what facts must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt the state legislature's definition of the elements 
of the offense is usually dispositive") 
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
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punishment. See Gentry v. McDougall. 685 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
Due process does not require the government to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the^ existence of facts that do not bear on the 
defendant's guilt. See. U.S. v. Sandini. 816 F.2d 869, 875-76 (3rd 
Cir. 1987). 
For example, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) 
The Supreme Court upheld a statue that established a minimum 
sentence of five years imprisonment if the sentencing judge found, 
by a "Preponderancevof the evidence", that the defendant "visibly 
possessed a firearm" during the commission of the underlying 
offense. Id at 84, 91. The reasonable doubt standard was in 
applicable in proving "visible possession" of the firearm because 
that fact was not an element of the offense for which the defendant 
was charged. Id. at 87. Visible possession became an issue only 
after the defendant was found guilty of the underlying felony. Id. 
Furthermore, the statute did not provide for greater punishment; it 
merely required a minimum sentence already permitted under state 
law, Id. at 87-88. 
Sentencing enhancement statutes similar to that in Mcmillan, 
have been upheld as long as the fact that brings the statute into 
play is not an element of the offense, but rather a sentencing 
factor irrelevant to guiltf or innocence. 
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Ip the case at bar Utah Statute § 76-6-301, ROBBERY; 
(1) Robbery is the \j^lawful a n d intentional taking of 
personal property in the possession of another from 
his person, or immediate presence, against his will 
accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
In the enhanced statute Utah Code § 76-6-302(1978), AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY; 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in fho 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(A) uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, 
knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly 
weapon; 
(B) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree. 
The firearm enhancement does not apply to the petitioner's 
conviction for aggravated robbery. The fact that brings the 
enhanced statute Utah Code § 76-6-302, to a felony of the first 
degree, andfa greater pi^iishment, then that of Utah Code § 76-6-
301, a felony of the second degree, is the 'element of a firearm or 
a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife, or a 
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deadly weapon. The five year firearm enhancement to run 
consecutively to the sentence of five years to life would be double 
punishment and a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See^McMillian v Pennsylvania, 4 77 U.S. 79, 85 
(1986). The Judgment, Sentence, Commitment appears in Appendix V. 
The Utah Legislature has clearly expressed its intention to 
more severely punish all felons who use a firearm. State v Russell, 
791 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1990). Russell. 791 P.2d at 191. In the 
case at bar, it was the prosecutions theory of the case, that the 
petitioner drove the get-away car and otherwise aided in the 
robbery. 
On July 15, 1988 this case came of for a sentencing hearing 
before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge presiding. (S.T. 734) 
If the court is considering imposing a firearm 
enhancement, I would indicate that the evidence was that 
Mr. Webb was not a participant in the robbery itself 
according to the evidence, and therefore, would not have 
been in possession or would not have used a firearm 
toward another person. I believe that it would be 
inappropriate to enhance any sentence with the use of a 
firearm enhancement clause. 
A copy of the sentencing hearing transcript, page 734 is 
attached hereto in Appendix W. 
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The sentencino Court errored when the Judoe sentenced the »v-'itioner to an 
additional five years to run consecutively to the senrence of five years and may 
be for life for the firearm enhancement on the element of the an^ravated robbery 
charoe and not on the evidence that petitioner used a firearm. See Sentencing 
Transcript in appendix X (pane 737). 
(S.T. pane 737) "It will be the judgement and sentence of this Court 
that each shal]v serve the indeterminate term provided by law for the 
offense of aonravated robbery. That beinq not less than five years 
and what may be for life. The Court will find that based upon the 
findinns of the jury that they have been found guilty of that charge 
which contains an element of the use of a firearm. The Court will 
find that the firearm enhancement statute does apply." 
The Sentencing Judge abused his discretion and violated the petitioner's 
rights to due process when the Judre based the firearm enhancement on the find-
ings of the jury that the oetitioner was found ouilty of aggravated robbery 
which contains an element of the use of a firearm, and not on the proof of the 
preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner did not use a firearm. The 
Sentencino Judge used the fact that brings the statute, Utah Code § 76-G-302, 
into play to sentence the petitioner to a greater punishment. The firearm enhan-
cement should be reversed. 
7. THE SIXTF JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE SUB-
JECT r-PTTER JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S 
D~TTTTf>* 
t l_ I A I X \J 
(?) PULE 6b D EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF. 
(b) (1) Scope, ^ny person committed by a court to inprisionnent in a state 
orison, or other correctional facility or countv jail who asserts that the commit-
ment resulted fron substantial denial of rinhts nav petition the Court for relief 
tinder this naranranh. This naranranh (b) shall govern proceedings based on claims 
realtinn to the orioinal connitnents and comnitnents for violation of probation 
or rarole. This naraoranh (h) shall not oovern proceedinqs based on claims relat-
ing to the terms or conditions of confinei^ent. 
Panrranh (b). T M s paragraph replaces subnaranraoh (i) of the forner rule 
that the Petitioner/^rellant, filed his Petition under 63 (L)(i) and the constit-
ution of Lu^' Artie1*: 1, Section 5. 
The Detitioner/Appellant raised claims in his petition that he was cenieo 
his rights u^der the Constitution nf the United States, and "tah, to cross-exam-
ination the witnesses aoairst birr or to crcss-exarin his co-defendant John Hump-
hrey • 1'^ en the Trial Judre rave a protective order that am' witness be it defense 
or prosecution concerning any aliened other bac acts by any witness would not be 
adnissible. This denied the Petitioner the richt in a iurv trial for the jury to 
\eioh the evidence circ1 10 determine the crecibilit/' of the witnesses. 
/At trial, on cross-examination by the Deputy County Attorney Janes V. Cope 
(T. ^17) °. Mow in an exchange with r s . Mells on direct txamination about 
031 n^ * as^ea vou, back on the llth cf riovenDer 1CC7, you nave 
i U » w Q v, C U * C i ^  U • u i Ct L M U t C M U S U U I M T ^  U f G w V 0 U UUlu L N C 
polict. at that ti^e ^er^ true; is that n> ht? 
•""list the part u!nere 1 saic f^unnhrey hac not sta^eu at ^y house 
accorrinr to /rat ~v statement sa/. I nor't recall. 
jhe nv-osecutir^ s^t si1entlw bv ,?hile the witness pussell ' a^tindale nave 
oerj»jred testimony to t^e court 6^ jury, arid kept from the court and jury the 
statenent nussell 'artinoale nave on f'ove^ber 1?, l?r7 to netective Harvey Jack-
son that was inconsistent with t^e rovenibt.r 11 ,\T1 statenert that Russell ''artin-
dale lust ^ave penurerl testimom' to. The Trial Courts irot^ctive order deniea 
credibility of the witness Russell Martindale. 
The Petitioner/Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel by 
the failure of his court appointed attorney to bring to the Court's attention the 
crucial Points of the preliminary hearinn when Russell Martindale took the stand. 
The crucial points was that the Horonable Judne Prant brouoht to the Courts att-
ention before trial, of the conflict of the leoal defenders jointly representing 
the co-defendant. The crucial noint that was withheld was the order of Judne 
Prart to charae Russell r'artindale with aonravated robberv in the case if he had 
any indication in this crime what-so-ever. See Brief in support of petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Supplemental Brief in support of Motion for Summary 
Disposition, as Petitioner/Appellant's Brief on appeal in support of his argument. 
The firearm enhancement does not apply to the Petitioner/Appellant's convict-
ion for aonravated robbery. The fact that brings the enhanced statute Utah Code 
| 76-6-302 to a felony of the first degree, and a greater punishment, then that 
of i'tah Coae § 7C-6-301 a felonv of the second decree, is tue element of a firearm 
T
'
he Sentencn'nn Jucne haset the firearm enhancement on t^e findinas cf the jury 
that Petitioner/Appellant was found nuilty of acnravated roDberv which contains 
:
he element of t*6 use cf r "irearm. dnti not on the T°of rr the orenoncerance *>* 
tu- evidence that t'~e r)etitiorer/^D^e1lart vie rot use ? firearm to sertence the 
Petitioner//nnellr^t to a greater ^urishr<ent. 
JYe ^ecition for "rit of f'abeas Corpus .-ids nronerlv filed in th- State Sup-
reme fourt, X ^ ^ P ^VK Petitiorer/'^tllcnt • ^s o>.riec o *>ir frinl ^r f subsuen-
uiol *!uir<l v M s rights une'er U<e Constitution of the Uni^d States, and Ucah 
subject matter jurisdiction to deten. ine the n.erits of the petition pursuant to 
Poile b5 C (b)(i). The Sixth Judicial District Court only had subject matter jur-
isdiction to hold a hearin^ in the interest of convenience and economy if the Pet-
ition should be tranbferrec to t^e district court havin" jurisdiction over the 
place of confinement. The Sixth Judicial District Court does not have the Judic-
ial power to over rule another nistn'ct Judn^,,
 0r the Utah Court nf Anpc?ls. 
(0) Commencement, The nroceedinn shall be commenced bv the filir^ of oetition, 
tonether with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the Court in which the commitment 
learinn to confinement was issued, excent that the Court mav order a Chanqe Of 
Venue on the motion of a party for the convenience of the oarties or witnesses. 
The Petitioner/Mpellant filed his netition with the State Supreme Court on 
December 10, 1991. The Petitioner/Appellant's petition was made returnable to 
the Sixth Districc Courtfcr Sanpete Countv, stating that the Utah Supreme Court 
is an anoellate Court and does not take evicence. Your oetition has therefore 
oeen referrea to the aoorooriate Court of neneral jurisdiction for disoosition. 
See ^DDenc^y v. 
nn Ja»uan' % 1°92 ^etitioner/^DnePant received notice rrcn the Sixth dis-
trict Court that on ^ecerDe^ 10, ]r?l thn Petition for 'rit of Habeas Lorous was 
^ece^ve^ in the Sannete Ocurtx/ Clef's office *n^h a cove** letter from r,he St^te 
Suoreme Court Clert. T he cover letter statp^ s,°ursuart tn A^ticle UIII, Sections 
0 and „ o^ the Utah State Constitution, the Utah Suorene Court hereby refers the 
enclosed -^tition for "rit of Habeas Corpus to the Sixth Jucicial District Court 
^f Sanpete County for sue1" ris™sition a^ ihe district Court CPC. S appropriate. 
3irireu n%/ reofferv Luttler See Appendix 7. 
TV ri/th Judicial r i 31 r i c t Court d V not Vv/* sul Vet ' r tter Vrisdiction 
to determine the merits of the petition pursuant to Rule 6b I (b)(1) and 2, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Sixth Judicial District Court was not the court in 
which the commitment leadinn to confinement was issued. 
The petition was properly filed with the State Supreme Courtwhen exinent cir-
cumstances existed under Pule 20 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the case 
at bar, the exioent circurstances were, when the portion of the preliminary hear-
inn transcript where Russell Partindale took the stand at the November 24, 1987 
preliminarv hearino were kept from the trial Court, and the Court of Appeals. See 
Supplemental Brief in suooort of Motion for Summary Disposition and Brief in sup-
port of frit Of Habeas Corpus as Petitioner/Appellant's Crief on anpeal. The ex-
igent circumstances were when the Court of Appeals based it's opinion on false 
information put before it. The Petitioner/Appellant was denied a fair trial as 
well as a fair anneal when the evidence was kept from the Court of Appeals. 
The exicent circumstances were when.the prosecution rave a perjured statement 
to the Court at the preliminary hearinn on November 24,1927. (Taoe 87-2^14) When 
t^e Ccurz asked tne rrosecution i* dt^y offer of immunity cr leniencv was ?iver\ to 
"usscil 'arcincaale and ^ritz "artinoale for crier "cestirronv. See naoe 2 anc 3 of 
the -^elininan' ^eariro, fove^oer 2^, 1C°7 cape r7-2-l- tuat was transmitted into 
^•»ver fyi1 i^muricy ^or t*e ar,r,ra*'6ter ^c^er' o^ .^er's "erelers ir ^ittb^urn5 
Tr. See ."p^encn > 2 . 
~
1
~L nLtitWer/Aor»-J1flrt rrawb that t! is ~^uft rill ^ant ar evidentiary 
hccirir" in tMs c^ s-. so LS-r; a full recorr ecn i: t M C V i" tMs ess-.. 
v. * J i 
I r l i c U o f c^e f n ren r i r ^ , /'rr»e 1 lent ^r^vs t / r t th i ^ „nurt n i l n.verst if e 
c'enidl of the Sixt«~ Judicial district Court, Sanpete County, arc rerand this case 
back to the trial Court for nev; trie! free from anv violation of the Constitution 
of the United States or the Constitution of Utah. 
nespectfu11v Submitted this 2, £• clay of Sentercber, l°r 5 
t ^ k^ZL / 6d< LAJJLMT 
v.f,r;r i cS i • C ^ L 
Attorney Pro Se 
P.O.Box 5u0 
runnison, Utah °4C34 
Certificate of "ail inn 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the brief of appellant was 
nailed , Postare preoaid this ££ day of September,1992 t o : 
Assistant Attorney reneral 
David F. Brvant 
tl?3 South 30P East, Suite 2?4 
* cr^/%ig£W^ 
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OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Christine F. Soltis 
72 East 400 south, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. No. 880283 
Charles Webb, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Pursuant to the the authority vested in this Court, 
this case is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for dis-
position. All further pleadings and correspondence should 
be directed to that Court. Their address is 230 South 500 
East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
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XRTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
South 2700 West . West Jordan, UT 84084 
DENT COMPLAINT CLASSIFICATION 
AGG ROBBERY 
IM (IF NOT COMPLAINANT OR BUSINESS) 
EX COOE 
EX COOE 
AOOITIONAL PERSONS NOT ON INCIDENT 
NAME 
COMPLAINT AS ESTABLISHED BY FOLLOW UP 
SAME 
OATE OF ORIGINAL REPORT 
9-4-37 
DOB 
0 0 8 
AODRESS 
AOORESS 
?: MJSOEMEANOR 
C FELONY 
SECTOR COOE 
OATE OF THIS REPORT £ ^ 
11-10-87 
RES PHONE 
RES PHONE 
BUS PHONE 
BUS PHONE 
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OPERTY NOT LISTED ON INCIDENT REPORT 
CUE OF ADDITIONAL PROPERTY 
STOLEN $ RECOVERED $ , DAMAGED $ . L O S T * . FOUND S. OTHER VALUE S . 
(CLONAL INFORMATION AND DETAILS 
On 11-9-87, at 1345 hours, RO showed Helen Lamoreaux a photo lineup. Lamoreaux was 
the victim of an aggravated robbery. 
Lamoreaux picked out a photograph of John E. Humphrey, and stated that she was 
absolutely sure that Humphrey was the person who robbed her at gun point at her 
place of employment. 
This case will be presented to the County Attorney for prosecution. 
REPORTING OFFICER 
ERTEL 
DISPOSITION 
Q ACTIVE 0 INACTIVE 
DP # 
13 
CALLf 
13 
APPROVING SUPERVISOR 1 
0 COMPLETED (P) Q CLEARED 0 UNFOUNOED 
[ TYPED BY 
CLEARANCE. ARREST 
0 JUV 
CHECK IF CONTINUED G 
FOLLOW UP OFFICER 
EXCEPTIONAL 
G AOULT 0 JUV D ADULT 
OATE ASSIGNED 
a ONIS 
G DMlS _ 
G CRIME ANALYStS 
D NO FURTHER LEAOS G INVEST CONTINUEO 
G COMPLAINANT REFUSED TO PROSECUTE (T) 
O CIVIL CASE 0 LOCATED / RETURNED HOME 
Q ATTORNEY REFUSEO TO ISSUE COMPLAINT (Y) 
G PROPERTY RETURNEO TO OWNER 
PROPERTY 
• C T T F R DESCRIPTION CODE AMOUNT LETTER DESCRIPTION CODE AMOUNT LETTER DESCRIPTION 
G YES O NO PENOING 
LETTER 
a YES a NO coNorrNL. 
WARN LTR 
£•£'•• £7 -98611 
IBjicT: RUSS MARTTNDALE 
K3E CNE 
l) 
•nnnmill ill W\ 7;12 HOURS, BETWEEN 
Sh: * "-98611 
BJFCT: RUSS MARTXNDALE 
GL CNE 
3E FOIJXWING I S A FHCNE CALL RBCDRDED CM NOVEMBER 13, 1 9 1 / . ,J , " I, HOIR BETWEEN 
\RVEY JACKSON AND RUSS MAittTlO^LE. 
HONE RINGING. 
: Hello? 
)• ^ Good morning nu^ T ipeak to Russ please. 
ii This is him. 
I; Russ hew are doxiiq, trj^ -s Detective Jackscn. 
\z Oh I'm alright, how about vou" 
2: Well Ifm doing fine. Russ 1 ^ :er£U' . • *
 nee^ t o g o over a f ^ rnore 
things• 
A: Yea wc «io, 
Q: Ok Russ let we explain scmsthing first of ail. Eo you recall the other evening 
when 1 advised you of your miranda rights? 
A: -•-• ': cc. 
Q: Do you o ^ i wneniber those? 
A: Yea I do, 
Q: Ana ; ..>,.* ,-i ,^i st and them? 
A: Yes/ 
Q: And your wii-ina to talk to me? 
A: Yea I am. 
0: And were going to, 
A: 7 just want to get urns ail cleared UD. 
Q: Ok, well, 
A: As much as "TOU ac« 
Q: Yea I appreciate ii, ana -. talked to txjtn Brirfc, and 1 talked to vour rather, 
now 1 understand that your hesitancy to teil me everything ya know when we first 
talked I know vou wanted tc taxk to your dac and get things squared away. But 
I think now is the time we need to take care of alj tras ok? 
Yea 1 understand, 
i Ok s* iron wnat 1 understand n\ speaking with^your dadf a we need to Ji A u^b, 
licit Tvnn Falls and Pittsburg.1 
lea, / i \ 
i { U 
Q: Jr., which one would you l i k e t o s t a r t with Russ? v 
A: Ck, a Twin F a l l s 1 g u e s s . 
Q: * k v/liy uuu yuu tell me about t h a t ? 
A: i Wo] I a , . . . . a . . / / hen a t h e f i r s t t ime whin \ liucJ ^rrtY me t o Las Vegas a l r i a h t , 
O: I A I ,ii htiii wah. t h i s Russ? ^ ^ /ycr 
1 1
 mi T J*wti / i t i i \\t m "T5-n=tafe=aut. Went dov^n t h e r e and 
;ASE: 87 -93611 
SUBJECT: RUSS MARTINDALE 
?PQE TWO 
2: Is that when he went down end gantoled the three hundred dollars? 
A: Yea. 
Q: Ok. 
A: And a, we came right back and we stopped in Salt Lake and picked up 
Ranee. 
Q: A huh. 
A: Drove up to Ranee's mem and dads. 
Q: S o you v^re with Ranee and Chuck then? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Ok, ^ r me AT «%**ZA^<%^£? 
A: And then a when he got up there he A urn Ranee' s mem and dad /f well 
when I was, when I got up there he told me he had this place in mind/ Ha S/&& *1* 
*
v
 /* /b/€ /BAAS • 
Q: Now does Ranee's mem and dad do they live in Twin Falls then? 
A: Yes they do.
 ;- — •" •—-——— — „ 
zo 
Q: Ok. 
A: A»b he went and looked over the place and he did it for a couple of days. 
I had no idea what he was up to, and then^lsl day that he decided to go do it, 
he a he came back to me and he said well I want you to go get a car. 
Q: A huh. ^ 
A: Ok, so se went and got a car. 
Q: Do you remariber where you got that car from? 
A: It was frcm a little car place in Burley. 
Q: Ok. What ki?5d of a car was it Russ? from* niouzA 
A: It was yellow, I'm not sure the year it was a USSBSS, Chevy Mawja. 
Q: A huh, and how did you get that? 
A: Just the same way I did •* Salt Lake. 
U: Took it for a test drive? 
A: Yea. 
Q: Ok did Chuck drop you off to get that car? 
A: Yea he did. 
Q: Ok so you got the car and what happened then? 
A: Ok, we drove back into Twin Falls. He a explained to me, 
Q: Ok now you drove into Twin Falls? 
A: Yes. 
Q: rrcm where? 
A; Burley. 
Q: Oh so you got the car in Burley then? 
A: Yea. 
\SL: 87-98(511 , 
JBJBCT: RUS$ MARTINDALE 
*GE IKREE 
: And he explained to we where he wantSPme to drive the car to «= 
out of -t^ fe place. 
rue 
): Where was that suppose to be? 
iz Well a I parked it on the next block over. 
2: Fran the jewelry store? 
\z Yea. 
2: Ok. 
k: And a and drove it to K-Mart after this thing happened. 
Q: Ok. 
A: And then a after that he said theres a box sitting in there c 
back counter. 
Q: A huh. 
A: He says all I want you to do go in grab the box and run out. 
Q: Ok. 
A: So that's what I did. Got in the car and went to K-Mart, and — 
and then he told me to get in the back seat and lay down, and 
UTAH . 
Q: And that was in his Cadillac? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So as far as you know that car was left at K-Mart. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you remember the%tore Russ? 
A: ...Un, I think it said Twins Fall Jewelry. 
Q: Ok so there was Chuck and Ranee and you in the car then? 
A: And the baby. 
Q: And the baby. Russ what was in the box? 
A: A frcm what I saw was just a bunch of junk. Ya know glass Src ^ ~ 
worth like a dollar seventy-five a piece. 
Q: What was suppose to be in the box? 
A: He said there was a bunch of big, big stones. But I never saw -
O- f> "uu wenc in and grabbed the box, where was the box sitting Ru> 
It was right on the back counter. 
Q: On the back counter? 
A: Yea. 
Q: Was the owner of the store in there? 
A: Yea he was sitting right in front. 
Q: So you just ran in and grabbed it and took off? 
CASE: 87-98611 
lUaTECT: RUSS MARTINEDALE 
AGE FCUR 
\z No just a hat and seme white western shirt. 
2: What kind of a hat Russ? 
kz A white hat. 
Q: Like a baseball cap or, 
A: Yea, 
Q: White baseball cap and white shirt? 
A: 
Q: Ok so you grabbed it jurrped in the car, drove to K-Mart you met Chuck and 
Ranee and then you came back to Salt Lake? 
A: Yea, he he was over by Isaac and he followed me all the way to K-Mart. 
Q: Oh I see ok. Un what ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ c S ^ o ^ e l^"t La^ce? 
A: A he then said a iust-SL,^.^ mvmi''iKiitii^ %TU*F that's when he came back 
he said, he said well none of this stuff is worth anything he said well 
Xf/I iust have to write it off. 
Q: Do you have any idea where he went to get rid of it? 
A: Fran what I understand he went tojOqden. 
Q: To, a jewelry store or a pawn shop 
A: . 
Q: Do you know which cne? ^^ 
A: Un, a, I'm not sure whafystreets are in Ogden, it was right across the 
street frcm a /HAII &&Gek *•* ****£ oF I7r& /»*/*> STAJ&STS -
Q: What happened to the box and the contents?^ ^  ^^ 7**1*4 £m *r A 
A: Well he a 3>guess threw-everything awavi&£ Uim break the box up m . ^O^DSTBJL 
Q: A huh. Ok, Russ I know that you mentioned that this happened after you got back 
frcm Las Vegas, 
A: A huh. 
Q: But can you narrow it down a little bit for ire, even as to a mcanth or anything 
like that? 
A: August. 
Q: It was in August sometime? 
A: I'm pretty sure it is. 
Q: Ok. 
A: If you get a copy of my phone bill you'll probably find that I made a call from 
Twin Falls. 
Q: So you rXL"*-u Eritt then? 
A: Yea. 
g: Ok, urn what about Pittsburg tb^Iluss? 
A: Ok, after he said he dicta*t Q a w f none of his money back on that one, he a told 
me te he wanted me to go do this thing back here ya know to get his money back. 
"
w
 —^ -
1
 "=» >™~iw he's makinq threats and everything. I didn't know what to do 
ZASE: 87-98611 
SUBJECT: RUSS MARTINDALE 
PA3E FIVE 
Q: So was it just you and Chuck then? 
A: Yea. 
Q: In the Cadillac? 
A: A huh That's when, that's when a we went back there the first time, 
Q: When was this about Russ? 
A: A, it happened in, at the end of August. Around the first oi^September. 
Q: Ok. Wtere did you go? 
A: Well a,.. .he drove a through a,.. .Qnaha, oh through Denver and up to Qnaha and 
and such, and then a straight into Pittsburg. 
Q: A huh. 
A: And He, and he stayed there a couple of days, ok and thai the next thing jf /OosrO 
dfe he came back to me and he says I found us a place. 
Q: Where were you guys staying? 
A: .. .We were staying at the Red Roof Inn out at the airport. 
Q: In Pittsburg? 
A: Yea. 
Q: And that's called the Red Roof Inn? 
A: Yea. 
Q: Ok.
 /AJ 
A: And then he found this place and they had a a great big box 3f a safe, 
A: n and he came back to we and he said,/trun in and grab that box out of the 
safe and take off. 
Q: A huh 
A : And I «srae in this big bag. So that's what I did. 0 ^ \ « < cs Q 
Q: So you went into the store? 
A: Yes I did. 
Q: And what did you do once you got inside the store? 
A: | I grabbed the box, and, ..ran out and he was parked in a parking terrace, and 
/\l ran in the parking terrace and he told me to climb in the trunk. 
Q: A huh. 
A: So that's what I did. And then he let me out about two hours later. 
Q: We^c •.- wearing any type of disguise Russ? 
A: A no I just had .ghirt shirt. 
Q: Do you remember the name of this store? 
A: Oh,. .let me see, it's um,Ungers. 
ZASE:'37-98611 
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Q: Ok. Did you see what was in the box Russ? ^ e 
A: -^ He pulled out of another box, the a, and a when he l e t me out an&ig, went through 
f t&B&e&fck TTi&Al *// /t*G ru>o /*>* r*> £ e r /ny CASH OOT • 
Q: AITOK: 
A: So that's what I did and .Like it was a whole lot heavier. 
Q: A huh. The*j& «^ H5 
A: And when he opened it up there was nothing in it but another little box. And m 
nine diamonds were in there. 
Q: What happened to those Diamonds? 
A: We went down to Indianapolis, Indiana and sold them to another guy. 
Q: Do you know who that was? 
A: A, I don't know the name of the place, but the oily way I can find it is to 
go there and shew scmeone hew to get there. 
Q: Was it a pawn shop or a jewelry store? 
A: It was a coin store. 
Q: What was it near, do you remsnber anything? 
A: A no it was way out on a, on a road near like each side of the road is 
a neighborhood and small businesses. 
Q: A huh. 
A: I7i/Tfj5 AH & Crtti "RgsngsnAc?*- /4&ovT 7~H*T • 
Q: Do you ranember how much money he got? 
A: He made about f i f teen hundred d o l l a r s . 
Q: Did you get any of t ha t money Russ? r ^ p %J\ 
A: He gave me five hundred dol lars t o pay my r a i t for September. * >oCN/ 
Q: Ok Russ did you use a gun in e i the r of those places? 
A: He bought a toy gun and to ld me t o s t i ck i t down my pants . 
Q: A huh. 
A: So that's what I did, he told me that I couldn't get in trouble for it. 
Q: ul Did you show the clerk the gun? I '^r^ ^ 
A: N No. I just kind of, I did'nt even really show it to her, I just kind of patted 
1\ 4tmm /toy STo/*i*g.H- 77**74$ ur#+T site r&<~z> />?e 7Z> &D-
Q: So did you grab that box out of the safe or did the a clerk? 
A: I did. She just, he told me if she started screaming tell her to shut up or I'd kill 
her BuT I didn't do that, I just when I patted my stcmach she went running off 
calling sanebody and I panicked and I cpened the safe and grabbed the box and ran. 
Q: Did Chuck happen to menticn whether or not he had dene either of those stores before? 
A: Un, I'm pretty sure he did, he said he had robbed a, burglarized a jewelry store 
right down the street en the corner in Twin Falls. 
Q: How long ago was that? 
- -u^  A^A^sir h& didn't say when it was. 
IASE: 37 -98611 
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Q: Did he tell you what he got out of it? JT'w K>OT Su&e 
A: He said a got a bunch of rings and something 4&&&^4fa&*. 
Q: Anything else you can remember about those Russ? 
A: That's about it en those 
Q: So en the Twin Falls store, you went in knowing you were going to steal that? 
A: He didn't tell me until the same day, 
Q: But when you vent in the store you knew what you were going to do? 
A: I knew that, <&&£ he J^/ju-nzf^^p^ 4 ^ . 
Q: A huh.
 AMt> /T &<>O<-&X»T &e tf**& 
A:
 - - -h© told me that that it's always been sitting there -r*> <srt?L4u* X walked up i&c 
Iter picked it up and #sB!m& out. 
Q: Are we honest on everything now Russ? 
A: Yea. 
Q: We're postive huh? 
A: Yea. 
EJ: Ok. Ok now you said he went to Medford, who is that? 
A: Chuck. 
Q: Ok. /vje *ub , ^ u 
Q: So Chuck, Hunphrey and you went to Medford? 
A: Yea. 
Q: When was this? - * 
hi It was about three weeks ago. 
Q: This was before the Salt Lake robbery then? 
A: After. 
Q: Oh it was after the Salt Lake robbery ? 
A: Yea. 
Q: Ok. 
A: He's still corplaining about it. Me paying him back, and threating to do harm to 
Britt and I and the kids. 
Q: A huh. 
A: I didn't know what to do. I just I, ..I wanted to, I didn't want to go with them. 
Q: What happened in Meford then? ' 
A: Ok theres a, there was a jewelry store there. 
Q: A huh. 
A: It's in the night time. And I guess he found this place out for a long time. He told 
me that all they had to do was run up and, and run right into the front windew. 
And a it would pep outbecause it was plastic. And he gave me a H^m^rr^n^ I went 
nter and ta*e a l l 
A b e said just s r ^ e e w a y ana 
and ne a» neXt- t o ^ 
^
 t o 1
 v ^ e UP-
vCu do that? 
^
 d i d
* .... ««a *aflt ^ ? 
„p in «*«**• 
you. **~ 
I d i d
 «at and e** in? 
„ ^ window out *» j broXe the ^ ^ 
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f 
A: That's when I traded if AJl /**> ' "" . 
Q: So this was after Stockton, ycu left Stockton and went up to Oregon? 
A: Yea. 
Q: So it was after that burglary that you left? 
A: Yea. 
Q: Ok. 
A: I just could fnt take anymore. breaking the law if anything happened. 
it may sound stupid . 
Q: Does a Britt or your dad know about that place? 
A: I don't think so. 
Q: Ok, are we clear en everything new Russ? 
A: That's everything. ^TH**? 
Q: No rare suprises huh? „*& ^ C J 2 ' y ^ i>*"'T 
A: Well I had to give y/>u gO^bf-m** 7 i? &*** about it. Ya know I imagine it could 
hurt your case. ' / 
Q: Well the case is not a problem it would have been damaging for you and Brltt. 
A: Yea well JTJUST u^ M-'Sgfr -TO £<rr IT A H ©<n i^ THE, opsti 
Q: Well I appreciate that Russ, now I'll call Jim at seven o1 clock then. 
A: Ok. 
Q: Ok. 
A: He should be there by then. I've got to get out of here I'll be late for work:' 
Q: Ok I'll give him a call at seven then? 
A: Alright. 
Q: Thanks Russ. 
A: Ok we^ll talk to you later. 
Q: Bye bye. 
A: Bye. 
THIS WILL CONCLUDE THE PHCNE CALL CONVERSATION THE TIME NOW IS 07:36 HOURS. 
TECS TAPE HAS BEEN TRANSCRIBED BY WOE HEAPS 96D CN THE EICHTH HJCXR OF THE MHJ. 
fill Q*#~fr~<£C~Tio&$ /on^o<e "By £>£T* CTA*-*LS>O^ , /^ - /*- / j "7-
DAVID E. YOCOM 
County Attorney 
JAMES M. COPE 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Buildin 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: f801) 363-7900 
v^x> j 
^^J 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT,COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT*LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN MPHRE^ DOB 12/16/34, 
B""""^  DOB unknown, 
,YN GREGERSEN DOB 11/02/47, 
Defendant(s). 
Screened by: J. Cope 
Assigned to: to be assigned 
BAIL $100,000.00 (Al 
BAIL $50,000.00 (B) 
BAIL $25,000.00 fC) 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 
The undersigned H. Jackson - SLCPD under oath 
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the 
states on 
crimes of: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 602 East 500 South, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 21, 
1987, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, 
JOHN EDWARD HUMPHREY, CHARLES WEBB and CAROLYN GREGERSEN, as 
parties to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally tock 
personal property in the possession of King Custom Jewelers 
from the person or immediate presence of Karekine Karmilianj 
against his will, by the use of a firearm or a facsimile of 
a firearm; 
COUNT II 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 602 East 500 bouth, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 21, 
1987, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 103, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JOHN 
EDWARD HUMPHREY, a party to the offense, assaulted Stephen 
Church, by the use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; 
(Continued on page Two) 
INFORMATION 
STAV^ v. JOHN E. HUMPHREY, CHARLES WEBB 
County Attorney #87-1-7382201/02/03 
Page Two 
and CAROLYN GREGERSEN 
THIS INFORMATION 
WITNESSES: 
IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
Det. John Lomax Sgt. Bill 
Martindale Russell Martindale 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Abbott Det. H 
Stephen Church 
Jackson Britt 
Karekine Karmilian 
case Your affiant is a police detective investigating 
#87-98611, the report of which he has read and relies upon in 
asserting that Mr. Karekine Karmilian, a co-owner of King Custom 
Jewelers at 602 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, reported that a 
bearded man with a sawed-off shotgun took $40,000.00 worth of 
jewels, and jewelry from the store on October 21, 1987 without 
permission. During the course of the robbery, the bearded man also 
threatened Stephen Church with the shotgun noted by Mr. Karmilian. 
Britt Martindale reports that on the afternoon of October 
21, 1987, Charles Webb and Carolyn Gregersen drove un to 
Martindale 1s home at 438 East Wasatch in a silver-blue 1983 
Cadillac. Webb got out and opened the trunk of the car. John 
Humphrey, a bearded man, then stepped from the trunk of the car. 
Humphrey then carried a ^*n*zs bag into Martindale fs r^ c^denr^.. 
Humphrey then went 
kitchen table. 
to the bathroom, leaving the canvas bag on the 
From the bag Webb took display travs of rings and other 
jewelry as well as a sawed-off shotgun. Webb gave Gregersen who was 
watching, a diamond timepiece and told her she could keep it. He 
then took all the items from the trays. 
Humphrev emerged from the bathroom clean-shaven and le^t the 
residence with Gregersen and Webb, who had placed the jewelry back 
into the canvas bag which Humphrey had brought into the residence 
earlier. 
/ 
Sq-bscribecL^,and_ sworn to before me 
Judge 
„J , y ^ n i . V .n...^ .... •••»,•*• /.,. i. 
Authorized for presentment an: 
f i 1 i ng : 
DAVID unty Attornev 
'>&f—' Deputy 
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STATE OF OREGON ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF JACKSON ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH; WARRANT 
>M27 
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X 
I, Larry Johnson, after being first duly sworn upon oath, 
depose and say: 
That I am a detective with the Medford Police, located in 
the City of Medford, County of Jackson, State of Oregon, and that 
I have been so employed for the past 15 years. 
That I have reason to believe that that certain business 
known as Mike The Traders, located at 401 South West Alder Street 
in Portland, Multnomah County, Oregon, said business being a 
second hand store operated and owned by Mike Vaden contains one 
hundred seven gold rings stolen from the business of John Nuich 
Jewelers located at 231 East Main Street, in Medford, Jackson 
County, Oregon on or about the 29th day of October, 1987, and 
that said one hundred seven gold rings are the subject of theft 
therefore subject to seizure* 
That the facts supporting my above described beliefs are as 
follows : 
That in the early morning hours of October 29, 1987r the 
Medford Police Department was informed by John Edward Nuich who 
is the owner of John Nuichfs Jewelry at 231 East Main Street in 
Medford, Jackson County, Oregon. That his business had been 
broken into and was the victim of a theft. That officers from 
the Medford Police Department investigated said complaint. That 
it was discovered that shortly before 5:00 a.m. on October 29, 
1987, unknown persons had entered said business by kicking and 
breaking a 3f by 5f front window. That after entering the 
business the glass in a display case inside the business was 
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broken out and it was determined by Mr. Nuich that a total of one 
hundred and seven gold rings were stolen from said display case. 
That said rings were of all kinds, shapes and descriptions and 
are more accurately set forth on Exhibit A which is a list 
furnished to me by Mr. Nuich which is attached to this affidavit 
and by this reference incorporated herein. 
That on November 13,, 1987, I talked on the telephone with 
- — — — • ^ 
Detective Harvey Jackson of the Salt Lake City Utah Police 
Department. That Detective Jackson told me that on October 20, 
1987, a jewelry store in Salt Lake City had been robbed. That 
Detective Jackson told me that he was personally contacted by a 
female named Brit Martindale on October 26, 1987. Detective 
Jackson told me the Brit Martindale advised him that she had 
information concerning his robbery. That Detective Jackson 
subsequently took a statement from Brit Martindale. That Detec-
tive Jackson told me that Brit Martindale fs statement was that 
the robbery in Salt Lake City was committed by a Tohn Humphries, 
a Charles Don, also known as Charles Webb and a Carol Greyson. 
That Ms. Martindale informed Detective Jackson that she had been 
told by her husbandf Russell Martindale, that Russell Martindale 
was also involved. That Russell Martindale had advised Ms. ^ i^ 
Martindale that the other subjects had made Russell Martindale 
steal a vehicle and that said vehicle was used by Humphries in 
the robbery of the Salt Lake City jewelry store. That Ms. 
Martindale further advised Detective Jackson that Mr. Humphries, 
Mr. Don an Mr. Martindale had then left the Salt Lake City area. 
That Ms. Martindale advised Detective Jackson that Russell 
Martindale said that he was afraid of Don and Humphries and told 
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Ms. Martindale that he was being forced to help them do robberies 
and burglaries. That Ms. MartiifCale provided Detective Jackson 
with a phone number where he could reach her husband, Russell 
Martindale in Vancouver, Washington. That Detective Jackson told 
me that he subsequently contacted Russell Martindale and later 
met with and interviewed Russell Martindale in Vancouver, Wash-
ington. That Detective Jackson told me that Russell Martindale 
stated that after the Salt Lake City jewelry store theft Mr. 
Martindale, Mr, Don and Mr. Humphries drove to Nevada where they 
sold that jewelry. That Mr. Martindale told Detective Jackson 
that they ended up_in Medford, Oregon, where Russell Martindale 
at the direction of Mr. Don and Mr. Humphries burglarized a 
jewelry store. That Detective Jackson told me that Russell 
Martindale stated that he knew the jewelry store in Medford was 
called John Nuich Jewelers. That Detective Jackson told me that 
ffir. Martindale stated that he kicked in the front window, then 
kicked out the display case glass and took a large number of 
rings. That Russell Martindale stated to Detective Jackson that 
W — mi ii I.I • " 
he then exited the store and was picked up by Mr. Dgn and Mr. 
Humphries. That Russell Martindale stated that this had occurred 
on October 29, 1987, in the very early morning hours. That Mr. 
Martindale then stated that all three of the subjects then drove 
to Portland, Oregon, where the checked into a motel room. That 
Mr. Martindale told Detective Jackson that in early afternoon of 
October 29, 1987, that Mr. Don and Mr. Humphries took the rings 
that Mr. Martindale and stolen from John Nuich Jewelers in 
Medford out of the motel room for the stated purpose of selling 
the said rings. That Mr. Martindale told Detective Jackson that 
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since he was left alone he decided to take advantage of the 
chance to get away from Mr. Don and Mr. Humphries therefore he 
left the motel and went to Vancouver, Washington, where he was 
later contacted by Detective Jackson. 
That I have reviewed the statement of Mr. Martindale as 
relayed to me by Detective Jackson and am convinced that Mr. 
Mar&jndale had to have been_involved jji the burglary__of John^  
Nuich Jewelers to know the details of how it occurred. That In 
connection with this case, I spoke with Detective Sandell of the 
Portland Police Department, in Portland, Multnomah County, 
Oregon. That Detective Sandell told me that on October 29, 1987, 
he was on stake-out duty parked directly across the street from a 
second-hand store known as Mike The Traders located at 401 South 
West Alder Street in Portland, Multnomah County, Oregon. That 
Detective Sandell told me that the business in a second-hand 
store dealing in large amounts of jewelry. That Detective 
Sandell told me that at about 2:30 in the afternoon on October 
29, 1987, he observed a white male adult who Detective Sandell 
later identified as Charles Don also known as Charles Webb walk 
into the store of Mike The Traders. That Detective Sandell told 
me that approximately one minute later Mr. Don then left the 
store in the company of the owner who Detective Sandell knows to 
be Mike Vaden and another subject. That Detective Sandell told 
me that these three subjects then walked next door to a restau-
rant known as O'Connors. That Detective Sandell told me that he 
was able to observe through the front picture window of the 
next-door restaurant the three subjects, that being Mike Vaden, 
Charles Don also known as Webb and the other man sitting at a 
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table. That Detective Sandell observed the three to talk for 
some tiflf and then observed Mike Vaden to come out of the restau-
rant carrying what Detective Sandell observed to be a clear 
plastic bag approximately 5" by 8" in size bulging with what 
appeared to gold items. That Detective Sandell told me that Mike 
Vaden then entered into his store and stayed approximately one 
minute. That Detective Sandell told me that he then observed 
Mike Vaden come back out of this store and join the other two 
subjects again in the restaurant. That Detective Sandell told me 
that approximately ten minutes later Mike Vaden came out of the 
restaurant and went back into his store, again staying approxi-
mately one minute. That Detective Sandell told me that Mr. Vaden 
then exited his store, went back into the restaurant -carrying a 
piece of white paper. That Detective Sandell told me that he 
observed Mr. Vaden place this piece of white paper in front of 
Mr. Don upon his arrival back inside the restaurant. That 
Detective Sandell told me that the three gentlemen stayed inside 
the restaurant for approximately ten more minutes and was unable 
to see any other items pass back and forth among the subjects. 
That Detective Sandell told me that he did notice that after 
about ten minutes of conversation that Mr. Don# also known as 
Webb, left the restaurant and walked westbound on the street away 
from the restaurant. That shortly thereafter Mr. Vaden and the 
third subject left the restaurant and went back into Mr. Vaden fs 
store. That Detective Sandell told me that he never observed the 
sack of gold after he saw Mr. Vaden go from the restaurant away 
from Mr. Don also known as Webb, into Mike The Traders. Detec-
tive Sandell told me that he then followed Charles Don, also 
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known as Webb, a short distance where he observed Mr. Don get 
into a Cadillac vehicle operated by a whit** male adult who 
Detective Sandell later identified as being John Humphries. 
That Detective Sandell told me that Mr. Don and Mr. 
Humphries were stopped by a uniformed traffic officer in the City 
of Portland for a minor traffic violation a short distance from 
where Mr. Sandell has observed Mr. Don get into the vehicle 
driven by Mr. Humphries. That Mr. Don, also known as Webb, and 
Mr. Humphries were subsequently arrested for the jewelry theft in 
Salt Lake City. 
That in talking with Detective Jackson of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department, Detective Jackson told me that Mr. Martindale 
stated that the only jewelry that Mr. Martindale- Mr. Don and Mr. 
Humphries were in possession of when they reached Portland, 
Oregon, was that jewelry that was stolen from John Nuich Jewelers 
in the early morning hours of October 29, 1987. 
That Detective Jackson has informed me that he believes that 
Russell Martindale has been truthful and reliable in the informa-
tion that he related to Detective Jackson concerning the burglary 
of John Nuich Jewelers and he dealings with Mr. Don and Mr. 
Humphries and including Mr. Don and Mr. Humphries leaving the 
motel room in Portland for the stated purpose of selling the 
stolen rings. 
That I believe Detective Jackson and Detective Sandell to be 
truthful and reliable in the information that they have related 
to me. 
That Detective Sandell told me that he is familiar with the 
business known as Mike The Traders from his past experience as a 
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police officer. That Detective Sandell told me that from his 
experience it is highly likely that the items of jewelry that he 
observed in Mike Vaden9s hand on October 29, 1987, will still be 
in Mr* Vadenfs business and be on display for sale. That detec-
tive Sandell told me that he personally knows that Mr. Vaden shop 
deals in a large amount of jewelry items and that the jewelry 
items that Mr. Vaden deals with are generally put on display as 
is and sold as is. 
That in talking with Mr. John Nuich, the victim, in this 
case, I've discovered that the total value of the rings that were 
stolen from his business totals approximately $19,000.00. 
That based upon the above and foregoing, I hereby pray for a 
warrant to issue to search that certain premises known as Mike 
The Traders Second Hand Store located at 401 South West Alder 
Street in Portland, Multnomah County, Oregon, owned and operated 
by Mike Vaden for those rings that are listed on Exhibit A 
attached, and an order to seize the said within described stolen 
property if found. 
Larry Johnson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
November, 1987. 
day of 
District Court Judge 
TAPE 87-2413 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Q: Please state your name for the record. 
A: Russell T. Martindale. 
Q: Mr. Martindale, during October of 1987 where did you reside? 
A: 438 East Wasatch, Midvale. 
Q: Mr. Martindale, are you comfortable proceeding without the 
presence or advise of counsel? 
A: No. 
JUDGE: I guess we have to find out if you want to have an attorney. 
A: Yes I would like an attorney. 
JUDGE: I think that's all we can do then. Exercise your right to 
counsel suspend the hearings. 
RM: Thank you. 
(COURT CONTINUES HEARING UNTIL THE 8TH OF DECEMBER.) 
P E R M I S S I U N i u o c n 
TP. 
, have been informed bv V"N 
and
 7 ) ^ ^ / /^ ^ 7 / // y Q C 
who made proper identification az (an) authorized law enfcrcient officer(sj of 
thc-iiidi'jEble Police Department, tfehiire, l/tan/of my CONSTITUTIONAL RIGUJ net 
to have a search made of the premises and property owned by ne and/or under ny 
care, custeJy and control, without a search warrant. 
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CERTIFIED GRAPHOANALYST 
39 NORTH VILLAGE WAY 
FRUIT HEIGHTS, UTAH 84037 
February 16, 1988 
Name Comparison Report For Carolyn Gregeresen 
To be sure that the name Carolyn signed in front of me wa%/her 
true unaltered signature. I asked her to bring several 
documents, signed several months ago. When we met I compared 
these to the ones signed in front of me. I was satisfied this 
was Carolyn's true signature. 
Next I took these signature home and compared them to the 
signature on the "Permission To Search Document". The following 
are my findings: 
1. First we will look at the name Renee. The capital R in both 
documents are completely different. Questioned "r" is very 
suppressed and scrunched with an open top, while the other is 
open and rounded with a small loop in the middle, the top is 
closed. The rest of the name is very similar except all of the 
names signed by Carol (in front of me) have a closed "e" through 
out the signature of Renee. The questioned name has several open 
"e's" in the name. The last being a very sharp closed "e". 
2. Next we will study the last name of Gregersen. ,Both capital 
"G's" at first glance look similar, but there is a very marked 
difference, Carol's "gM always comes up to a sharp point then 
down to form a point. Continue on up to form a large loop at the 
top right side and smoothly down to form a point on the left side 
and in some cases a large loop, then across the ,!g' and into the 
rest of the name. 
The questioned "G" comes up into almost a point then down and up 
into a very sharp point and then down not crossing the "g's" 
bottom into the rest of the name. No large loops occur in the 
questioned "g". 
The next letter, Carol's "r" is very sharp while the questioned 
"r" is rounded. Again Carol's "e's" are closed while the 
questioned ones are open. 
The next letter "g" in Carol's ng" they are closed at the top 
while questioned "g" is opened at the top. 
Next letter "e" is closed in Carol's name and opened in 
questioned name. 
The next "r" is sharp in Carol's name and rounded in questioned 
name. 
The next Ms" is soft and round in Carol's name and taller and 
sharper in the questioned name. Without question in all the 
names signed earlier by Carolyn and the ones I saw her sign her 
"s's" were always soft and almost laying down on the line. 
The next "e" is the same. 
The next letter MnM looks the same, but there is a slight 
difference. Carol's "nM is very scrunched down and sometimes a 
sharp point occurs. The questioned name is taller, more rounded 
and tilted down at an angle. The top of Carol's "n" does not 
come up near as tall and curved as the "nM in the questioned 
name. 
From close examination of the names signed in front of me and the 
name Carolyn allegedly signed. It is my conclusion that there 
are distinct differences in these two signatures. 
My opinion as a Certified Graphoanalysis, is I do not feel the 
questioned Search Agreement was signed by Carol Gregersen. 
Sincerely,^ 
Linda J. Knight 
I n i n U W W i w . r . — 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
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IT THROUGHOUT THIS STATE. IT IS AN AWESOME RESPONSIBILITY 
TO SIT IN JUDGMENT OF ANOTHER HUMAN BEING, BUT IT IS SOME-
THING THAT YOU CAN DO AND YOU WILL DO AND THE JUDGE HAS 
INSTRUCTED THAT YOU MUST DO. YOU ARE THE ONLY PEOPLE IN 
THE WORLD WHO CAN DECIDE WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THIS CASE. 
ABOUT 20 YEARS AGO 1 WORKED AT AN OTHERWISE UNKNOWN 
EATING ESTABLISHMENT CALLED ALI BABA'S KABOB HUT. PAUL, WHO 
WAS THE BOSS -- WE CALLED HIM ALI BABA. HE HAD A PRECOCIOUS 
THREE-YEAR-OLD SON WHO HAD BEEN TAUGHT VERY BUSINESSLIKE 
PHRASES BY HIS FATHER AND ONE DAY ANNOUNCED TO ME THAT THE 
WAY TO GET RICH WAS TO BUY CHEAP AND SELL FOR A PROFIT. 
THAT IS AN APHORISM, I SUPPOSE, THAT ANY BUSINESSMAN COULD 
VOUCH FOR THE TRUTH OF. 
WE HAVE IN THIS CASE A PERSON THAT REPRESENTS HIM-
SELF TO YOU AS MR. WEBB AS A BUSINESSMAN. HE DEALS IN 
SECONDHAND GOLD AND OTHER JEWELRY. AS STATES EXHIBITS 42 
AND 43 SHOW TO US, AND AS HE ADMITTED ON THE STAND, HE DOES 
18 j SUBSTANTIAL TRAVELING IN THE PURSUIT OF THIS BUSINESS. MR, 
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WEBB ONE DAY, WHEN EXACTLY WE DON'T KNOW, BUT CERTAINLY AFTER 
THE JANUARY BIRTH OF HIS .AND RENAEE GREGERSEN'S TWINS, CAME 
INTO CONTACT WITH A YOUNG MAN NAMED MARTINDALE AND IT APPEARS 
FROM MR. MARTINDALE'S TESTIMONY THAT HE SOMETIMES WENT WITH 
MR. WEBB TRAVELING. HE TESTIFIED THAT ON ONE OF THESE 
OCCASIONS HE AND MR. WEBB BROUGHT MR. HUMPHREY BACK DOWN 
TO SALT LAKE CITY. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT ALTHOUGH 
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[ THERE ARE MANY, MANY RECORDS OF LOLLECT TELEPHONE CALLS, 
WHICH WERE MADE BY MR. WEBB AND HE HAS ADMITTED DURING HIS 
TESTIMONY, DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER THERE'S NO COLLECT 
TELEPHONE CALLS MADE FOR THE LATTER PART OF OCTOBER, THIS 
DOESN'T PROVE ANYTHING, DOES IT? WHEN YOU COUPLE IT WITH 
SOME OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES IT BEGINS TO TELL US SOMETHING. 
WHY WOULD A MAN, WHO IS TRAVELING IN ELY AND EVERY PLACE 
ELSE, NOT CONTINUE THE SAME PATTERN THAT HE'S ESTABLISHED 
THROUGHOUT SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO THAT OF CALLING TO CHECK 
ON HIS BABY, CHECK WITH HIS GIRLFRIEND, RENAEE GREGERSEN? 
THE STATE SUGGESTS THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE TESTIMONY 
OF MR. MARTINDALE AND MRS. MARTINDALE SHOW THERE ARE NO 
PHONE CALLS BETWEEN THE 13TH OF OCTOBER AND 26TH OR 27TH 
OF OCTOBER, BECAUSE HE WAS IN TOWN. HE WAS IN TOWN CONDUCT-
ING SOME BUSINESS WITH MR. MARTINDALE AND WITH MR. HUMPHREY. 
THAT BUSINESS INVOLVED A JEWELRY STORE. APPARENTLY THERE 
WAS SOME TALK ABOUT WHAT JEWELRY STORE IT WAS GOING TO BE 
BEFOREHAND. MS. MARTINDALE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, AND MR. 
ig j MARTINDALE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, BUT THINGS HADN'T FIRMED UP 
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MR. MARTINDALE WAS GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT, GETTING A CAR. HE 
DID SO. THAT WAS THE CAR FOR WHICH HE WAS GRANTED IMMUNITY 
FOR HIS TESTIMONY, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO DIVERT HERE JUST A 
MINUTE. DO YOU RECALL DURING HER OPENING STATEMENT, MS. 
WELLS TALKED FOR A LONG TIME ABOUT THIS GRANT OF IMMUNITY AND 
HOW A PERSON WHO HAD SUCH A GRANT COULD DO WHATEVER THEY 
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WANT TO DO. WHAT A TERRIBLE THING IT WAS GOING TO BE TO TRY 
TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH WITH THIS GRANT OF IMMUNITY. REMEMBER 
THAT MS. WELLS WAS THE PERSON WHO CALLED MR. MARTINDALE TO 
THE STAND. MR. MARTINDALE WAS A DEFENSE WITNESS, A DEFENSE 
WITNESS, AND SHE DOESN'T ASK HIM VERY MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT 
THINGS HE COULD, PERHAPS, ENLIGHTEN US ON. SHE WANTS TO 
KNOW SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THINGS THAT SHE TOLD THE POLICE 
ON THE 11TH OF NOVEMBER, ONLY THE 11TH OF NOVEMBER. SHE 
DOESN'T WANT TO KNOW ABOUT WHAT HE TOLD THEM ON THE 13TH OF 
NOVEMBER, ONLY THE 11TH. SHE GETS HIM TO ADMIT THAT HE 
PROBABLY SIGNED THE PAWN SLIP THAT IS, I BELIEVE, NO. 37, OR 
WHATEVER, IN EVIDENCE. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE DEFENSE 
CALLED MR. MARTINDALE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, AND HE 
REFUSED TO TESTIFY. MR. MARTINDALE, APPARENTLY, HAS ALWAYS 
BEEN A DEFENSE WITNESS BUT AS HIS DEMEANOR ON THE STAND 
SHOWS, I WOULD INDICATE HE WAS VERY RELUCTANT. WHY IS HE 
RELUCTANT? WELL, CERTAINLY NOT FROM THE QUESTIONS ASKED. 
HE IS SCARED. HE KNOWS THAT IF HE GETS ASKED CERTAIN QUES-
19 I TIONS NOW THAT HE HAS A GRANT OF IMMUNITY. HE HAS TO ANSWER 
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THEM. HE IS WORRIED WHAT KINDS OF QUESTIONS MAY BE ASKED. 
MAYBE THE GRANT OF IMMUNITY DOESN'T EXTEND AS WE READ IT TO 
HIM. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE GRANT OF IMMUNITY DOESN'T EXTEND 
BEYOND THAT SMALL TIME FRAME AND IT DOESN'T EXTEND BEYOND 
THE BORDERS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. THAT'S WHY HE IS BEING 
SO CIRCUMSPECT, BUT HE DID ANSWER ALL THE QUESTIONS HE WAS 
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, -ASKEDwND ALL THE QUESTIONS THAT HE WAS ASKED WHICH WERE 
2 QUITE OBVIOUSLY ATTEMPTS TO GET HIM TO SAY HE MIGHT HAVE SAID 
3 SOMETHING DIFFERENT ON THE U T H THAN HE DID ON THE 13TH. 
4 ALL THE QUESTIONS THAT HE WAS ASKED IMPLICATE MR. HUMPHREY 
5 AND MR. WEBB, ALL OF THEM, AND HIMSELF, TOO, AND HIMSELF. 
6 SO WHERE WAS HIS ADVANTAGE TO GETTING A GRANT OF IMMUNITY? 
7 WHERE WAS DEFENSE'S ADVANTAGE OF CALLING MR. MARTINDALE AS 
8 A DEFENSE WITNESS? 
9 I YES, IT IS TRUE THE GRANT OF IMMUNITY WAS PROCURED 
BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY. MR. YOCOM IS THE ONLY PERSON IN 
THE COUNTY WHO CAN GIVE SUCH A GRANT. WHY? BECAUSE HE 
WAS SUBPOENAED BY THE DEFENSE AND THERE'S NO POINT IN HAVING 
HIM TAKE THE STAND AND CLAIM HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGES. 
10 
11 
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14 I AGAIN, IF HE HAS SOMETHING TO SAY LET'S HEAR IT. SO HE 
15 ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS, MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN A VERY GOOD 
16 WITNESS, BUT WHAT HE HAD TO SAY WAS TRUE 
17 j WITNESSES TO CRIMES ARE SORT OF LIKE RELATIVES 
18 j IF THEY HAPPEN TO BE THERE YOU TAKE THEM, WARTS AND ALL 
YOU CAN'T CHOOSE YOUR WITNESSES ANY MORE THAN YOU CAN CHOOSE 
YOUR RELATIVES. AND THE STATE IS PLEASED WITH SOME OF THE 
THINGS THAT MR. MARTINDALE REPRESENTED, NOT PLEASED WITH 
19 
20 
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22 SOME OF THE THINGS THAT HE REPRESENTED, BUT THERE HE IS, 
23 
24 
OPENED UP JUST AS EFFECTIVELY AS ANYBODY ELSE, THE GOOD, 
THE BAD, THE UGLY, WHATEVER THERE IS, BUT IT IS SOMETHING 
25 THAT THIS DEFENSE WITNESS IS CONSISTENT WITH, WHAT THE 
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•WALK AROUND IT IN THE JURY ROOM, AND YOU WILL^SEE THAT IT 
HAS A SILVERY BARREL, JUST THE SAME AS IT HAS A BLUED BARREL. 
WHAT IS IT? ARE WE GETTING HUNG UP ON THE BUGABOO OF THE 
DESCRIPTION? AGAIN, NO, HE DOESN'T SEE MUCH OF THE GUN. 
HE WAS LOOKING AT THE BUSINESS END OF IT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED 
WHEN IT CAME TO IDENTIFYING WHO IT WAS, HE HAD NO DOUBT IN 
HIS MIND THAT'S THE MAN. MR. CHURCH, LIKEWISE, DIDN'T HAVE 
AS MUCH OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE FACE, BUT THERE'S 
NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND EITHER. HE HAS AN ADDITIONAL DIS-
TRACTION, PERHAPS, BECAUSE HE SEES A LITTLE BIT MORE OF THE GUN. 
HE KNOWS SOMETHING ABOUT GUNS, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
WEAPON, MAYBE HIS ABILITY TO IDENTIFY SOME OF THE OTHER 
THINGS IMPEDED HIS ABILITY TO IDENTIFY SOME OF THE THINGS 
THAT WERE GOING ON AT THE TIME. HE HAS, ALSO, NO 
DOUBT WHEN HE IDENTIFIES THIS MAN. HE IS ABLE TO IDENTIFY 
THE WEAPON AS BEING EXACTLY THE SAME AS WHAT HE SAW HELD 
IN THE DIRECTION OF HIS BODY ON THE 21ST OF OCTOBER. MS. 
MARTINDALE, WHERE IN THE WORLD DID SHE GET ALL THOSE DETAILS 
ABOUT THAT? WHERE DID SHE GET ALL THOSE DETAILS. THE KEY 
TO THE HANDCUFFS, THE CARVED OPAL, WHICH IS NOT IN EVIDENCE, 
APPARENTLY NEVER RECOVERED. THE BROKEN WATCH, THE RINGS, 
THE RING BOX. YOU KNOW, IF SHE WERE MAKING UP A STORY OR 
SHE HAD REALLY SEEN THE BOXES, DON'T YOU THINK SHE WOULD 
KNOW SOMETHING MORE ABOUT WHERE EXACTLY THE SACK CAME FROM? 
ALL SHE COULD REMEMBER IS A WRITING LIKE TROLLEY SQUARE. 
577 
MAYBE WE SHOULD TAKE A POLL AND FIND OUT HOW MUCH 
LONGER 1 HAVE. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT 
REASONABLE DOUBT. REASONABLE DOUBT DOES NOT MEAN BEYOND 
A SHADOW OF A DOUBT. JUST READ THE DEFINITION THE JUDGE, 
I BELIEVE, IS GOING TO SEND WITH YOU TO THE COURTROOM --
INTO THE DELIBERATIONS ROOM WITH YOU. REASONABLE DOUBT 
IS SOMETHING THAT HAS TO BE BASED ON REASON, HAS TO BE BASED 
ON THE EVIDENCE OR LACK OF EVIDENCE. IT IS NOT SOMETHING 
EPHEMERAL, NOT SOMETHING MADE UP. IT IS NOT SOMETHING 
MYSTIFYING. WE ARE NEVER IN THIS WORLD ABLE TO PROVE ANY-
THING BEYOND ALL DOUBT OR BEYOND A SHADOW OF A DOUBT. EVERY 
HUMAN ACTIVITY IS SUBJECT TO SOME DOUBT. WHEN YOU BUY A 
HOUSE YOU DON'T KNOW THAT IT'S GOING TO BE A WONDERFUL HOUSE 
FOR THE <+0 YEARS YOU ARE GOING TO LIVE IN IT. YOU CHECK AS 
BEST YOU CAN TO MAKE SURE IT IS NOT INFESTED WITH TERMITES. 
YOU HAVE A TITLE SEARCH DONE TO MAKE SURE YOU ARE GOING TO 
OWN THE PROPERTY OF GROUND THAT IS ON THERE. YOU MAKE SURE 
THAT THE COOLER WORKS ON A DAY LIKE THAT. MAKE SURE THAT 
THE WATER RUNS WITHOUT BEING MILKY OR RUSTY COLOR. YOU DO 
A LOT OF THINGS, BUT WHEN IT COMES RIGHT DOWN TO IT, AND 
YOU BUY THE HOUSE, WE ALL UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS NOT 
EVERYTHING DONE AND NAILED IN PLACE, THINGS COULD GO WRONG, 
BUT YOU BUY A HOUSE AFTER CHECKING IT OUT AS CAREFULLY YOU 
CAN, YOU HAVE EXERCISED SOMETHING IN YOU WHICH RECOGNIZES 
WHEN IT'S POSSIBLE TO MAKE A DECISION BEYOND A REASONABLE 
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'BY THE WAY, HANDWRti T I NG LOOKS VERY SIMILAR TO THE HANDWRITING 
ON THE ONE THAT WAS SIGNED BY RUSS MARTINDALE, MIGHT MEAN 
SOMETHING, MIGHT NOT MEAN SOMETHING. 
WHO HAS A REASON? WHO HAS THE BEST AND BIGGEST 
REASON FOR FABRICATING IN THI_S JCASE? WELL, THE DEFENSE 
SAID, IN THEIR OPENING STATEMENT, THEY WERE GOING TO j>HOW 
THAT BRITT MARTINDALE HAD A GOOD REASON TO DO IT. EVIDENCE 
DOESN'T SHOW ANY REASON FOR HER TO DO THAT. HER HUSBAND IS 
IN ENOUGH TROUBLE. SHE CERTAINLY IS NOT GOING TO GET HIM 
OUT OF IT BY TESTIFYING IN THIS CASE -- OR, BY TESTIFYING 
FALSELY IN THIS CASE. IT IS PRETTY APPARENT THAT BRITT 
MARTINDALE SAW THE ACTUAL PROCEEDS OF THE ROBBERY. THERE'S 
TOO MANY DETAILS THAT SHE IS AWARE OF FOR THAT NOT TO BE THE 
CASE, THE CANADIAN MONEY, THE SALES RECEIPTS, THE DIAMOND 
SAFE, THE MONEY BOX, THE WATCH, THE BAG, THE WEAPON. SHE 
SAID THAT STATE'S EXHIBIT 1 IS JUST LIKE THE WEAPON SHE 
TOOK INTO HER CUSTODY AND PUT IN HER KITCHEN. THERE AREN'T 
ANY MAJOR DISCREPANCIES IN ANY OF THE WITNESSES' STORIES 
19 | WHO TESTIFIED FOR THE PROSECUTION. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF 
20 I DEFENSE WITNESSES WHO TESTIFIED ABOUT THINGS THAT HELPED 
21 THE PROSECUTION, AS WELL. THE ONLY PEOPLE WHO HAVE A MOTIVE 
22 TO FABRICATE, HAVE A REASON TO FABRICATE, HAVE TIME TO 
23 FABRICATE, ARE THESE TWO GENTLEMEN HERE, THE GENTLEMAN IN 
24 THE RED SHIRT AND THE GENTLEMAN IN THE WHITE SHIRT. THEY 
25 HAVE PUT TOGETHER A PRETTY DECENT STORY. UNFORTUNATELY, 
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WHEN YOU START EXAMINING THE COMMON SENSE, IT FALLS APARTr^ 
MR. HUMPHREY SAYS, FOR EXAMPLE, HE SHOWS UP UN-
INVITED, PERHAPS UNEXPECTED, EVEN AT RENAEE GREGERSEN'S 
HOUSE, TO LOOK FOR HIS GOOD BUDDY WHO HE'S MET IN THE SOUP 
KITCHEN AT BALONEY JOE'S UP IN PORTLAND ON SEVERAL PREVIOUS 
OCCASIONS. HE CAME DOWN BECAUSE CHARLES WEBB INVITED HIM TO 
COME DOWN AND HAVE A VACATION. ACCORDING TO MR. HUMPHREY, 
LIVING ON THE STREET AND WORKING IN A SOUP KITCHEN IS NOT 
HIS IDEA OF A GOOD TIME, SO WHY NOT TAKE HIM UP ON THE 
INVITATION? HE SHOWS UP. RENAEE SAYS YOU CAN'T STAY HERE, 
CHUCK IS GONE AND MY KID IS SICK, SO I WILL CALL UP MY FRIENDj 
BRITT MARTINDALE, AND SHE WILL TAKE YOU. SO HE GOES OVER TO 
BRITT'S ON THE 17TH OF OCTOBER, HE SAYS, AND HE SITS THERE 
FOR FOUR DAYS AND HE WATCHES TELEVISION. HE DOESN'T GO 
ANYWHERE, AND HE TENDS THE KIDS AND THAT'S ALL HE DOES, 
AND SUDDENLY THE AFTERNOON OF THE 21ST OF OCTOBER BRITT AND 
HER HUSBAND JUST DISAPPEAR AND ASK HIM TO TEND THE KIDS, 
FOUR KIDS UNDER THE AGE OF FOUR. HE IS GOING TO TEND THEM 
ig I AND THEY ARE GONE FOR A COUPLE HOURS. WHEN THEY COME BACK, 
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THERE IS ANOTHER GUY IN A LATE SEVENTIES CADILLAC. HE FINDS 
THE GUY'S FIRST NAME OUT. ESSENTIALLY, HE REALLY DOESN'T 
KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON. HE SEES THEM RUN INTO THE BEDROOM 
WITH SOMETHING COVERED UP IN A BLANKET. THEN THEY ARE IN 
THE BEDROOM WHILE HE IS STUCK THROUGHOUT WITH THE FOUR KIDS, 
PRESUMABLY, AND THEN THEY COME OUT LATER AND HE NEVER SEES 
581 
1 "ANYTHING. WELL, A LITTLE LATER ON HIS TESTIMONY, SUDDENLY 
2 HE REMEMBERS THAT HE SAW THE BAG, THERJD__BAG, AND HE SAW 
3 SOME JEWELS, BUT THE FI RST_ T LME_THROUGH THE STORY HE DIDN'T 
4 SEE NOTHING. HE JUST SAW THE BLANKET AND THEN ARRANGEMENTS 
6 WERE MADE FOR THIS FELLOW_J"HAT_HE _DOESN' T KNOW, WHp_SE_£J,RST 
6 NAME IS -- AND I'LL NEVER EVER FIND OUT WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN 
7 FROM AROUND FRESNO, CALIFORNIA, AND THESE MEN SIT IN A 
8 CAR, RUSS MARTINDALE AND THIS UNKNOWN DRIVER, AND MR. 
9 HUMPHREY, AND THEY GO DOWN TO LAS VEGAS BECAUSE HE THINKS 
10 HE MIGHT HAVE HEARD THAT MR. WEBB WAS DOWN THERE. AND YOU 
n GO TO THE SAHARA AND ASK THEM TO PAGE MR. WEBB. YOU DON'T 
12 EVEN KNOW WHETHER HE IS IN TOWN OR NOT. HIS WIFE HASN'T 
13 BEEN GETTING ANY COLLECT CALLS FOR A WHILE OR HIS GIRLFRIEND, 
14 SURE ENOUGH, HE SHOWS UP AND YOU GO AND YOU HELP RUSS 
15 MARTINDALE PAWN SOME STUFF. YOU CAN'T REMEMBER WHETHER YOU 
16 SAW MR. WEBB PAWN ANYTHING OR NOT BECAUSE YOU SPLIT UP. 
17 SOMETIMES YOU STAY THERE TOGETHER FOR THREE OR FOUR DAYS, 
18 J THEN YOU MOVE ON TO CALIFORNIA AND MOVE UP TO PORTLAND. IN 
i 
19 j PORTLAND RUSS MARTINDALE SPLITS OFF. HE'S GOING SOMEWHERE 
20 I BUT HE IS NOT GOING WITH YOU, SO INSTEAD OF STAYING IN 
21 j PORTLAND WHERE HE HAD HIS hOME WHERE BALONEY JOE'S WAS, 
22 I MR. HUMPHREY GOES WITH MR. WEBB AND THEY HIGH-TAIL IT 
BACK TO UTAH. THEY GET HERE ABOUT THE 1ST OF NOVEMBER AND 
NOTHING HAPPENS AGAIN FOR ABOUT FOUR DAYS, UNTIL THEY ARE 
23 
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25 ARRESTED ON THE 4TH, 
582 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1? 
18 
WELL, BR1TT MARTINDALE SAYS SOMETHING ELSE DID 
HAPPEN. SHE SAID MR. HUMPHREY WAS SITTING IN HER HOUSE. 
WHAT HE WAS DOING THERE AND FOR WHAT, HE'S NEVER SAID, BUT 
IF YOU HAD JUST LOST ONE-THIRD OF YOUR BUSINESS PARTNERSHIP 
BECAUSE SOMEBODY DEFECTED AND WAS MAKING NOISES LIKE HE 
WANTED OUT OF THE BUSINESS YOU WERE IN, WOULDN'T YOU WANT 
TO KNOW WHERE HIS WIFE WAS AND WHAT SHE WAS DOING AND 
WHETHER OR NOT THE HUSBAND WAS GOING TO CONTACT HER? AND 
SO THE WIFE MAKES UP AN EXCUSE TO GET OUT OF THE HOUSE. 
SHE LIES TO MR. HUMPHREY TO GET OUT OF THE HOUSE AND SHE 
GOES TO THE POLICE AND SHE TELLS THEM EVERYTHING SHE KNOWS. 
NOW, WE DON'T GET THOSE KINDS OF DETAILS ABOUT A 
ROBBERY FROM READING THE NEWSPAPER OR WATCHING THE 6 O'CLOCK 
OR 10 O'CLOCK NEWS. THE POLICE KNEW THAT THEY WERE 
WATCHING -- THEY WERE LOOKING AT SOMEBODY OR TALKING TO 
SOMEBODY AND KNEW WHAT HAD HAPPENED, SO THEY CONTACT HER 
HUSBAND. HE GIVES THE STATEMENT ON THE 11TH, BUT HE'S 
GUARDED IN THE STATEMENT AND WOULDN'T ADMIT TO EVERYTHING 
19 j THAT HE KNOWS. HE TRIES TO LIMIT THE POLICE. THEY DON'T 
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WANT TO BE LIMITED. 
YOU KNOW, YOU LOOK AT THE SIZE OF THOSE STATEMENTS 
YOU SAW THEM ON CROSS-EXAMINATION AND DIRECT EXAMINATION OF 
MR. MARTINDALE. WE ARE TALKING MULTIPLE PAGES. WE ARE NOT 
TALKING FOUR OR FIVE PAGES. WE ARE TALKING 30 PAGES, 15 
PAGES. THESE ARE SUBSTANTIAL STATEMENTS, AND WHAT DOES THE 
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DEFENSE HAVE TO CROSS-EXAMINE ABOUT THOSE STATEMENTS? ISN'T 
IT TRUE THAT YOU SAID THAT BRITT WAS IN THE CAR WHEN THEY 
CAME IN? MR. MARTINDALE APPARENTLY EXPLAINED, YES, I DID 
TELL THE POLICE ABOUT THAT, BUT I WASN'T THERE. I WAS JUST 
SAYING WHAT THE POLICE WANTED TO KNOW REGARDING WHAT I KNEW 
A50UT THE STORY. 1 TOLD THE POLICE I WASN'T THERE. I DIDN'T 
SEc ANYBODY COMING IN THE CAR, BUT YOU DIDN'T SAY THAT YOU 
~C_D THE POLICE THAT BRITT WAS IN THE CAR? FINALLY, ON 
C^CSS-EXAMINATION, WE GET UP. WE READ THE LINES THERE AND 
S.^E ENOUGH HE SAYS BRITT -- HE IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED HIM-
S £ _ = AND SAID, I MEAN RENAEE AND SO AND SO. HE TESTIFIED 
- V D E R OATH THAT HE WASN'T THERE. HE TOLD THE POLICE THAT 
- ~ WASN'T THERE, BUT THAT'S ALL THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL COULD 
- r - O TO CROSS-EXAMINE HIM ON ON HIS POLICE STATEMENT AND 
- 3 -AGES. COULDN'T THEY HAVE FOUND SOMETHING MORE SUBSTAN-
THE COURT: YOU HAVE BEEN GOING 30 MINUTES. 
MR. COPE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I GUESS NOW 
I —-AVE GONE OVER MY 30 MINUTES. Y0U WILL HAVE LESS TIME 
~ _ I S T E N TO ME WHEN I TALK TO YOU AGAIN. LADIES AND 
^EE-f— _EMEN OF THE JURY, THIS CASE IS NOT ABOUT A LOT OF 
"—ZS-teS. IT IS NOT ABOUT REASONABLE DOUBT. THE WITNESSES 
• - — = NO REASONABLE DOUBT. THIS CASE IS NOT ABOUT DESCRIP-
~ Z M B . THE WITNESSES DON'T HAVE TO DESCRIBE WHEN THEY 
ZEE^,—IFY. THIS CASE IS ABOUT A ROBBERY, A BRUTALLY PULLED-
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STRESS -- WOULD YOU HAVE REHEARSED EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS YOU 
WERE GOING TO SAY FOR THE HOLD-UP? COMMON EXPERIENCE WOULD 
SAY PROBABLY SO, PROBABLY YES. 
HAVE A GOOD LOOK AT THAT COMPOSITE SKETCH THAT 
WAS INTRODUCED BY THE DEFENSE AND COMPARE IT WITH THE 1986 
PHOTOGRAPH AUTHENTICATED BY MR. HUMPHREY HIMSELF ABOUT WHAT 
HE LOOKED LIKE WITH A BEARD ON, AN INCREDIBLY GOOD LIKENESS, 
I WOULD SAY. NO LINE-UP. THERE WAS NO LINE-UP. OH, MY 
GOODNESS, WE CAN'T HAVE A LINE-UP IF THE DEFENDANT DOESN'T 
WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN ONE. AND IF WE HAVE ONE OR IF WE 
SHOWED SOME PICTURES, THEN THE DEFENSE IS GOING TO SAY WE 
SUGGESTED TO THESE PEOPLE WHAT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO SAY, 
SO WE ARE IN NO POSITION — YES, THERE WAS NO LINE-UP, BUT 
WHY DO WE NEED A LINE-UP WHEN YOU HAVE THE PEOPLE,_WHEN YOU 
HAVE THE EYEWITNESSES SAYING YES, THAT'S WHO 1T~WAS, WHEN 
YOU HAVE A THIRD PARTY SAYING THESE PEOPLE PARTICIPATED IN 
A ROBBERv THAT MY HUSBAND HELPED TO STAGE. 
RUSS MARTINDALE WAS NOT ARGUMENTATIVE AND 
19 J SARCASTIC. HE WAS DEFENSIVE. HE WAS ANGRY AT HAVING BEEN 
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SUBPOENAED AND HAVING SAT THROUGHOUT ON THAT BENCH TWO DAYS 
WAITING FOR MS. WELLS TO FINALLY CALL HIM AND ASK HIM SOME 
QUESTIONS AND THEN SHOW HIM A DOCUMENT WITH HIS SIGNATURE 
ON IT. YES^ HE HEDGED. THAT LOOKS LIKE MY SIGNATURE .__ 
I THINK IT WAS THE FIRST THING HE SAID, AND FINALLY, AFTER 
A FEW MORE QUESTIONS, HE SAID, WELL, YEAH, I DO REMEMBER 
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1 'SIGNING SOMETHING. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT M™<E? MR. WEBB, 
2 MR. HUMPHREY, MR. MARTINDALE WERE ALL DOWN THERE IN LAS 
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3 VEGAS GETTING RID OF THE STOLEN PROPERTY. THAT'S WHAT THEY 
4 WERE DOING. THEY ARE GOING TO DO IT -- SOME AT A PAWN SHOP, 
5 SOME AT ANOTHER PAWN SHOP. MAYBE THEY WILL SELL SOME, WHO 
6 KNOWS? SO WHAT? WHEN YOU HAVE A CRIME COMMITTED IN HELL, 
7 J YOU HAVE DEVILS FOR WITNESSES. MR. MARTINDALE IS DIRTY. 
8 I DON'T KNOW WHY THE DEFENSE CALLED HIMf__BUT THFJf DID, AND 
9 HE PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT WAS HELPFUL TO THE PROSECTUION, 
WHY WOULD YOU MAKE UP A STORY ABOUT A DEAD HORSE? I MEAN, 
THAT IS SOMETHING THAT IS RELATIVELY EASY TO PICK UP ON, 
ISN'T IT? WHY THROW A DETAIL LIKE THAT INTO A STORY? WHY 
13 J THROW A STORY IN ABOUT RETURNING A VIDEO TAPE THAT IS 
14 [ PRETTY EASY TO PICK UP ON, AND CHECK OUT, ISN'T IT? YOU 
15 I THROW THOSE KINDS OF DETAILS IN BECAUSE THEY_jj£P P E N_JO__B E 
16 TRUE. MR. MARTINDALE KNEW DARN WELL WHAT HE WAS DOING. 
17 HE KNEW THAT THE CAR THAT HE HAD STOLEN WAS GOING TO BE US£D 
18 J TO DO A ROBBERY___HE_JUSTL,DIDNIXJCNOW 1IL_MA.S_GOING TO BE 
19 KING'S CUSTOM JEWELER AT TROLLEY SQUARE. HE DIDN'T KNOW 
IT WAS GOING TO BE AT 15:35 IN THE AFTERNOON. HE WAS 
ANGRY AND UPSET. HE CAME BACK AND FOUND OUT THAT THEY USED 
HIS KITCHEN TABLE TO DIVIDE UP THE cOOT. HE THOUGHT THAT 
THE BOSS OF THE OPERATION SHOULD HAVE TAKEN IT TO HIS HOUSE 
BUT, OF COURSE, MR. WEBB CAN'T DO THAT BECAUSE HIS 10-YEAR-
OLD BOY IS GOING TO BE HOME FROM SCHOOL THERE. HUMPHREY 
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CAME BACK FROM PORTLAND WITH MR. WEBB TO HOLD SACK ON THE 
MARTINDALE HOUSE AND MAKE SURE THAT THE DEFECTOR FROM 
OREGON, NAMELY, MARTINDALE, DIDN'T HAVE CONTACT OR COME BACK 
WITHOUT THEM KNOWING ABOUT IT BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL IN BIG 
TROUBLE IF HE DECIDES HE WANTS TO START TALKING ABOUT WHAT 
HE'S BEEN DOING WITH THEM IN LAS VEGAS AND IN SALT LAKE CITY 
DURING THE LATTER PART OF OCTOBER OF 1987. THAT'S WHY THEY 
CAME BACK. THERE'S NO REASON FOR MR. HUMPHREY TO COME BACK 
AFTER HE'S ONCE GOTTEN UP TO PORTLAND, BUT WE KNOW HE WAS 
THERE. THEY EVEN ADMIT TO BEING STOPPED ON BURNSIDE BRIDGE 
AND ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR CAR, OR SOMETHING. WHY 
WOULDN'T HE JUST SAY THERE HE WOULD BE GONE TWO WEEKS? HOW 
LONG IS HIS VACATION FROM THE SOUP KITCHEN SUPPOSED TO BE? 
HE CAME BACK TO HOLD SACK. HE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THEY 
GOT THE DEFECTOR, RUSS MARTINDALE. THAT'S WHY? THERE'S 
A LOT OF EVIDENCE OVER HERE. SOME OF IT IS IN THIS BOX AND 
MS. WELLS TALKED ABOUT ALL THAT EVIDENCE THAT DIDN'T COME IN. 
WELL, A LOT OF IT WAS NOT RELEVANT. NICE TO KNOW, INTEREST-
ING PERHAPS, BUT IT IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION YOU HAVE 
TO DECIDE. FOR THAT REASON, THERE'S GOING TO BE SOME GAPS 
IN THE NUMBERS. YOU KNOW, THE STATE INTRODUCED SOME 
EVIDENCE THAT WASN'T ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. THE JUDGE 
HAS MADE A RULING. THAT'S THE WAY THAT THIS LEGAL SYSTEM 
OPERATES. WE DON'T TALK ABOUT WHAT WAS NOT INTRODUCED. WE 
TALK ABOUT WHAT WAS AND THERE IS PLENTY. WHY SHOULD BR ITT 
617 
MARTINDALE ENSURE THf APPREHENSION OF HER HUSBAND BY TALKING 
TO POLICE RATHER THAN JUST LEAD HIM AROUND AND FIND OUT IF 
THEY WON'T FIND OUT ABOUT ANY OF IT? WHY WOULD THE POLICE 
NOT SEARCH THE MARTINDALE HOUSE? GOOD GRIEF, IT'S BEEN 
10 DAYS SINCE THE ROBBERY. WHY WOULD THEY THINK THEY WOULD 
FIND ANYTHING? THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THEY COULD FIND ANYTHING 
THERE. YOU CAN'T GET A SEARCH WARRANT WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE. 
THE SEARCH DONE AT THE GREGERSEN HOUSE WAS DONE INCIDENT TO 
THE ARREST. THAT'S HOW THAT HAPPENED. 
MS. WELLS WOULD LIKE TO RUN THE STATE'S CASE, BUT 
SHE CAN'T. SHE CAN PICK AT IT IF SHE WANTS BUT THAT'S AN 
INDICATION OF HOW WEAK HER OWN CASE IS. SHE HAS NOTHING 
MORE TO TALK ABOUT THAN THE THINGS HERE ON THE CHART, A 
FEW WORDS. THE EVIDENCE IS ALL IN FAVOR OF THE STATE. 
TALK ABOUT REASONABLE DOUBT, DID RUSS MARTINDALE . 
HAVE ANY REASONABLE DOUBT ABOUT WHAT THESE TWO GUYS WERE UP 
TO WHEN HE RAN AWAY FROM THEM UP IN THE NORTHWEST PART OF 
OUR COUNTRY THE END OF OCTOBER OF 1987? HE KNEW WHAT WAS 
GOING ON. Ip "HE DEFENSE COUNSELS' THEORY ABOUT HOW THIS 
ALL HAPPENED IS TO BE BELIEVED, RUSS MARTINDALE IS THE 
GREAT LEADER OF THE PACK. YOU SAW HIM ON THE WITNESS STAND. 
DOES THAT MAN LOOK LIKE HE IS CAPABLE OF PULLING OFF AN 
ARMED ROBBERY WITHOUT THE HELP OF ANYBODY ELSE? BY HIMSELF? 
WERE THESE GENTLEMEN ASSISTING HIM? UH-UH. HE IS A 
GREAT GOFER, APPARENTLY, KEPT HIS MOUTH SHUT FOR A WHILE, 
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BUT HE IS NOT THE LEADER OF THE PACK. HE IS NOT THE 
BUSINESSMAN HERE. IT IS MR. WEBB WHO IS THE BUSINESSMAN. 
WOULDN'T IT BE A FREUDIAN SLIP FOR MS. WELLS TO SAY, AS SHE 
DID DURING HER ARGUMENT TO YOU, HE KNEW, REFERRING TO RUSS 
MARTTTJDALE, THEY HAD THE GUN USED__IN THE ROBBERY. THAT'S 
THE GUN THEY USED IN THE ROBBERY. THE EVIDENCE IS ONLY 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL. IT IS TRUE THERE'S NO SERIAL NUMBER ON THAT 
GUN. NOBODY WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SEE IT EVEN IF THERE 
WAS ONE, PROBABLY. SO WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT IS REALLY 
THE GUN THAT WAS USED IN THE ROBBERY. IT LOOKS EXACTLY LIKE 
THE GUN THAT WAS USED IN THE ROBBERY, ACCORDING TO EYE-
WITNESSES, LOOKS EXACTLY LIKE THE GUN THAT BRITT MARTINDALE 
SAW AFTER THE ROBBERY. AND THERE'S NO DOUBT ABOUT IT BEING 
THE DEFENDANTS, OR AT LEAST MS. GREGERSEN'S. EVEN IF THE 
DESCRIPTION OF IT, AS HAVING NO RECOIL AND ONLY ABLE TO 
ACCEPT ONE SHELL, IS TO BE BELIEVED, MS. WELLS REFERS TO THE 
GUN AS SPECIAL, SPECIAL IN THE SAME SENSE THAT THE CHURCH 
LADY SAYS THINGS ARE SPECIAL. THAT GUN IS NOT GOOD FOR 
19 | ANYTHING EXCEPT SCARING PEOPLE TO DEATH AND PULLING OFF AN 
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ARMED ROBBERY. THE RUSTY COLOR THAT MR. KARMILIAN TALKED 
ABOUT WAS THE COLOR OF THE STOCK. IT WASN'T THE COLOR OF 
THE BARREL. AND NO AMOUNT OF TWISTING OR WORKING WITH HIS 
TRANSCRIPT OR HIS PRELIMINARY HEARING TEST IMONY _JJ_j£JUNG TO_ 
CHANGE THAT. 
THE INTENT OF MR. WEBB IS ADEQUATELY SHOWN BY THE 
619 
LITTLE SCENE IN THE KITCHEN OF THE MARTINDALES. MR. HUMPHREY 
IS NOT EVEN THERE. HE IS IN SHAVING HIS BEARD. HE IS IN 
SHAVING HIS BEARD. WHY WOULD MR. HUMPHREY ADMIT TO SHAVING 
HIS BEARD OFF THAT DAY, ANYWAY, DURING THIS CROSS-EXAMINATION 
5 | TESTIMONY? WELL, BECAUSE TOO MANY PEOPLE SEEN HIM IN TOWN 
6 | THAT DAY, THAT'S WHY. IT WAS OBVIOUS HE DIDN'T HAVE A BEARD 
7 [ WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED. YOU HAVE TO EXPLAIN SOME WAY, MIGHT 
8 I AS WELL BE THEN AS LATER. THAT'S THE ONLY REASON THEY 
9 THOUGHT THIS THING THROUGH CAREFULLY. THEY TRIED TO TAKE 
10 INTO ACCOUNT AS MANY DETAILS AS THEY COULD BUT THEY CAN'T 
n GET THEM ALL. THEY CAN'T GET THEM ALL. MR. WEBB'S INTENT 
12 WAS SHOWN BECAUSE HE WAS THE LEADER OF THE PACK. HE WAS 
13 SITTING AT THE TABLE. HE WAS DIVIDING UP THE GOODIES. HE 
14 WAS GIVING PERMISSION TO HIS GIRLFRIEND TO KEEP HER WATCH, 
15 HER RING. EVERYTHING ELSE GOT SWEPT OFF TO LAS VEGAS, 
16 J GOT DISPOSED OF IN A MANNER OF A GOOD BUSINESSMAN, BUY CHEAP, 
17 | SELL FOR A PROFIT. WHEN YOU BUY FOR NOTHING, ANYTHING YOU 
18 I MAKE IS PROFIT. THE ISSUE I_S_£REDIBI LITY OF THE WITNESSES 
19 ! NO T WWETHER_YOU LIKE THEM OR NOT. 
20 I MR- COPE: HOW MUCH TIME DO I HAVE, YOUR HONOR? 
21 
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25 
THE CLERK: YOU ARE UP. 
MR. COPE: I WOULD URGE YOU TO EXAMINE THE 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CAREFULLY. IT SPEAKS BUCKETS AND 
BUCKETS. SINCE IT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AS EVIDENCE, IT IS 
CERTAINLY A LOT MORE VALUABLE THAN ANYTHING I HAVE TO SAY, 
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"ANYWAY. THIS CASE HAS HAD A LlT'tuE BIT OF EVERYTHING, BUT 
THERE'S NOT ENOUGH THERE FOR THE DEFENDANTS TO GET OFF UN-
LESS YOU SAY IT IS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE DEFENSE HAS 
HAD A DIFFICULT TIME EXPLAINING THE EVIDENCE. THEY HAVE 
MADE A VALANT EFFORT, BUT WHEN YOU LOOK AT IT FROM ALL SIDES, 
UNDERNEATH AND ON TOP, THE ONLY LOGICAL WAY THAT YOUR COMMON 
SENSE WILL ALLOW YOU TO PUT EVIDENCE TOGETHER SHOWS CLEARLY 
THE GUILT OF BOTH OF THESE MEN, THE GUNMAN AND_ THE WHEELMAN. 
THOSE ARE THE ONLY TWO PEOPLE YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER. THEY 
KNOW A LOT, BUT THEY DON'T KNOW ENOUGH. WHEN ALL IS SAID AND 
DONE, PERHAPS THE MOST USEFUL INFORMATION THAT HAS COME TO 
YOU ABOUT THE PROCLIVITIES AND HABITS OF MR. WEBB ARE IN 
THE FORM OF BUSINESS RECORDS FOR MOUNTAIN BELL. YOU WILL 
NOTE ON PAGE 18 OF THAT PARTICULAR DOCUMENT, STATE'S 
EXHIBIT 42, A HUGE GAP BETWEEN ABOUT THE 13TH OF OCTOBER 
AND THE 29TH OF OCTOBER. IF HE WERE REALLY IN ELY TALKING 
TO HIS GIRLFRIEND'S BROTHER, WHY WOULD IT HAVE BEEN 
IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO MAKE A CAL^ OR ANY SUBSEQUENT DAY, 
10 I UNTIL A L L OF A SUDDEN IN LAS VEGAS HE PICKS UP THE TRAIL 
20 I AGAIN? THE REASON IS OBVIOUS. MR. WEBB IS WITH MR. 
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HUMPHREY IN SALT LAKE DOING A R03BERY. MR. MARTINDALE IS 
DIVIDING UP THE LOOT AT MR. MARTINDALE!S HOUSE, GOING 
SOMEPLACE TO GET RID OF IT SO THEY CAN CONTINUE ON WITH 
TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS, 
THE COURT: SWEAR THE BAILIFF. 
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<b 
October 31 198 
I Rhonda Blanchard was present when Britt 
Martindale told me that Renee Gregersen had a Diamond 
watch and also a Ring. 
She also told me that she had sent a picture 
of Russell Martindale back east to show to a friend, 
but she wanted her to send it back as she didnt want 
anyone to see it because a jewlery store had been robbed back 
there. 
A: Yes I work here in Trolley Square, in Trolley Square with King 
Anthony Jewelers 
Q: Were you working in that Trolley Square Jewelry store during the 
month of October 1987 
A: Yes, and its my store 
Q: What is the name of that store 
A: Kings custom Jewelry 
Q: What kinds of things do you sell in that store 
A: Retail jewelry store, custom made jobs, repairs, silvers 
Q: I would like you^to think of the 21st day of October, 1987, did 
anything unusual happen to you while you were working your store 
that day 
Yes 
What was it that happened that was unusual 
Well I got robbed 
o,k. about what time of day was it that you got robbed 
Around-3:30 afternoon 
How many robbers were there 
One person1,; i 
Could you please describe what that robber looked like 
About 54 to 50 years old was it and with the beard, glasses, 
hat, jacket 
Q: Do you remember anything that he might have been carrying 
A: Shotgun 
Q: Could you describe the shotgun 
A: Well it was short, about this 
- 4 -
Q: Your honor the witness is indicating approximately 18 inches ir^  
length 
A: Yes 
Q: What color was it 
A: Oh it was rusty when I saw the, my English is not perfect but I 
can, make it to telling what 
Q: Do you know the Armenian word for what it is that you wish 
A: Sure 
Q: Could you go ahead and say that 
(Side B Mark 23-24) 
A: 
Q: Now your honor I have given to understand that the gentleman in 
the white sweater speaks Armenian, I do not believe that he is a 
certified court reporter and quite frankly I do not know 
JUDGE: An interpreter 
PROSECUTOR: what qualifications one must have to do that but, could 
we use him interpreting 
JUDGE: Any objections on the part of the defendants 
JBs J!ib 8B5ection 
LR: No objection 
SWEARING IN OF INTERPRETER 
JUDGE: Now so we can keep it as simple as possible, simply have him 
interpret the English word for the Armenian -words when"the witness 
is not able to express himself in English, can we do it that way 
JB: That would be agreeable to me your honor. I think that's 
appropriate. 
- 5 -
PROSECUTOR: Sir would you please tell us in English what the word 
was that was last given in Armenian by the witness. 
A: Barrel 
JUDGE: Tell me 
A: Barrel 
JUDGE: O.k. 
PROSECUTOR: And what about the wooden part of the shotgun, did you 
see what color that was 
A: I don't think so~ 
Q: The man who came in with the shotgun what did he do when he came 
into your store and you first saw him 
A: When he came in he was exactly like this with the glasses I-
have, I am working on my bench/ so I thought he was a customer 
coming in, you know, so I step up, when I step up I saw his pulling 
the-shotgun from the handbag which is this high, was it, and he told 
me give^©e:alXiifcbe^gold#-you\knowwso when I. saw^the^sbotgun^I said I 
don8t have gold here its in the safe so he makes me walk to the 
safe;-I open the safe, I give him everything I have in the safe, I 
put iru.thejbag;:Iater on he told me give me all the jewelry in the 
showcase, you know in the case, so I start pulling out the boxes and 
put in the bag, and he told me I want the second one too, so I did 
the second one too and uh 
PROSECUTOR: Could I stop you right there for just a minute 
A: Sure 
Q: What color was the bag he was having you put things into 
(pause) ^^^"^ 
A: I r e a l l y d o n ' t remembej^jjioht nQw, T c a n ' t rememner t h a t 
DAVID E.;:rOCOM 
Salt Lake County. Attorney 
JAMES M. COPE 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
Plaintiff, ) FOR DISCOVERY 
v. ) 
Case No. CR87-1572 
JOHN E. HUMPHREY, ) 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
Defendant. ) 
The State of Utah, by and through its attorney, JAMES M. 
COPE, responds as follows to the defendants December 22, 1987 
request for discovery, using the same paragraph numbers employed 
by the defendant: 
1. The prosecution knows of no statements of the 
defendants which nave not been already outlined in the statements 
of witnesses offered at preliminary hearing. A 20 page transcript 
of the statement given by co-defendant Gregerson to Detective Rav 
Dalling on November 4, 1987 was provided under cover of our 
December 2, 1987 letter, as was a 21 page transcript of the 
statement given by Britt Martindale on November 3, 1987. 
2. Mr. Humphrey's criminal record is known to us only 
through his RAP sheet, which is attached. 
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3. Certain items of jewelry and a firearm were seized 
by police agents within a day of Humphrey's arrest. Also, 
clothing whic#f matches the description of that worn by Mr. 
Humphrey during the robbery was discovered in a stolen car shortly 
thereafter. The defense may inspect these items at any convenient 
time by following the well-known and established protocols. No 
scientific analysis of any of these items is anticipated. 
4. No evidence in possession of the State raitigatfes 
the circumstances of these crimes. 
5a. All the reports fitting this description were 
provided to the defendant on December 2, 1987. 
5b. The State intends to call the following persons at 
the trial of this case: 
1. Det. John iomax, Sheriff's Office, Detective 
Division. Work Phone: 535-7157 
2. Sgt. Bill Abbott, Sheriff's Office, Detective 
Division. Work Phone: 535-7157 
3. Det. H. Jackson, Sheriff!s Office, Detective 
Division. Work Phone: 535-7157 
4. Det. Dalling, S.L.C.P.D. Work Phone: 535-6522 
5. Britt Martindale 
6. Russell Martindale 
7. Stephen Church, 454 East South Temple #205, 
S.L.C., Utah 84111 Work Phone: 532-6202 
8. Karekine Karmilian, 6836 Baldwin, West Jordan, 
Utah, 84084 Work Phone: 521-9114 
The State respectfully declines to provide the home 
telephone numbers of the witnesses on the grounds that such 
disclosure is a gross and unwarranted invasion of their privacy. 
The State will disclose the out-of-state address of the 
Martindales only upon order of the court. 
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5c. All the reports fitting this description were 
provided to the defendant on December 2, 1987. 
5d. There are no such reports. 
5e. The State has no information regarding criminal 
convictions of witnesses and respectfully declines to research the 
matter beyond the information it has already provided. 
5f. On December 22, 1987 the State offered to allow 
Carolyn Renae Gregerson to plead to Theft by Receiving, a Thiird 
Degree Felony, in settlement of the Aggravated Robbery couht 
pending against her. 
5g. There are no such reports known to the State. 
5h. There are no such items known to the State. 
5i. This information is neither known nor discoverable. 
5j. These items were either previously provided as per 
paragraph 1, or do not exist in the prosecutor's 
files. 
5k. The items meeting this description, if they exist 
at all, have always been available for viewing. The prosecutor 
will assist defense counsel to obtain a viewing. 
51. The prosecution knows of no such reports. 
5m. Mr. Humphrey's lack standing to contest the 
legality of a search of his co-defendant's property induces the 
State to decline Mr. Humphrey's requests to view these items, 
other than as described in paragraph 3. 
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The State respectfully declines to provide materials 
unless such come into its possession in the normal course of 
diligent preparation for the trial of this case. Although we 
understand our continuing duty to disclose discoverable material, 
we do not believe we must create such material, 
DATED this Zff^ay of JjJSceMb&t^ , \4fcfc: 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
77?, 
/JAMES M. COPE 
Deputy County Attorney 
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REMAL, Attorney for Defendant, at the address stated below. 
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SS^l, *j2*<fl [//''re tS^-y C^ oZ/TPhone . 
^ ^ Z ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
A / S i 
„J X4-t Phone •"g-—r V 
Accepting Agent
 v 
- — s' s ' C-^ J 
Agent Location - >' ^ - c ^ —*~—~-rT - < 
City & State S^7. $! ^ f lASJ J / 
/u a 
TRANSACTION 
WHITE COPY-to CDN / YEUOW COPY-to Agency / PINK COPY-to Customer 
NUMB ER 
CDN 650 CDN MLR 650 4/86 
DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY OR PRODUCE DOCUMENTS OR THINGS 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: 532-5444 
In the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, I k U D p O e n a 
Fiaintiff, / Duces Tecum * 
> ™ , M . CR87-1572 
CHARLES WEBB, \ JUDGE JAMES S . SAWAYA 
D e f e n d a n t . 
TO: CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS - FLYING J TRUCK STOP 
YOU ARE COMMANDED tojapjKwcx&c 
in the city of on the day of 
19 , at o'clock M. to testify at the taking of deposition in the above entitled action 
pending in the District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and bring with you* 
The records of transaction #0166531 on 10/1/87 between 
Britt Martindale and Russell Ilartindale. 
Dati.fi- J u n e 3 IQ 88 
BROOKE C. KELLS 
Attorney for: D e f e n d a n t ' C l e r k 
By 
Y& h^-^^rA-^ 
Address Deputy Clerk 
Any subpoenaed organization not a party to this suit is hereby admonished pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to file a designation with the court specifying one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or 
other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and shall set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he 
will testify or produce documents or things. The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably 
available to the organization. 
•Strike the words "Duces Tecum" and "and bring with you" unless the subpoena is to require the production of documents or tangible things, in which case the documents 
and things should be designated in the blank space provided for that purpose. If testimony by an organization representative or designee ts requested, descnbe with 
reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
FILE NO. f 
"LE: ( • PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: (^ COUNSEL PRESENT) 
1mA. 4 ^ A^ z ^ /-7^U^> z I^-TZ-JZ--
?,M* k^L ^rfs?h~K*-~ /-<rt<irtsff«/ 
&J^. 
^U^^U^^s^ 
^A.<7> ,/Q'^f=ritf-^<-^ 1? 
CLERK 7f^€^l^^p^ 
REPORTER DATE: S ^ W >> , /Z^ 
JUDGE 
BAILIFF 
J-6JuJ-fi-~ M€^S^-L2 
2^L /ZUSIS-&L> 
12* 
*£# XZ< <^^L -^-^t-o 
* & * - & ^^-w 
/r^-^W^, / 
jL 222c {/ /"£**£?-&<? td/r ^p £,/f* &2* 
2 * /Tt^^A^^c^ ^V? ^ ^ y ^ ^ ^ ^ s*^s ^£>4>^J-^ 
A \ HfJPENji^R, 
~f- , / _ s r\^, ^.ofn ia?<? 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF NEVADA) 
COUNTY OF ELKO) S s , 
CAROLYN RENEE GREGERSEN, being first duly sworn on 
oath, Deposes and states that: 
1. I' am the common law wife, of charles Webb. 
2. I CAROLYN RENEE GREGERSEN was also a co-defendant 
in this case and was to be tried with the defendant, 
Charles Webb. 
3. On January 22, 1988 my privately retained counsel 
Ray Stoddard, filed a motion to sever, and a motion to 
suppress. 
4.The motion to sever was granted under the BRUTEN V 
U.S. CASE. Over the statement that I made to Detective 
Ray Dalling Wednsday November 4, 1987. 
5. The motion to supress was denied. 
6. I was coersed into making the statement that I gave 
Detective Ray Dalling. 
7. Detective Ray Dalling asked me November 4, 1987 in 
my taped statement, that an incident occured at a jewelry 
store here in Salt Lake City. I told Detective Ray Dalling 
that I really donft know, I don!t know. 
r*\-r \ / 
8. Detective Ray Dalling stopped the tape and told me if I 
did not teLi him about this robbery, He would see that I would go 
Prison and I would never see my children or husband again. 
9. I asked Detective Ray Dalling what he wanted me to do. 
10. He told me he would tell me about the robbery, and would 
write things on a card for me to say. 
11. I tolded Detective Ray Dalling if it would help me and my 
I would do it. 
12. Then he turned the tape on again. 
13. Detective Ray Dalling was telling me that we went to a 
house on Wasatch, the Martindales, is what he wrote on the card. 
14. He asked me what happened to the jewelry and, I thought he was 
asking me about the diamond watch, and ring that my husband 
bought for my birthday when he came home from Oregon. 
15. I never did tell Detective Ray Dalling that the Diamond 
Watch or Ring came from this robbery in Salt Lake. 
16. On November 4, 1987 I never did give Detective Jackson 
and Detective Dalling permission to search the premises and 
property located at 111 W. Wasatch Apt.#14 Midvale Utah. Or 
did I sign a permission to search document. 
17. OnJanuary 22, 1988 A motion to Supress was before the court 
on the grounds that I did not sign the permission to search 
document. The court did not believe me when I told the court 
that I did not sign the permission to search document but 
believed Detective Ray Dalling when he said that I did. 
the court denied the Motion to Suppress. 
18. I knew I did not sign the permission to search document 
so I went to a Certified Graphanalysis, Linda Knight and 
her opinion as a certified Graphanalysis that I CAROLYN RENEE 
GREGERSEN did not sign the questioned search agreement. 
19. A copy of Linda Knight's opinion and thcperO-ssion to 
search document is attached to my Affidavit as my evidence that 
I did not sign the permission to search document. 
20. On May 20, 1988 a renewed motion to suppress was before the 
court on new evidence that I did not sign the permission to 
search document. 
21 J. That Motioit7 was denied by the court. 
22. 1 believe that my husband the defendant, Charles Webb was not 
given a fair trialin case no. CR.87-1572 in district court 
Salt Lake County. 
23. I was one of the defendants witnesses, and because we was 
Indigent the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc, would not bring me 
to court to testify for my husband the defendant, Charles Webb. 
24. My testimony woihld have been " That my husband was not home 
or in Salt Lake City, Utah on October 21,1987, but that he came 
home November 1,1987 and on the evening of November l,or 2, Britt 
Martindale called my husband and asked him if he would buy an old gol 
diamond watch and ring, my husband and I went down to Brittfs 
house and my husband bought the watch and ring from Britt 
Martmdale, John Humphrey was at Britt's house when my husband 
bought the watcn and ring from Britt Martindale. 
25. My testimony would also have been that my husband Charles Webb 
always called home, sometimes he would call me collect, but he always 
called, but when he is in Nevada, he almost always pays for the phone 
call on his end. / / / 
CAROLYN RENEE GREGERSEN 
^ ^ x p / v * SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS ^  ^WCT~'"zr%^ QRi'NFR 
O F ^ / -J "''/'AM 1990 ,, . \ /ml'''\ .NOTARY PUBLIC 
comission expires: 
N O T A D V 
P C R M I S S I 0 N T u U A K L J I 
I , A C r T / O f c s ( f f dr^^c^CCz/Z S c r A J » n<*ve been informed by 
A^T.r/4C^7x) and _ 2 > £ f ^ £>,s4///Ajp, , 
who nade proper i d e n t i f i c a t i o n as (an) author ized law enforcment o f f i c e r ( s ) o f 
the-H*-4vele Pol ice Department, t t e t e i e , U t a n / o f my CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT not 
to have a search made of the premises and proper ty owned by me and/or under my 
care, custody and c o n t r o l , w i thou t a search warrant 
Knowing cr ny lawfu l r i g h t to refuse to conse t to such a search , I w i l l i n g l y 
give ny pe rmss ion to the above named officer(s) to cond jet a complete search o* 
the premises and p r o p e r t y , i n c l ud i ng a l l bu i l d ings and v e h i c l e s , both i ns ide and 
outs de o f t b * p , e r t y located at / / / Ul u ^iSATCrl APT & /*-/ 
The above said of4 (s) f a r t h e r have my permss ion to take from my premises 
and proper!"", any 1 L t e r s , papers, or any other proper ty or th ings which they 
desi re as evidelrce f o r c r im ina l prosecut ion » the case or cases under i n v e s t i -
gat ion 
This w r i t t e n permission to search w i t f o u t ^ s^ar^h / ^ - i n t s g iver by me to the 
abo/e o f f i c e r ( s ) v o l u n t a r i l y and w thout anv t h r e i t s o< pronises o f any k i n d , 
•+ A. 
**• J5JLLLL A M o n t h ^ s // c ay o r , /Vo J 1Q<2_,7 at / / / ^  ^ / I S ^ r v y 
Signed _ f i ^ ^-jn _jL^„^^a^~, S 
Witness ^Lyl/Z^/i^uf Witness s'^'s ^yzC^^y' 
AdJ-ess ^^JS(^PP) /ddress S^ < y 7 ) 
Phone (H) _ _(B) Pho-e (H) _ (B)_ 
LINDA KNIGHT 
CERTIFIED GRAPHPANALYS1S 
39 North Village Way 
Flint Heights, Utah 84037 
(801)544-0429 ^ . . _ 
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Resume 
Name: Linda J, Knight 
Birth date: November 28, 1951 
Birthplace: Ogden, Utah 
Parents: William A. Pettit and Emma Pettit 
1076 Kansas Ave. 
Napa, California 94558 
Spouse: Dr. James D. Knight 
Children: Newel J. Knight 12-20-73 
Heather J. Knight 03-29-75 
Vincent A. Knight 11-04-76 
Alisha C. Knight 11-08-78 
Lacy A. Knight 07-09-80 
Dale G. Knight 07-09-82 (Deceased) 
Lynn W. Knight 03-28-84 
Raina Z. Knight 08-10-85 
EDUCATION: 
High School: Napa Senior High L.D.S. Seminary 
Napa, California Napa, California 
Graduated - June 1970 Graduated - June 
College: Ricks Jr. College 
Rexburg, Idaho 
Graduated, Associate Degree - May 19 
QUALIFICATIONS: 
General Course: International Graphoanalysis Society 
Chicago, 111 
Graduated - June 1970 
Master Course: International Graphoanalysis Society 
Chicago, 111 
Graduate - June 1988 
Member Utah Graphoanalysis Society 
WORK RELATED EXPERIENCE: 
In depth Report for Dr. Neil King of Idaho Falls, Idaho 
In depth Report for Dr. Bud Glanser of Idaho Falls, Idaho 
Employee selection reports for Dr. James D. Knight, Bountif 
Utah. 
Tn HPDt.h nomDarison report for classified Client 
rw. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS i^ ICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES WILLIAM TCCEB ( j a i l ) 
v 
Defendant 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case Nn. 
Count No 
Hnnnrahlft 
CAerk 
Reporter 
Railiff 
Hate 
CR87-1572 
one 
J a n e s S. Sawava 
3 usan Gray 
Catuy Ualle-jos 
Nick Kirk 
J u l y 15 , 1988 
O The motion of. , to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by 5fca jury; a the court; a plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r v
 a felony 
of the _i£?degree, a a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by B« W e l l s
 i anC j the State being represented by J * Cooe j s now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
a to a maximum mandatory term of 
D not to exceed five years; 
Q of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
(2 of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
• and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
. years and which may be for life; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $-
.to 
Q sucn sentence is to run concurrently with _ 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with . 
• upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
n 
are hereby dismissed. 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of pronation. 
E2 Defendant is remanaed into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County C&for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D tor delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, wheradefehcfarrt shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment-^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f ® / ^ * ' 
(S Commitment shall issue f o r t h w i t h ~i 
DATED this I S t h d a y of J u l y i/. ! 19 j£&. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
v
^ 
_/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel •£•*-
Deputy County Attorney ^ p p / r , ^ ] j ^ ^ r
 * - --Page 1 of L 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
CHARLES WILLIAM WEBB (jail) 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No. 
Honorable 
Clerk 
Reporter 
Bailiff 
Date 
CR87-1572 
James S. Sawaya 
Susan Gray 
Cathy Gallegos 
Nick Kirk 
July 15, 1988 
Pursuant to UCA 76-3-203 (1), the Court further 
sentences defendant Charles William Webb to serve a 
mandatory on-e year for use of a firearm and discretionary 
five years for use of a firearm, each to run 
consecutively to the sentence of five 
Dated this 15tl 
/ 
o life. 
1988 
/ / Distric t Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. EXXON HiNDLEY 
CtkM> 
1 IF THE COURT IS CONSIDERING IMPOSING A FIREARM ENHANCEMENT, 
2 I WOULD INDICATE THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS THAT MR. WEBB WAS 
3 NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE ROBBERY ITSELF, ACCORDING TO THE 
4 EVIDENCE, AND THEREFORE, WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION 
5 OR WOULD NOT HAVE USED A FIREARM TOWARD ANOTHER PERSON. 
6 I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO ENHANCE ANY 
7 SENTENCE WITH THE USE OF A FIREARM ENHANCEMENT CLAUSE. 
8 THE COURT: MR. HUMPHREY, DO YOU WISH TO MAKE ANY 
9 STATEMENT? 
10 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY. 
11 MR. HUMPHREY: I HAVE SAID ALL I WANT TO SAY. 
12 IF YOU WANT, YOU CAN SENTENCE ME. I MEAN --
13 THE COURT: I CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU ARE SAYING 
14 MR. HUMPHREY: I JUST -- WHAT I SAID, I DON'T LIKE 
15 THE UNDUE PROCESS --
16 THE COURT: I SEE, OKAY. 
17 | MS. REMAL: iE INDICATED HE'S ALREADY --
18 J TnE COURT: SAID EVERYTHING HE NEEDS TO SAY. 
19 ] MS. REMAL: I HAVE ONE COMMENT TO MAKE ABOUT MR. 
20 I HUMPHREY. IT'S WITHOUT QUESTION THAT HE SPENT A GREA" DEAL 
21 I OF TIME IN PRISON IN THE LAST 30 YEARS OR SO. DESPITE THAT 
22 | FACT, HE APPARENTLY SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED HIS PAROLE --
23 WAS IT '85 OR '86? '86. IT INDICATED IN THE PRESENTENCE 
24 REPORT THAT ALTHOUGH HIS PERFORMANCE ON PAROLE WAS NOT 
25 PERFECT, AND HE WAS DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH, THAT HE 
1 IDENTIFY ANYTHING IN THE POLICE REPORT. 
2 THE COURT: WITH REGARD TO EACH OF THESE 
3 DEFENDANTS -- DO YOU WANT TO BE QUIET? IT WILL BE THE 
* JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT THAT EACH SHALL SERVE 
5 THE INDETERMINATE TERM PROVIDED BY LAW FOR THE OFFENSE OF 
6 AGGRAVATED ROBBERV; THAT BEING NOT LESS THAN FIVE YEARS AND 
7 WHAT MAY BE FOR LIFE. THE COURT WILL FIND THAT BASED UPON 
8 THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY THAT THEY HAVE BEEN FOUND GUILTY 
9 OF THAT CHARGE WHICH CONTAINS AN ELEMENT OF THE USE OF A 
10 FIREARM. THE COURT WILL FIND THAT THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT 
11 STATUTE DOES APPLY IN THIS SITUATION AND BASED THEREON, 
12 EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS WILL BE SENTENCED TO SERVE AN ADDI-
13 TIONAL MANDATORY ONE YEAR TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY AND IN THE 
14 DISCRETION OF THE COURT SERVE AN ADDITIONAL FIVE YEARS, 
15 WHICH WILL RUN CONSECUTIVELY. COMMITMENT WILL ISSUE FORTH-
16 J WITH. 
17 GENTLEMEN, THE APPEAL TIME IN THIS STATE IS 30 
18 | DAYS. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO FILE AN APPEAL BEFORE THE 
19 j APPROPRIATE APPELLATE COURT IN THIS STATE WITHIN 30 DAYS. 
20 
21 I MR. WEBB: YOUR HONOR, MAY I SAY SOMETHING? 
22 THE COURT: YOU HAD YOUR OPPORTUNITY, MR. WEBB. 
23 MR. WEBB: YES, SIR, AFTER SENTENCE HAS BEEN 
24 PRONOUNCED, I DO WISH TO ASK THIS COURT UNDER RULE 24 THAT 
25 I HAVE MORE TIME TO ASK THIS COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
APP^J/y y. 7 3 1 
#2?*N 
Clerfe 
332 ^iate Capitol 
^ferit ptk* Qlttg, Pteif 84114 
December 10, 1991 
(Eijief fustier 
^ssauciaie Cttlficf JJnsttcr 
Hustle* 
^tcljael JL Zimmerman 
justice 
Mr. Charles W. Webb 
CUCF 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
Re: Charles W. Webb v. Fred Van Der Veur 
Dear Mr. Webb: 
This day your petition for writ of habeas corpus was 
made returnable to the Sixth District Court for Sanpete County. 
The Utah Supreme Court is an appellate court and does 
not take evidence. Your petition has therefore been referred 
to the appropriate court of general jurisdiction for disposition, 
If your petition is successful in the District Court 
you will no doubt be happy. If you are unsuccessful at the 
District level you may then file a notice of appeal in the Sixth 
District for an appeal to the appellate court of appropriate 
jurisdiction. 
Please remember that with an appeal, you must file 
rhe notice within thirty days of the order dismissing the 
petition. 
Very truly yours, 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
mm 
ODcuffrcg 3 . JJutlrr 
(Clerk 
^tat£ of p a l ] 
£ a l i ^Cakc (flitg, ^ t a l ] 84114 
December 10 , 1991 
jLLi" -p . / 7 
(garbon J{ . |Cail 
(Hi]uf 3Ju»ttre 
^fltr{|2tjcl ^3. Zimmrrartari 
Ms- Kr.istine Christiansen 
Clerk of the Court 
Sixth Judicial District 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Re: Charles W. Webb v. Fred Van Der Veur 
Dear Ms. Christiansen: 
Pursuant to Article VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the 
Utah State constitution, the Utah Supreme Court hereby refers 
the enclosed petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Sixth 
Judicial District for Sanpete County for such disposition as 
the District Court deems appropriate. 
Very truly vouxsf/ 
ii. . / / . - / A 
^A-t -^u, w / 
//! / / 
Vji' 
Geoffrey J'. Butler 
Enc: 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SANPETE COUNTY 
Address: 160 North Main Street, Manti, UT 84642 
Telephone: (801) 835-2131 
Charles W. Webb, 
Petitioner, 
vs, 
NOTICE RE: (1) TRANSFER 
AND (2) HEARING ON MuTIuN 
Case number 10012 
FRED VAN DER VEUR, 
Warden, Central Utah 
Correctional Facility, 
Respondent. 
On December 13, 1991 the above case was received in the 
Sanpete County Clerk's office with a cover letter from the 
Supreme Court Clerk. A copy of the cover letter is attached to 
this Notice and by this reference incorporated herein. 
This Court is providing it's own NOTICE OF THE TRANSFER so 
there is no question about it and so that future filings will 
be proper. For the information or the parties, nidi lings to the-
District Court in Sanpete County should be made to the Sanpete 
County Clerk, 160 North Main Street, Manti, Utah 84642. The 
County Clerk's telephone number is (801) 835-2131. 
0061D 
/* rt*\ -. 
Webb vs. Van Der Veur, 10012 
Notice, Page -2-
On January 15, 1992, at 10:00 A.M. the Court will consider 
the Plaintiff's MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. A copy of 
that Motion is attached hereto and by this reference 
incorDorated herein. 
Dated: _/^±/'19lh '. - W C^U^fU^ 
^--IDavid L. Mower 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a full, true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE RE: (1) TRANSFER AND (2) HEARING 
ON MOTION /to the following, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, 
this ."? -— day of January, 1992. 
Charles W. Webb, 
Central Utah Correctional Facility, 
P.O. Box 550, 
Gunnison, UT 84634 
Utah Attorney General, 
Murray, UT 84107 
Deputy Clerk 
0061D 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
CHARLES WEBB, 
Defendant, 
Case No. 871010419 
TAPED TRANSCRIPT 
BEFORE THE HON. JUDGE GRANT 
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 
November 24, 1987 
APPEARANCES: 
For the State of Utah 
For the Defendant 
James W. Cope 
Deputy County Attorney 
Ms. Remal 
Jim Bradshaw 
Public Defender 
^i ritn.-n / ; .,. 7 „ y 
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THE COURT: (inaudible) 
MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you. As to the progress to 
what I know about Mr. Martindale and his testimony, it 
would be that he was at the home shortly at the time the 
bul — the robberies is alleged to occurred and that that 
evening, that same evening, he left the jurisdiction and I 
would further indicate as to the relevance your Honor, of 
other crimes. If nothing else, I would ask to go into any 
agreements that have been made in terms of immunity for 
those crimes or deferring prosecutions in exchange for the 
information that he provided in this case. Beyond that 
your Honor, his wife has testified that she did not provide 
the information that — that — that went to the father-in-
law, that — that eventually came to the police through, 
what I understand is, this witness' father, and I would ask 
to go into exactly how the police came to be aware of the 
information which his wife has related to the court today 
and also any agreements or arrangements that were made with 
this individual prior to, or subsequent to, that 
information being relayed to the police. I think it's not 
only relevant to this witness' testimony, I think it's also 
relevant to his wife's testimony. His wife has testified, 
I'm entitled to know what kind of deals he's getting. 
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*^?HE COURT: Well, we'll just ask Mr. Cope. Then 
we'll find out as an officer of the court. Has there been 
any immunity, there been any promises made as to the 
testimony of these two individuals? 
MR. COPE: No your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, the next question did you want 
to cover — the previous witness had no discussion which 
really, it was your question allowed him the hearsay that 
her father-in-law's the one who reported it to the police. 
There's certainly nothing to keep you from asking the 
father-in-law, is there? So the information you're seeking 
is available by collateral information. I just — I just 
don't see how you can get a bit of information out of this 
gentleman. As to any of the subsequent events, and 
certainly if you have any suspicions he's involved in the 
perpetration of this particular crime, he's pretty well 
already invoked his rights in that term himself. And 
basically sitting here, in all fairness, it would be, 
unless he really knowingly wants to tell, it would be my 
advice to him not to discuss anything about this particular 
crime. It's an unusual situation because normally under 
these circumstances we're dealing with a witness that's 
called by the State, used by the State, and we have that 
dilemma. 
In this case this witness was not called and 
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used by the State, and in fact, informed by the Court he 
would not be anticipated to be used against the co-
defendant . 
MR. BRADSHAW: In — in that regard, your Honor, 
I think the record should reflect that he was subpoenaed 
and brought here by the State --
THE COURT: No question about that. 
MR. BRADSHAW: — and was only called by the 
defense after he was not called by the State. 
THE COURT: No question that I think the 
defendant's rights have an opportunity to eventually have 
him here. It still doesn't solve the dilemma against self-
incrimination. It's not an issue — I have no problem with 
that, but the fact of the matter is, he wasn't on call by 
the State and that the — the same issue is — I'm even 
trying to figure out if I can appoint counsel to represent 
him. I'm sure we can. Never ever had to appoint counsel 
until a person's charged. I'm sure we can under the 
Miranaa, iz shouldn'r be any problem. And I got: faith in 
the guys that do your substitute work -hat they'd tell him 
net to taiK, so why don't we just ger on with it:. If you 
want to wait for over to tomorrow and hopefully the time 
prevails itself, I don't have any problems dealing with 
this tomorrow, but I — I think it's just an exercise in 
futility. What do you want to do? 
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MR. BRADSHAW: We'd ask -- we'tl ask to have it 
set over to tomorrow your Honor. We can make the 
arrangements if Mr. Cope can make the witness available. 
We can certainly have a talk with Mr. Hill who will contact 
a — a conflict attorney. I can have them contact Mr. Cope 
who can then put them in contact with the witness I'm sure 
by ten o'clock tomorrow. 
MR. COPE: Your Honor, Mr. Martindale, I think, 
had anticipated getting on an airplane this evening and 
returning home with his wife. Ah, we had subpoenaed him 
for today, if the court is continuing these matters and 
he's been called by the defense, I hate to use the term 
"wash my hands of him," cause it's not exactly what we're 
doing, but I just don't feel it's our responsibility to 
house him and — and feed him and get an attorney for him. 
I wonder if there might be someone else who would more 
properly do that. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think it will bankrupt 
the County if they have to pop for a motel. 
j MR. COPE: 
i that, but — 
THE COURT: 
Ah, I just don't — I 
going to come of it. 
whenever you come here 
Oh, I think they're willing to do 
So I don't — that isn't a problem. 
just don't see how anything else is 
We'll come in here tomorrow and 
tomorrow he'll have an attorney that 
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tells him -- I told him not to testify, (inaudible) either 
way. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I think what we need to 
know --
THE COURT: The other alternative is that 
something might happen and Mr. Humphreys and Mr, Webb will 
be languishing for seven more days in the County jail and 
they would have to in the normal processing of this case, 
and I think that's something you have to deal with too, 
MS* REMAL: Well, we can certainly to deal with 
that tomorrow if that arises. 
THE COURT: And even as much as two weeks. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I think what Mr. Bradshaw 
was asking is if — we would need to be able to put the 
conflict: attorney in touch with Mr. Martindale and just 
need to know how — how to do that in order to accomplish 
that in the morning. Can we — 
THE COURT: Well, I presume it would have to be 
done before nine o'clock in the morning, before tne 
busyness of the courts start to gear up. 
MS. REMAL: But can we dc that through you Jim? 
Have --
MR. COPE: Yes, if you'll call my office, we'll 
know where he is. 
MS. REMAL: Okay. 
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THE COURT: I would think"^hat you would have to 
have a conflicts attorney, at Mr. Cope's office somewhere 
around nine, nine fifteen in the morning. 
MS. REMAL: Or we'll at least have one — 
THE COURT: Mr. Cope would have to provide this 
gentleman — 
MS. REMAL: — put a call in. 
THE COURT: — to be there, Mr. Martindale. 
MS. REMAL: That's fine. 
THE COURT: And he can converse with him there. 
MS. REMAL: And what time to you want us to come 
back? At nine thirty, or — 
THE COURT: Well, I have a class at the 
University of Utah until a quarter after. I'll be here 
about nine-thirty. We have about eight matters on the 
calendar tomorrow at nine-thirty and two jury trials, that 
I'm not sure of the statuses. So we'll just have to deal 
with it as we deal with it. 
MS. REMAL: What time — 
THE COURT: (inaudible). Well, it sounds like 
one ijury showing up. 
MS. REMAL: What time will you ask the jail to 
bring out the defendants? We'll be here then. 
THE COURT: I probably won't ask the jail to 
bring out the defendant til sometime after eleven o'clock 
~7~ Colloquy 
1 just — we'll have time for all of this stu^/ to get back 
2 together. 
3 MS. REMAL: Should we report back here at eleven 
4 o'clock, does that suit your calendar? 
5 THE COURT: If you promise not to get lost, til 
6 (inaudible). 
7 MS. REMAL: We won't get lost. 
8 THE COURT: Good. 
9 MS. REMAL: We'll be here. 
10 THE COURT: We'll just have to figure out when to 
11 have the — the defendants brought up from jail. 
12 MR. COPE: Your Honor — 
13 THE COURT: The transportation officer of the day 
14 (inaudible). 
15 MR. COPE: Your Honor, I believe that the witness 
16
 would probably appreciate the court's concession on behalf 
17
 j of nis employer. We informed them that he would be back to 
work tomorrow. 
THE COURT: I'm sure we can give you a note to 
take nome ro your employer indicating that the court 
required (inaudible). No problem. Hopefully I'd like to 
see nim out of here by noon. 
MR. COPE: I'd like to see him out of here 
earlier than that your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, we may, if he refuses to talk, 
18 
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- 8 - Col loquy 
there's no — (inaudible). So, enjoy a free night on the 
County and what the order of events is going to be. If 
he's simply going to refuse to testify, I want to know that 
as soon as possible. If he's going to testify, then 
obviously we're going to have to make some time. 
MR. BRADSHAW: What do you feel — (inaudible) 
that you at least call your (inaudible^, you'll know where 
it is. 
(End of case) 
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